


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20 APRIL 1989



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

***KOMMUNIST***

No 2, January 1989

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# Soviet Union KOMMUNIST

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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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## KOMMUNIST

No 2, January 1989

### Towards a New World Order

18020008a Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian  
No 2, Jan 89 (signed to press 17 Jan 89) pp 3-11

[Article by Vadim Nikolayevich Nekrasov, editor for KOMMUNIST International Relations Department]

[Text] The global community of states and peoples welcomed 1989 with a growing expectation for future major changes and the urgent need for them. Profound changes for the better are taking place in the international area, to which our country is making a substantial, not to say decisive, contribution. The Central Committee Appeal "To the Party, the Soviet People," which was adopted by the CPSU Central Committee plenum in connection with the forthcoming elections for USSR People's Deputies, states the following on the subject of the situation which has developed in the world: "On the basis of the new political thinking nonstandard, innovative approaches to the key problems of international life were found. The logic of reason, good will and constructive dialogue was pitted against the unhealthy and dangerous mentality of confrontation. International tension began to decline and the situation in the world has become calmer and safer." It is thus that the most real prerequisites for mankind's start of a peaceful period in its history are being laid.

Specific developments and progress have been taking place following the start of the implementation of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, and in discussions on other parts of our program for building a nuclear-free world. The daring and impressive decisions made by the Soviet leadership in recent weeks provided an energetic impetus to the start of a fruitful multilateral discussion on significantly reducing armed forces and conventional armaments.

World events convincingly prove that a time has come for everyone to change his way of thinking and take a new look at the foundations of the world order which has developed over the past 40 years.

Naturally, it would be thoughtless to complacently rely on the idea that the triumph of positive prophecies has become programmed and on the inevitability that the walls of bias, mistrust and suspicion will crumble. Let us recall the history of the INF Treaty—how unwilling and gradual was the retreat of its enemies, such as those in the American Senate or NATO circles, surrendering one fortification after another only under the pressure of life, yielding to the judicious thinking the USSR and the pressure of the public in their own countries, or else the uninterrupted sequence of violations of agreements on settling the Afghan problem, the recent anti-Libyan actions of the U.S. military and other obstacles erected on the path to agreement. Let us remember that the

processes of improving the international climate are still developing quite unevenly, encountering unabated opposition. This is necessary in order not to fall into the trap of illusions. We can expect new achievements and hopes as well as new problems, concerns and worries.

Nonetheless, a substantial warming of the climate is obvious. Readiness to cooperate for the sake of solving common problems and seeking solutions to the impasses of tension and the arms race, which has increased everywhere, is obvious. This was manifested particularly tangibly over the past few months.

What was the immediate reason for this? Perhaps the most adequate answer to this question was provided at the November USSR Supreme Soviet Session, where it was pointed out that the new democratic aspect of our country is becoming an important moral and political factor in improvements in the international situation. The resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, the initiated implementation of the political reform in Soviet society and the beneficial influence of glasnost on all aspects of life are encountering a corresponding reflection in the nature of relations in the world arena, on the intergovernmental, social or personal levels.

It must be pointed out that for a rather lengthy period of time the right-wing political forces in the West and all those who, one way or another, were able to extract benefits and profits from the cold war and confrontation were able, despite the lively interest shown by the public in Soviet perestroika, to maintain moods of mistrust concerning its nature and objectives. Repeatedly the economic reform in the USSR was proclaimed unattainable. Meanwhile, critical publications in Soviet mass information media were extensively used to "prove" that, allegedly, as a political practice, socialism is "incurably ill" and that as theory it had lost its creditability. Some people maliciously tried to present the changes taking place in our country as the Kremlin's aspiration "to make its war machine more economical."

Surpassing all forecasts, the energetic steps in the radical political reform in the Soviet Union noticeably changed the overall mindset of Western public opinion. They disarmed many opponents of perestroika and dispersed the skeptical attitude of other. The advance credit of trust and support on the part of the broad world public circles, enjoyed by our country, was largely repaid. Thus, it was actually on behalf of the sensible wing of Western politicians, that G.-D. Genscher, FRG minister of foreign affairs, said: "I recommend to anyone who finds it difficult to abandon his customary view of the Soviet Union, who confuses his concept of the enemy with the real perception of the world, and who believes that one should always assume the worst in intercourse with the Soviet Union, to modernize his views and, together with us, to see the historical opportunity which is offered in the new processes occurring in the Soviet Union and to make use of the same." The West German minister was

referring to the opportunity for maintaining international stability and interest on the part of the global community in the anticipated development of the situation.

The new moods are noticeably turning into political actions. They were manifested above all in the nature and broadening of the framework of bilateral relations between countries belonging to different social systems. In particular, summit dialogues held in the past few months by the Soviet leadership with representatives of Austria, Italy, Brazil, the FRG, India, France and the United States, as well as a number of other contacts, and the establishment of numerous relations on the business, scientific, cultural, humanitarian and other levels were all confirmations of the fact that, as they assume a systematic nature, such types of interaction are having a major positive influence within a wide international context as well.

Nonetheless, the task of consolidating and intensifying the initiated process of renovation of the international atmosphere requires a corresponding multilateral interaction. Unquestionably, the dialogue which ensures the normal and constructive course of this process, requires the constant and active participation of all countries and parts of the world. Yet the views and statements of some governmental and political leaders in different countries occasionally indicate a dissatisfaction with the fact that, for a variety of reasons, at the present exceptionally important stage, at times they seem to be as though outside the main problems of global politics.

The need to strengthen world stability and the dynamic nature of international relations formulate, in its full magnitude, the task of ensuring the practical manifestation of the inevitable fact that all of us, all peoples on earth, are members of a single family and part of a single civilization. To rely on the internationalization of the dialogue and the process of talks so that, as Lenin said, "Each nation can solve the problem of the destinies of all mankind" (see "*Poln. Sobr. Soch.*" [Complete Collected Works], vol 39, p 328) is the principal summation reached by the Soviet leadership in its study of the global processes which are gathering strength and in the course of its participation in international politics.

More than 4 decades ago, through the efforts of the United Nations, which defended, in a mortal clash with fascism, the democratic and humane interests of our civilization, a universal organization was created, which could express the interest of different countries and merge their efforts—United Nations. In our days, when the universal human factor has become the banner of the struggle for the survival of the human species, it is as though UN activities have acquired a new meaning. UN initiatives and actions are becoming increasingly substantive. The aspiration to contribute in all possible ways to the revival of its importance, based on the initial objectives which were laid by the USSR and its allies in

the anti-Hitlerite coalition in the charter of this organization, and the desire to make a contribution to the enhancement of its possibilities were the foundations for the decision taken by the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and head of the Soviet state to pay a historical visit to the United Nations, and his 7 December speech at the 43rd General Assembly.

The events which have occurred in the world since then, which can be directly linked to the political results of the trip and the broadest possible response everywhere to M.S. Gorbachev's U.N. speech, as well as to the meetings with the American leadership he held in New York, unquestionably prove that his trip was an act of high international importance.

The Soviet leader's UN speech stirred the world and drew the attention of the global public to the USSR, once again focusing it on the conceptual views on prospects of global development. The new thinking, as observers noted, spread further.

This means that the objective of the speech by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, mentioned in its introductory part, was attained: "The role of the Soviet Union in global affairs is known. Taking into consideration the revolutionary perestroika taking place in our country, which contains a tremendous potential for peace and international cooperation, we are now particularly interested in being accurately understood." He pointed out the intention to share his thoughts with the participants in this most authoritative organization in the world and with the representatives of the global community of nations, and informed them of the new important decisions made in Moscow.

Strictly speaking, the main content of the new political thinking is already familiar to the world public from the book "*Perestroika and New Thinking For Our Country and the Entire World*," which is well known in the West. It was repeatedly clarified in public speeches by Soviet leaders in the course of their meetings with foreign political personalities. This pertains to the imperative nature of the need to protect human civilization in the face of the threat of nuclear annihilation and to draw practical conclusions from the acceptance of the variety and interdependence of the world and the strict respect for the rights of each nation to make a free choice relative to its destiny, and realizing the impossibility of providing a military solution to disputes among governments, the importance of seeking a balance of interests, and so on. The fullest possible consideration of the variety of such interests and the priority of universal human values and conversion from confrontation to dialogue, as the main form of international relations, as well as other components of new political thinking, have not simply become part of the international pool of ideas in circulation but have also contributed in the past period to making noticeable positive changes in the global situation.



The contemporary world is changing at a headlong pace. The openness of the new political thinking to anything new emphasizes the specific nature of today's world and outlines the most likely trends in its development, making the Soviet conceptual platform consistent with the changing circumstances and enabling us to single out the facets which are most consistent with the requirements of our time. The new vision of the world is not closed but is being steadily enriched with new concepts. That is why a noteworthy feature in the speech by the Soviet leader was, above all, the relevance of his philosophical approach to basic problems and the main sensitive areas of the contemporary situation. Justifiably, this speech was assessed as a new comprehensive presentation of the Soviet doctrine of global developments.

What aspects in this approach could be singled out and given priority today?

Above all, they pertain to the clearly formulated idea that the deployment of social forces in the world and the concepts, which are the result of the new realities, of the nature and criteria of progress, make it possible to formulate on the strictly practical level the task of eliminating military and coercive forms in relations among countries and peoples, replacing them with forms of political and legal resolution of contradictions and conflicts. The new thinking makes it possible to solve problems which previously seemed insoluble: solving political problems by strictly political means, and human problems exclusively by human means.

This also involves an evaluation of the uniqueness of the present historical time, when the disorderly and uncontrolled approach to mankind, which leads to an impasse, must be replaced by the ability to shape and guide international processes in such a way as to preserve civilization and make the world safe for everyone, as well as better adapted to leading a normal existence. Noteworthy in this connection is the prospect, as earmarked in the speech, of creating a new world order by seeking a universal consensus, i.e., finding universally acceptable compromise approaches which would not violate anyone's vital interests. As has been pointed out, the foundations for such consensus will be found in the further growth of the interdependence among the different components of our civilization.

It was on such prepared grounds that the thought was laid of the variety existing within the contemporary world as a factor of reciprocal enrichment and attraction. This variety is indeed great in the economic, political, social, cultural and other areas. The world is advancing not toward a kind of multipolar condition, about which Western political experts like to speculate, but toward a pluralism which is natural for our new times, which presumes equality, and which can be achieved only on the basis of balanced interests. Hence the need for eliminating prejudice and for tolerance, openness and honesty in international politics.

However, the fierce objections formulated by the extreme right-wing camp to the idea of cooperation among countries and peoples, which could be described as "cocreativity" and "codevelopment," drew universal attention. This was perfectly natural. Particularly strong in the area of possibilities provided by such cooperation, are the accretions remaining from the period of intensified ideologizing of foreign policy, and intensifying the confrontational nature of relations among countries with different social systems. Nonetheless, the time during which defining ways of economic and social development was limited to national boundaries or domestic social systems, is in the past. Peaceful coexistence among countries at the present stage, the speech notes, requires a new **quality** of interaction among countries and sociopolitical trends, regardless of ideological or other differences.

Mary McGrory, the WASHINGTON POST columnist, wrote, in summing up her impressions of the speech by the Soviet leader, that he offered the nations a "plan for saving the planet and democratizing the world." We agree with this, for it is a question of the most important suggestions on the restructuring of international relations and their democratization, humanizing and internationalization, subordinate to universal human interests.

Foreign observers agree that the conceptual, the philosophical platform of international development and the political ideas and packet of specific and thoroughly considered and developed detailed proposals and initiatives presented in the speech by the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman, the importance of which outstrip any other suggestion presented by the Western mass information media, have made a tremendous impression. Unquestionably, the focal point in the set of practical suggestions, aimed at encouraging the solving a wide range of problems which are cause of the greatest concern in the world today, was the decision of the Soviet leadership to reduce the size of the USSR Armed Forces and the amount of conventional armaments, including significant reductions outside national borders, which is a decisive and radical step.

The following question arises: What were the considerations which dictated such a broad unilateral good-will action? Furthermore, to what extent could it influence the global balance of forces, which is still largely resting on strategic parity? For example, the number of tanks reduced by the Soviet side is the equivalent of approximately 30 U.S. tank divisions, and the reduced strength of the personnel may be compared to the size of the entire Bundeswehr of the FRG.

The Soviet actions became a major step toward the practical shaping of a qualitatively new model of comprehensive security on earth, consistent with current world conditions and realities. They contributed to a

turn from the principle of superarmament to the principle of sensible defense sufficiency. However, we should not downgrade the difficulties of the practical implementation of this new principle, which includes not only a reciprocal reduction in armed forces and armaments but also maintaining strategic parity on a lower level and equal security of the sides, as well as substantial changes in the nature of their military activities and structure of armed forces, all of this exclusively based on a defensive military doctrine.

This involves a tremendous number of difficult problems. For example, we cannot ignore the fact that the United States and its NATO allies are currently relying in the building of their armed forces on quality parameters, on so-called high accuracy weapons which are being increasingly assigned to solving problems which were previously assigned to nuclear weapons. Consequently, in formulating the question of asserting the dominant role of the principle of sensible sufficiency we must discuss the reciprocal elimination of the offensive potential of either side.

The Soviet people, who still remember the tragic experience of June 1941, as well as our allies and friends throughout the world ask themselves the following: Is this unilateral action taken by the USSR in reducing armed forces and armaments a risky measure which could cause real harm to our security today or tomorrow?

Let us look at the military-political situation in the world, as it appears today. It has nothing even remotely resembling the alarming prewar atmosphere of the end of the 1930s. Furthermore, one of its characteristic features is, unquestionably, a certain lowering of the threat of a possible major military clash, nuclear in particular. The most important prerequisite of the new political thinking—the understanding that there can be no winner in a nuclear war and that, by virtue of its catastrophic consequences, it cannot not be considered an extension of politics by other means—is increasingly spreading in the West. The United States has acknowledged that a nuclear war, be it “total” or “limited,” must not be allowed. Naturally, reasons to speak of the lifting of the nuclear threat are not being provided as yet by virtue of the existence of huge stockpiles of mass destruction weapons, as well as the attachment of Western leaders to the dangerous “containment” doctrine. According to the *BOSTON GLOBE*, however, it is a fact that in the West as well today “nuclear weapons are considered less useful than was assumed by some strategists several years ago, when talk on waging nuclear war was fashionable in Washington.”

As a whole, furthermore, thinking in terms of military categories, one may say, is gradually becoming unfashionable. “...Broad-scale wars among countries have virtually come to an end ever since their most experienced participants—the European countries—stopped fighting with each other in 1945,” is the view expressed by the

London *ECONOMIST*. Indeed, in today's Europe, with its developed nuclear power and chemical industries war, whatever variant it may adopt, would mean turning the entire continent into a desert. Already gained international experience has substantially corrected ideas on the possibilities of power politics, something which, understandably, has not been ignored by the more soberly thinking politicians and strategists in the West.

Today, after numerous contacts between heads of states and governments and foreign policy departments of countries with different social systems have taken place over the past few months, the unquestionably predominant view that a major turn for the better has taken place in the overall climate of international relations has become unquestionably prevalent in broad international public circles. Under these circumstances, a priority criterion in assessing the unilateral steps announced by the USSR is the following question: Under the new situation, is it necessary to act on the basis of the old models, or has the time come to draw practical conclusions from such changes and thereby lead the world toward further stabilization? Such were the conclusions that were made, based on the existing historical asymmetry in the armaments and structure of armed forces of the military-political groups which have been opposing each other for 4 decades. It was an asymmetry, the existence of which had been neglected for such a long time in the course of unsuccessful attempts to solve the problems raised by military rivalry through the “wedge versus wedge” method.

The unilateral reduction in Soviet military personnel and various types of armaments, and the formulation of specific plans, the implementation of which the Soviet Union intends to carry out within a short time, thus releasing hundreds of thousands of workers for the country's national economy, would make it possible to reduce defense expenditures. At the same time, it could provide an impetus for new and significant breakthroughs in continuing the reduction of armaments, which we were unable to achieve in the past year.

What will the West bring to the expected talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe? Judging by all available information, for the time being there is by no means unanimity within the ranks of the North Atlantic Alliance as to the approach to the forthcoming talks with the Warsaw Pact. However, the number of supporters of the demand that the Western powers adopt a thoughtful and honest position is growing. On the other hand, there are numerous opponents of a practical approach based on equal security, both among those who are deliberately continuing to support in a variety of ways the concepts of the cold war period, as well as, let us say, those who are honestly mistaken, trapped by the concept of security typical of the pre-nuclear world.

All in all, we believe that those people in the West who claim that the world has parted with the cold war are right. However, this parting is by no means taking place smoothly and painlessly.

World affairs cannot change for the better without the positive development of Soviet-American relations. The fact that the international public has been able, of late, to sigh with relief has been largely the result of the shift in the nature and atmosphere of relations between Moscow and Washington. This conclusion, which was reached through personal experience, was heard once again from the UN rostrum in the Soviet leader's speech.

Why conceal it, both sides bear a great deal of responsibility for the situation which developed on the planet. Today, however, the situation has begun to change decisively: attachment to one's social system or ideological concepts has not prevented either side from realizing the concern of the other with an entire set of universal, global problems, which provides an opportunity for the development of cooperation in a great variety of areas.

As the Soviet leader said, both countries have already gone through the primary training in reciprocal understanding and in finding ways to untangle the complex knots in their own and the common interest. They were able to draw proper conclusions based on their responsibility, and to become the first to reach an agreement on reducing and physically destroying some of the biggest nuclear missile arsenals they had stockpiled. Despite the seeming attraction for military secrecy which dominates the world, they nonetheless were able to lay the foundations and begin to develop a system of reciprocal control both over the destruction as well as restrictions and prohibitions in arms production.

Bearing in mind also the latest travels of the Soviet leader abroad and, as a whole, his peace-making activities in the past period and contribution to the turn taking place in international relations, in numerous public opinion surveys and assessments by mass information media, M.S. Gorbachev was named as the most popular governmental leader of 1988. The world political and social leaders have accurately rated his role in providing a guiding impetus to the disarmament and detente processes and in stabilizing Soviet-American relations on a new basis.

As to the latter, it could be assumed that history will give its proper due also to M.S. Gorbachev's partner in the talks—U.S. President Reagan—and to his ability to grasp the nature of various global problems and his aspiration to prevent, to use the popular American expression, a "nuclear Armageddon." As Marx once noted, the acceleration or slow-down of the overall course of development "greatly depends on... 'random factors,' which include a 'factor' such as the character of the people heading the movement" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 33, p 175). Clearly, this description is entirely applicable to assessing the changes which have been experienced in Soviet-American relations since 1985.

Naturally, one cannot arbitrarily interpret the views of the head of the executive branch in the United States or invest in his declarations extraneous ideas. However, we have no right to ignore, for example, Ronald Reagan's statement at one of his last press conferences, which drew universal attention. He said that he did not exclude the possibility for the United States and the Soviet Union once again to become allies, as they were in World War II. Allies in what? Obviously, in the struggle for the solution of global problems which are besieging mankind.

Now, when the power in Washington has changed hands, it is most pertinent to ask the following: Are there truly qualitative changes occurring in Soviet-American relations which let us claim that they are entering a new stage? Let us not hasten to draw any whatsoever final conclusion. The equation involves such a large number of various factors and vectors of different power as well as conflicting trends and subjective features that the answer would be probably strictly tentative had the pressure in favor of taking decisive international steps to prevent a nuclear or ecological collapse not increased so tangibly. In his UN speech the Soviet leader assured the world public that the future U.S. administration, headed by George Bush, will find in the Soviet Union a partner who is ready, without long pauses or back steps, to continue the dialogue in the spirit of realism, openness and good will, with an aspiration toward specific results. Following his New York meeting with Reagan and Bush, he expressed the confidence that Soviet-American relations will strengthen and broaden "taking into consideration our responsibility to the other nations."

The possibility of putting a final end to the cold war between the United States and the USSR exists. Its implementation requires perspicacity and courage. It requires, above all, the firm resolve to proceed on the basis of superior interests which are both national and universal. Efforts, in some cases substantial, must be made to come out of the political rut established in the course of decades. The psychological readiness displayed of late by the American and Soviet peoples to establish new relations between them, manifested particularly clearly of late, can support such steps. The reciprocal movement toward each other, the predisposition and the desire to cooperate are growing on both sides, eliminating mistrust and prejudice.

The tragic events in Armenia forced the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman to interrupt his trip to the United States and to postpone forthcoming visits to Cuba and Great Britain. The interference of the elements thus somehow unwittingly restricted the international political scale and range of planned foreign policy action. At the same time, the earthquake in Armenia, which took away tens of thousands of lives and caused tremendous destruction, drew with its tragedy the attention of all mankind and suddenly emphatically illumined an aspect of the spiritual climate which is being asserted today on

earth, something which was not considered by a number of political strategists: the rapidly gathering strength of solidarity among people, nations and the global community in the face of challenges encountered by mankind in its complex interrelationship with the natural environment.

The compassion and desire to come to the aid to people in trouble, which were displayed throughout the world, provided clear proof of the fact that universal human interests are powerfully proclaiming their existence, forcing people and governments to set political or ideological considerations aside. It was also noted throughout the world, with a feeling of deep satisfaction that, having widely opened its borders to international aid to the victims of the earthquake for the first time in history, the Soviet Union displayed another facet of its glasnost and openness and confirmed its loyalty to the concept of the indivisibility of the global community. The London TIMES noted with full justification that the Armenian tragedy made it possible to implement some of the principles presented in the United Nations on the subject of the new era of international cooperation.

Demands addressed to the leaders of the Western world to "rise to the level" reached by the Soviet leader in his programmatic speech are persistently continuing to be heard today. What makes such demands even more legitimate is the fact that the problems encountered by the nations are frequently growing and becoming aggravated faster than political reactions to them. Consequently, in order to put an end to the arms race, halt the degradation of the environment and achieve a balanced global economic process, we need the fastest possible ascent to the new level of international interaction, as proposed by the Soviet Union. As to our country, as was reconfirmed in the CPSU Central Committee address "To the Party and the Soviet People," it will persistently aspire to achieve a radical improvement in international relations and to make serious progress in disarmament and conversion of the defense industry to a peaceful track.

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**Political Leadership—From Word to Deeds**  
*18020008b Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian*  
*No 2, Jan 89 (signed to press 17 Jan 89) pp 12-21*

[Interview with Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov, first secretary of the Krasnodar CPSU Kraykom, conducted by N. Tyurin]

[Text] The level of activities of each party organization and the maturity of party workers must be assessed precisely according to the ability to implement party policy in a new fashion, using the methods of ideological-political and organization work among the masses. This conclusion, which was drawn at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and codified in one of its resolutions, is

increasingly being put to practical use today. Understandably, each party committee solves the most crucial and complex problem of mastering political methods of leadership in its own way, on the basis of existing possibilities and in accordance with specific local features. Such a variety of approaches is consistent with the spirit of our time and a prerequisite for the creative solution of the set of problems which arise in this area. The first secretary of the Krasnodar CPSU Kraykom describes in this article the experience gained by the communists in the Kuban and the components of the specific circumstances which dictate the main trend of the quests.

[Tyurin] Ivan Kuzmich, we are talking at a time when the new year has still not managed to dislodge in our minds last year's results. A great deal of new developments were manifested in Krasnodar Kray in the areas of management and organization of production, strengthening its ties with science, wages, and social life, in which democratic means are being increasingly applied in solving pressing problems. A great deal is also changing in party work itself. The results are shown in the growth of basic indicators in industry and agriculture, positive changes in the sociopolitical climate and a certain democratization of internal party life. However, at the recent kray accountability and election party conference there was repeated criticism of the secretaries and department heads of the CPSU Kraykom and the leadership of local and central economic departments. A great deal of self-criticism was also voiced. In short, there was a tonality of worry and, in some cases, major concern about the specific course of affairs....

[Polozkov] This as well, I believe, is one of the most essential features of today's reality. The people are ever more decisively parting with the stereotypes of civil indifference and the notorious "unanimous approval." But let there also be less enthusiasm and emotion about the growing restoration of a condition which is natural and which is the only possible normal state of affairs for our society, in which man perceives social and governmental affairs as his own. It is true that on this subject many statements were made in the past as well. I believe, however, that it is only now that we are beginning to sense this quality which, to begin with, determines the atmosphere at meetings and debates and, second, begins to influence the area of labor practices. This is what matters most.

As to the critical and essentially personal remarks addressed at party and economic managers in the course of the conference, they were by and large accurate. Indeed, the number of new approaches, initiatives and experiments in all economic sectors in the kray is increasing rapidly and so is the number of cases in which, in one sector or another, the people who have applied the principles of cost accounting are achieving impressive successes. Nonetheless, these sectors and segments have still not merged in a single stream. They have not become a system of clearly functioning mechanisms. Frequent and vexing breakdowns occur in the

work of industrial enterprises, construction projects and the agroindustrial complex. This is essentially caused by the worsened situation in material and technical supplies to industry. Hence there have been no tangible changes on the store shelves or in the social area. Understandably, such a gap between the tasks of perestroyka and the actual current results in daily life trigger in the people a sharp critical reaction to the still unsurmounted faults in economic management. In some cases, and naturally I am not referring to the party conference where, in the general view, a constructive and mature discussion on perestroyka was held, this critical mood may develop into negative feelings and turn into individual skepticism which, triggered by the lack of satisfaction of material and social needs, leads to demagoguery.

[Tyurin] I read in one of the kray's newspapers that the audience unanimously, "like one," left a lesson in economics, stating that henceforth no one needed this type of training. Is this not a significant situation?

[Polozkov] Yes, this event which took place at the Novorossiysk Ship Repair Yards, is food for thought. It is a fact that so far we have been unable to reach a proper standard of universal economic and legal training and seen to it that every worker, kolkhoz member and specialist acquire a clear idea of the advantages of working in a new style. Furthermore, daily practical experience frequently sharply clashes with the ideas which are presented to the students by lecturers and propagandists. Here is a rather typical example: officially, the collective of the Krasnodar Compressors Plant converted to the new economic management conditions. However, even after 10 months, a survey at the enterprise indicated that 78 percent of the workers noticed no changes whatsoever in the organization of labor and wages; two-thirds of the respondents were dissatisfied with the existing bonus system. Understandably, such situations demand a most thorough study and a profound explanation of the reasons for this, for it is high time for all of us to realize that the people develop their view of life not on the basis of statistics but of real changes in their working and living conditions.

Or else let us consider the structural changes which were made at the Krasnodar Industrial-Commercial Clothing Association. In the past the autonomous labor collectives of the enterprises were deprived of their production-financial and legal autonomy. Now they are rightless from the viewpoint of the possibility of handling their earned funds. All accounts with suppliers and consumers pass through the head factory. A similar management structure has been created in the "Krasnodaravtotrans," "Krasnodaravtodor," and "Krasnodarstroy," the sections of the North Caucasian Railroad, the detachments of the North Caucasian Civil Aviation Administration and many other kray departments. Who needs this kind of restructuring? Only the bureaucratic apparatus, which is defending its customary position in economic life and which is presenting changes in labels as perestroyka.

The party kraykom believes that the components of the present situation are found in the kray's economy. In plain terms, so far it has been unable to rebuff the covert or overt opposition to the reform in economic relations displayed by numerous economic management authorities. A number of people empowered to make decisions are trying, as the saying goes, to press on the gas and brake pedals at the same time. Generally speaking, these are difficult and conflicting times, not only in the economic area. Whatever facet of reality we consider, is it obvious everywhere that, for the time being, the opposition to perestroyka processes and the factors which, in their totality, form the obstruction mechanism, have not been surmounted. And even when we say that each one of us has many features which took shape in the past and that one should begin perestroyka with oneself, in my view, we must remember that we have reached the point where everyone must make a final choice. We must either vote in favor of that which April brought to the party's and country's life or else the upper hand will be assumed by indifference, sluggishness and maneuvering between appeals and reality.

[Tyurin] Where do we look for our mainstay?

[Polozkov] I believe that the answer here cannot be simple. It is literally everywhere. The party and its healthy forces have started a tremendous project in renovating our society. The threads of leadership in the most important and essential perestroyka processes lead to the ruling party and its committees. Delegates to the party congress, the Central Committee plenums and the 19th Party Conference discussed with growing persistence the need to master political work methods and to abandon more rapidly and decisively "all-embracing" command and management by figure indicators and instead face the people and turn to real action. This, precisely, is the focal point of difficulties and hopes. And if today we are not satisfied with the pace of perestroyka, if we are concerned with the half-way and inconsistency of one reform step or another, this means that the level of party-political work is inadequate and that so is the professionalism of the specific party committee, its aktiv and its apparatus. This is related, above all, to the mastery of political management methods.

[Tyurin] However, could we reduce to a single reason the broadest possible range of contemporary socioeconomic, ecological, national, moral and many other problems?

[Polozkov] I would not like to be seen as a person who is trying to reduce to file cards the entire variety of life's colors. Unquestionably, reality is 100 times richer than relations between the party committee and the primary party organizations, labor collectives, and so on. These are relations expressed in organizational structures and forms of direct or indirect subordination. However, as to the ideological and political influence on the course of perestroyka in its crucial aspects, it would be difficult to overestimate the role of the party committee, above all from the viewpoint of actions which purposefully rally

and disseminate everything that is best and progressive which existed in human affairs in the past or was created only yesterday. Under such circumstances the question urgently arises of rejecting once and for all the command-administrative management methods and converting to political ones.

[Tyurin] Ivan Kuzmich, this is not the first time that you address yourself to problems of political work methods. Of late this topic has become increasingly discussed in party kraykom documents, the press, and local radio and television programs. Last October the kray CPSU committee held a plenum to discuss "The Task of Kray Party Committees In Mastering Political Work Methods Under Contemporary Conditions." It is noteworthy that, to a certain extent, the meaning of the very concept of "political methods" is changing. The change here is from emotional but very general statements, such as "understanding one's greatest possible responsibility for organizing the implementation of party decisions" to specifically more concrete and meaningful definitions. What caused this?

[Polozkov] I believe that the evolution was the result of nothing other than an attempt to put general party stipulations to practical use. The problem of political management methods could hardly be considered as being theoretically developed, although Lenin's legacy includes a tremendous number of thoughts on this account and examples of brilliant use of the arsenal of party-political work. Today we lack an overall concept of political style of activities which would take into consideration the contemporary level of social life and awareness. Naturally, we find some useful chapters in textbooks, monographs and encyclopedic articles. Here as well, however, as a rule there is a great deal of scholasticism and few specifics. Furthermore, the classical definitions of policy based on the concept of "state," "the masses," "interests," and "power," although unquestionably true in essence, exist in the perception of the ordinary party worker somehow outside his daily concerns. This makes it necessary to seek through home-grown means, as we say, a way of finding approaches consistent with the present. I know that in the post-April period serious work on the interpretation of creative ideas has been taking place in a number of party organizations, thus intensifying the process of their practical implementation. Therefore, in this case we are obviously not alone. I believe that your journal as well could make a more essential contribution to mastering political work methods, the more so now when the so-called administrative-pressure or command methods have been both political and organizational demoted and many party workers, including experienced ones, are confused, to put it bluntly. Yet today, more than ever, we need specific actions.

I would like to express a few ideas of my own on this matter. Political management methods are, above all, those which are addressed to man, to his awareness and his inner behavioral motivations and actions. These are

methods which presume the ability to implement the party's policy through the party members, using persuasion and relying on democratic principles, taking extensively and permanently into consideration public opinion and the interests of the various social and age groups and political ethnic features. Finally, these are methods aimed at making scientific decisions, rejecting arbitrariness and incompetent interference in any practical area or discussions "from positions of superiority" with the social organizations.

It may appear as though nothing essentially new is included in this list. I believe that it is not even a question of a list but of the proper understanding of these features and the implementation of its components. This is the main difficulty which faces practical workers. Nor do we claim that our ideas are comprehensive and complete. The main purpose of discussions at the party's kraykom plenum and at meetings held in the urban and rural party organizations was to classify the present requirements concerning the party in such a way that they become an interrelated set. What was the situation until very recently? The sectorial principle in the structure of the party committee apparatus dictated not only the method of action but of thinking as well. And although in the propaganda, science, and culture departments the humanitarian concept could still be found, the word "man" in the industry, agriculture and construction departments was rarely heard. Yet work with people, through people and for people and not for percentage figures must become the main objective of anyone who has chosen the field of party-political work as his profession. This is equally needed by every party member.

I do not wish in the least to depict matters as though our party organization has surmounted past errors and blunders "entirely and totally," and is making full use of the constructive potential of perestroika. It is true that we completed the reorganization of the party committee apparatus, from the rayon to the kray, elected party kraykom commissions and a control-auditing commission. We are formulating the functional obligations and new structures of the party committee. For the time being, however, these are merely the prerequisites for quality changes in party work, in our entire way of life.

[Tyurin] Prerequisites? But was there not in recent years in the Kuban a turn toward a more efficient economic and dynamic development of the social area and an improvement in the moral atmosphere? Here are, for instance, some data which reflect positive processes: Compared with 1985, last year industry increased its output by more than 900 million rubles. Production of consumer goods increased by more than 650 million rubles. The average annual grain production reached 877,000 tons; meat increased by 23 percent and milk by 14. Good results were achieved in social amenities and housing construction as well. Or else, let us consider the following facts: in the course of the accountability and election campaign slightly less than one-half of the party

organization secretaries were new. Many of them were previously rated as "inconvenient," as obstinate people. Fifty-eight percent of the primary and 63 percent of the shop party organization secretaries and 45 percent of the party group organizers were elected from a choice of two or more candidates. Are these not reasons for optimism?

[Polozkov] If we look at some indicators in the economy and external characteristics of the democratization processes, such a reason does exist. It reveals the major efforts made by the kray party organization and the great contribution of all the people in the Kuban. Today, however, we must go much farther and deeper. Can we continue to tolerate a situation in which, along with definite successes, we have a drop in capital returns, and material and energy resources are being used inefficiently, as in the past? In speaking of the agroindustrial complex, we must mention the fact that in the kray processing the output of fields and livestock farms is extremely neglected. Although since the beginning of the 5-year period capital investments in excess of half a billion rubles have been made, or as much as was invested in the entire previous 5-year period, the pace of renovation in the processing industry does not suit us in the least. It is precisely for that reason that we continue to lose as much as 35 percent of valuable, labor-intensive and already paid for output. There was a time when such a misfortune was concealed behind "report" figures and behind ovations and the rustle of challenge banners. I hope that this time has gone into the past forever.

Today many problems exist in the development of the democratic principles of our lives, intraparty problems above all. Here as well there is still a tendency to emphasize quantitative indicators and to boast of some examples taken out of the context of reality. For example, at one of the meetings of the kraykom bureau, the first secretary of the Slavyansk City Party Committee described quite picturesquely the way their plenums were now being held, managers elected, and so on. However, when members of the buro asked the speaker why the stores in the city were empty, why was the potential of suburban farms used so poorly and what had the gorkom, as an agency for political management, done for democratically to encourage the revival of the economy, there was essentially no answer.

In considering such situations, we reach the conclusion that the reflex which became customary in previous decades of presenting wishful thinking for reality, simplifying problems and following a straight line to our objectives is still deeply seated in us. However, that which we reject or leave "for later," mandatorily boomerangs and extracts a revenge for its neglect. For the sake of brevity of let me quote a single example of the accountability and election kray party conference. The process of raising the prices of mass consumer goods and reducing their variety did not bypass us. In particular and to our shame inexpensive sweets disappeared in the kray, such as confetti, gingerbread, macaroons, and jam. In this connection, together with the kray agroprom, the

kray executive committee assigned to the enterprises control figures for the production of the necessary foodstuffs. At this point, the labor collective councils, exercising their rights, refused to produce unprofitable goods worth 600 million rubles. The same occurred at the bread-baking enterprises and the stores of the consumer cooperative. The executive committee was forced, on the authority of the kray soviet session, to order the production of the items needed by the population, in the necessary quantities....

You can see the tight knot that is created by yesterday's and today's problems. We are quite concerned by the thought the enterprises which were afflicted by such collective egotism employ many thousands of party members, have a functioning system of political and economic training and apply many other traditional forms of party influence. What is the actual efficiency of our work? Is it not time to take a close look at its criteria and adopt as the basic measure of people's activities the views held by the party members and their line of political behavior?

[Tyurin] We know that at the start of the 1980s a situation developed in Krasnodar Kray marked by widespread thefts and corruption and violations of basic standards of cadre work. A great deal has been done in recent years to correct this situation and to restore in the people faith in socialist legality and in our moral foundations. Criminals were sent to jail and their accomplices were punished but, Ivan Kuzmich, you must agree that the roots of the weeds are frequently much stronger and widespread than the visible stem....

[Polozkov] You are mentioning something which concerns us greatly. Yes, the period of stagnation had a severe impact on the cadre situation in the kray. Contributory factors to this were both the familiar subjective ones and the objectively increased crime-prone nature of our resort area. The main feature in the efforts to improve the situation was and will remain political, i.e., the elimination of the nutritive grounds for crime and abuse, for that same root system which, if not destroyed, could grow ever new shoots. Although in 1984-1986 more than 5,500 people in the kray were expelled from the party, and more than 1,500 among them were put on trial, the number of all personal cases which were reviewed was much higher. We must put an end not only to direct distortions of party and juridical standards but also to disgusting phenomena, such as connivance and reciprocal guarantees. In December 1986 the kraykom departments and the party control commission drafted an analytical note on the fact that some personnel of party, soviet and law enforcement authorities were helping violators of party and state discipline to avoid responsibility, and that tolerance was shown toward negative manifestations in some kray party organizations. We considered the note at the kraykom buro meeting and published this document in the press,



naming dozens of names. This resolution was then discussed by the primary party organizations and CPSU gorkoms and kraykoms. Naturally, the proper disciplinary measures were taken.

However, this is only one aspect of the matter, which I would describe as active therapy. As to the foundations of the political health of each party organizations, the only reliable means here are glasnost and democracy, applied not pro forma but substantively. We addressed ourselves to the party public when the urgent need arose for appointing decent, principle-minded and competent managers whose personal example should correct and heal the damage caused to the party by people motivated by greed and by careerists. We were not wrong. We saw the practical value of Lenin's thought of the "miraculous means" which begins to work if every party member actively joins in the common project. Many of the people who were given responsible jobs during those difficult times have justified the trust of their comrades.

Let me briefly discuss the results of the accountability and election campaign in the kray's party organizations. To begin with, judging by the way the conferences were held, we have substantially improved our standards of democracy and criticism. Clearly, we have somewhat matured in this respect. The communists spoke sharply and energetically, raising the most sensitive and difficult questions. As a rule, the tone was set by the rank-and-file party members and not the scheduled speakers, as was the case in the past. Some 22 to 26 delegates took the floor at each conference. All told, 3,500 critical remarks and suggestions were made, addressed at party, soviet and economic authorities on all levels. People are now trusting that their voice and opinion are of real value. Now one of the main concerns is not to undermine this faith but to strengthen the spirit of party comradeship within each party organization.

Here is another characteristic feature: the party conferences formulated unequivocal and objective assessments of all local party cadres. Suffice it to say that virtually no single secretary or member of the bureaus of CPSU gorkoms and raykoms was elected with 100 percent of the vote. Yet only 3 years ago this was the standard, and if one or two votes were negative, this was considered an exceptional occurrence! Now there were 10-15 or even as much as 40 percent of ballots cast against some comrades. This clearly indicated the actual rather than official reputation of a given official.

Finally, the political approach taken by the party members in analyzing life in their city or rayon was manifested much more clearly than in the past. Social problems were considered most closely, particularly trade, housing and health care. Problems of spiritual development and of asserting high moral rules of community life were discussed extensively. It is noteworthy that this was originated by no means exclusively by the members of the intelligentsia but came from workers and kolkhoz

members. In other words, this meant a type of emancipation of problems submitted for discussion at the conference and marked a certain turn toward the purposeful politicizing of collective conclusions and evaluations. I consider this a sign of increased maturity.

[Tyurin] Yet, in the course of the accountability and election campaign there were unforeseen and rather complex situations which indicated that democracy could enhance not only good aspirations....

[Polozkov] Yes, there were. Their study confirms that in a number of party organizations the mood of some of the party members was governed by groups rallied around people who had been "offended" or "hurt" by perestroika, former leaders primarily. They tried to use the conference as an arena for settling personal accounts and satisfying their ambitions.

For example, a sharp electoral struggle developed on the eve of the party conference in Starominskiy Rayon. M.V. Dyachenko who was relieved in the past of his position as first secretary for committing unseemly actions but, as was then the practice, was shown some mercy, put his name on the ballot for the same position. Let us emphasize that under such unusual circumstances, to put it bluntly, the healthy forces in the rayon party organization were able to display political tactfulness, willpower and restraint. The rayon newspaper published articles in which details were given on both candidates and their careers. It was thus that the rayon party members and the conference delegates could be accurately guided and realize their likes and dislikes. The people realized that Dyachenko was not the type of person who could head the rayon party organization today and were able to make the right choice. I.G. Khmara was re-elected first secretary.

Something similar occurred in Kanevskiy Rayon: having sensed the opportunity of winning back at least a small part of what they had in the past, the supporters of P.P. Chubov, the former first secretary of the raykom, who was arrested, accused of bribery and abuse of official position, but who was recently exonerated for lack of proof, became energized. Nonetheless, was it possible to avoid making a principled assessment of his actions and justify him because he was a party member, if an atmosphere of embezzlement of public funds and a moral corruption of cadres had been established in the rayon with his direct connivance? A total of 82 people were expelled from the party for theft and bribery in the "Kanevskiy Rayon Case," and 76 were criminally prosecuted. The articles in SOVETSKAYA KUBAN, the kray newspaper, under the heading of "Chubov and Others," triggered broad public response and corrected misinterpretations and fabrications.

[Tyurin] The result is that despite existing experience in cadre selection and placement, occasionally the kraykom has to resort to rather strong measures to control the cadre situation?



[Polozkov] I do not agree with this, and here is why: under circumstances governed by the pluralism of opinions and the broadening of democracy, the party committee had to be prepared to use a great variety of forms of work. Using the facilities of the party press must become a constant and customary means for us, particularly during periods of major political campaigns. Let me point out, incidentally, that although the practice of addresses by party kraykom secretaries and heads of the kray executive committee in our newspapers and on radio and television has substantially increased, we clearly are still underestimating this important channel for engaging in a dialogue with the people. I am convinced that the contemporary party and soviet manager must be able to make efficient use of the potential of the mass information media.

As to the structure of the cadres with which the kraykom must steadily work and for which it must be fully responsible, or the so-called nomenclature, the CPSU kraykom intends to substantially reduce this nomenclature. The logic here is the following: if a given position is not directly included in the party's table of organization, should it be part of the nomenclature? For example, is there such a need to control through the CPSU kraykom elections and appointments of all kolkhoz chairman and sovkhoz directors? Is the party raykom not better familiar with their moral and practical qualities? Or else let us consider ship skippers and first officers in our maritime shipping administrations. Such people, who are part of our nomenclature, rarely visit the kraykom. In their own party committees, however, they are known not on the basis of their files but of their work. Please note that these two categories alone number some 900 people.

By thus simplifying the nomenclature, we shall be able to study much more thoroughly the processes occurring within the corps of cadres. Frankly speaking, a number of unsolved problems remain in this area. It is true that we are trying to work more concretely with the people scheduled for promotion, to broaden their social base and to provide them with the opportunity to work in different sectors and to test their abilities. However, so far a great deal is based on intuition. There is virtually no scientific system for identifying and training people who aspire to engage in political work. The result is that in some cases an individual who is generally strong and gifted suddenly begins to display features which harm both his reputation and the work.

In general, I have noted that today people are particularly sensitive to intonations in a conversation and to nuances in reciprocal relations. They would rather choose a humane and intelligent manager than a supporter of the command style. Recently, an unusual event took place in Yeysk: a primary party organization secretary sued the party gorkom first secretary for personal insult (he publicly called the plaintiff a "traitor to perestroyka" for his refusal to organize the participation of the labor collective in going to the aid of a village).

The court rejected the suit as illegal. However, to us this was reason to consider yet once again what is today more efficient: a slogan or an argument, a shout or a sensible word from the heart.

[Tyurin] Ivan Kuzmich, in your address at the 19th All-Union Party Conference you sharply criticized the position of sectorial ministries, the Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance, for blocking local initiative in economic development. How has the current model of economic management influenced the efficiency of decisions made by the kray's party and soviet authorities?

[Polozkov] Very regrettably, virtually nothing has changed. Some things have even worsened: whereas previously the machineries of ministries and departments managed, albeit sluggishly, to solve problems formulated by economic reality in the production area, today in the majority of cases all problems facing production workers are meeting with no response under the pretext that they have been given economic autonomy. It is as though the personnel of the ministries do not realize that the representatives of plants and factories approach them because of extreme urgency and extremely grave lack of real rights and real resources.

Examples of one initiative or another on our part being blocked firmly by a ministry or department are numerous. Let me mention briefly two obvious situations.

Guided by the Law On the Cooperative, we decided to reform the system of the kray's consumer cooperative, which is particularly important here. As a whole, the volume of output and procurement activities and paid services have reached impressive figures in the kray: some 600 million rubles. At the same time, however, the consumer cooperative lost many of its age-old functions: cooperative work principles were abandoned, the role of the general assembly of shareholders was reduced to naught and the role of the rural cooperative as the basic unit of the system was downgraded. Essentially, there was an actual nationalization of the consumer cooperative, which violated the interests of the population and, consequently, which is triggering indifference, deficits and violations of the rules of commerce. The question, therefore, was why not enhance the role of the shareholder and make him the main character and, at the same time, make broader use for trade services to the rural population of the goods produced by the population itself, develop family contracting, set up stores in homes and organize mobile and catalog trade? However, the leadership of Tsentrosoyuz is in general opposed to all such initiatives. Why? Because if the management of the rural cooperative is in the hands of the shareholders themselves, rather than professional trade workers who can be ordered around but to whom no one is responsible, and if all of this is truly applied, many full-time workers of the consumer cooperative will have to change if not their profession, in any case their old habits. Is this a political problem? I believe it is, for it affects the vital interests of hundreds of thousands of people.

There was talk at the 19th All-Union Party Conference of the unsolved construction problems. Everyone is familiar with them so I shall not repeat them. However, this is a heavy and old burden. The comprehensive brigade which applies the contracting system and which has decided and will continue to decide the fate of the target and the plan is still not, stubbornly, recognized as a legitimate labor collective, as a juridical person. The existing SMU, trusts, associations, main administrations and ministries have surrounded the brigade and prevented it from functioning normally. In order to understand, to experience the problems of the construction brigade, I assumed sponsorship, so to say, over one such collective. It is headed by Dmitriy Yefimovich Zhovtenko, an outstanding master of his work, a person with great spiritual qualities. The brigade has some 30 workers who have mastered the full range of construction skills. They sign their own contracts with subcontractors and pay for everything themselves. It is a pleasure to see the way these boys work, and how simply and efficiently they solve difficult production problems. Making use of my official authority, I tried to help Zhovtenko to settle the most essential problems related to real brigade cost accounting. A second such collective is now being formed and is beginning to work. However, I have no particular reason to be pleased, for if the kraykom would stop being concerned with these brigades, the Minyugstroy and its territorial construction associations, which is the new name of the main administrations, would instantly crush them....

I believe that currently we are dealing in economic management not with the latest "growing pains" but with a clash of diametrically opposite interests. Consequently, to the best of my understanding, proper means must be provided to solve this general situation.

[Tyurin] The poet said about Lenin that "He controlled the development of thoughts and only for that reason, the country."... In connection with this quotation, one final question: What is the correlation between methods of political management and the task of restoring to its full magnitude the intellectual dignity of the party?

[Polozkov] I am convinced that it is only with the help of such methods, plus the personal qualities of the party personnel, that the conscious trust of the party masses and individual party members can be gained and collective reasoning applied. By appealing to the best in man and calling upon him to share what he has considered and experienced, we provide a guarantee for the preservation and multiplication of his personal experience in joint party creativity. With such an approach the old ills such as formalism, bureaucratic administration, secrecy, and dogmatism in thinking become intolerable and literally alien. Along with the forward development of the party collectives, political managers of a new type are shaped, managers of the period of perestroika: people who are daring, honest, highly educated and well-wishing. I know from personal experience and from that

of my colleagues that this path is hard to follow. However, it is necessary. A renovated communist party must act in a renovated society. Such is the logic of perestroika. The words from the CPSU Central Committee appeal "To the Party and the Soviet People," which formulate our electoral platform express in the best possible way the main objective of the changes which are taking place in the awareness and actions of the party members.

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**Economic Reform, the First Year: A Survey**  
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[Article by Yegor Timurovich Gaydar, candidate of economic sciences, editor, political economy and economic policy department, KOMMUNIST]

[Text] Last year the reform in the economic management system left the area of theoretical debates and experiments and entered the lives of millions of people. The laws "On the State Enterprise (Association)" and "On the Cooperative In the USSR" were enacted. Economic units accounting for more than 60 percent of industrial and agricultural output, about 50 percent of contracting construction work, approximately one-half of the service industry and the entire trade and communications area started working on a self-financing basis. Even the most convinced supporters of the development of cooperatives did not assume that as early as the end of 1988 the number of people employed in this economic sector would exceed 1 million and that its annual volume of output of goods and services would exceed 4 billion rubles. The challenge which the fast development of cooperatives hurl at state enterprises and their growing monetary income will, unquestionably, be a catalyst for change. Leasing enterprises to labor collectives which, only last spring, was considered amazing, is confidently becoming the practice of dozens of economic units which are working on the basis of such conditions. Although a number of unsolved economic and legal problems remain in this area, sociological studies convincingly prove that a great deal of the hope for radical improvements in the efficiency with which state property is used is linked to precisely this form of economic management, which is the result of initiative from below. Information on the issuing of stock by Soviet enterprises, the beginning of work by joint companies and registration of cooperative banks are no longer considered sensational.

Although the power of inertia remains strong, only those who are unwilling to accept the obvious can deny that the system of economic management has seriously changed. Today it is precisely on the basis of practical results that society judges of the accuracy of the chosen

course and the substantiation of the decisions which were made. The consolidate indicators of economic development for last year improved (see table).

# **Growth Rates (percent)**

| Indicator           | Average Annual |  | 1987/1988 |      |
|---------------------|----------------|--|-----------|------|
|                     | 1981-1985      | Average Annual According To 12th 5-Year Plan | 1987      | 1988 |
| Generated           | 3.6            | 4.2  | 2.3       | 4.4  |
| National Income     |                |  |           |      |
| Industrial Output   | 3.7            | 4.6  | 3.9*      | 3.9  |
| Agricultural Output | 1.0            | 2.7  | -0.6*     | 0.7  |

\*Refined Data, USSR State Statistical Committee

The achieved acceleration of growth rates in the volume of output made it possible to reach in a number of important parameters the level stipulated by the 5-year plan or to come close to it. Compared with 1985, the national income generated in 1988 was 11.1 percent higher (the 5-year plan calls for 12.8 percent); industrial output was 13.3 percent higher (5-year plan: 13.8 percent).

The dynamics of indicators of production efficiency, social labor productivity above all, have changed substantially. Their growth rate, compared to last year, doubled. The process of releasing those employed in basic production sectors of the national economy, started in 1987, intensified. Thus, in the fuel and energy complex, where the real growth in the volume of output continued, employment was reduced by 29,000 people in 11 months. The scale of this process can be assessed better by remembering that according to data of the RSFSR State Statistical Committee, studies conducted in 1988 listed at enterprises of civil machine building in the republic the operation of 946 industrial robots worth 24.7 million rubles, which made the release of no more than 349 people possible.

All of this could lead to the conclusion that major successes were achieved from the very beginning of the application of the new economic management methods. Such would have been the case had the situation on the consumer market and the drastic aggravation of shortages not existed, had the faster price increases not affected the budgets of millions of families and had there been no growing concern about economic development. Against this background even the most accurate information on the favorable dynamics of the volume of output must be accepted cautiously and, in some cases, with mistrust.

Therefore, in order to assess the development of the national economy in 1988 it is of essential importance to determine the reasons for the existing negative trends and to understand the extent and circumstances of changes in material production which would be needed to stabilize the situation in the immediate future.

## **I**

The active use of the market control mechanism is the pivot of the initiated restructuring of the economic management system. Without prices which balance supply with demand and make it possible to coordinate the interest of producers and consumers, inevitably such an operation would require an overall "chief." The current rationing of millions of types of goods produced in the country is the best guarantee against any serious reduction in the size of the administrative apparatus.

As practical experience indicates, the biggest obstacle to the implementation of a radical economic reform is the threat of an uncontrolled acceleration of price increases, which undermines the effectiveness of economic incentives and the social support of initiated changes. Therefore, the reform can be successful only if combined with an efficient and systematic anti-inflation policy. The basic measures for such a policy are well-known in worldwide practical experience: reducing state expenditures and lowering budget deficits and restricting credits and monetary circulation.

The program for economic reform, which was adopted at the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, called for the implementation of steps aimed at improving financial health. In practice, however, the development of events took an essentially different direction.

The financial situation of the state had been stressed for a number of years. A substantial decline in budget revenue from two most important sources—turnover tax from the sale of alcoholic beverages and income from foreign trade—substantially declined starting with 1985. In order to provide normal conditions for the economic reform, under these circumstances expenditures had to be curtailed even further. Instead, their growth rates were accelerated and the share of the budget in the use of the national income increased. By 1988 the budget was already redistributing more than 70 percent of the national income. At the same time, the increased population income, cost accounting enterprise funds and budget expenditures are obviously boosting inflationary processes. Nonetheless, despite a rapidly increasing national debt, in 1989 alone the plan calls for increasing budget appropriations by 51.1 billion rubles. This is more than the entire increase in national income for the first 3 years of the 5-year plan.

Although the indicators which characterize the dynamics of monetary circulation are still not accessible to all, a number of parameters lead to the conclusion that nor were anti-inflationary measures in the area of monetary circulation carried out. The average annual increase in population savings, which amounted to 12.9 billion rubles during the 11th 5-Year Plan, rose to 23 billion in 1986-1987. In 1987 population deposits reached nearly 30 billion rubles. General economic considerations make it clear that in the thus developing situation the rate at which money was put in circulation increased even further.

The situation in cashless circulation took an adverse turn as well. By the end of 1987 the enterprises were granted big loans at easy terms. This made it possible to reduce the volume of overdue loans. It was expected that this

amount should decline even further in the course of 1988. In practice, in the first 10 months of the year, overdue obligations from loans and reciprocal account settling increased by 17.5 billion rubles.

Therefore, the conversion to the new economic management method was combined with decision which simulated a sharp increase in inflationary processes. The aspiration to use identified opportunities for immediate acceleration of the pace of economic growth and for easing tight spots in various economic sectors was clearly apparent. This resulted in the aggravation of contradictions on the markets for consumer goods and production resources.

## II

The consumer market was already seriously disturbed as early as the start of 1988. Whereas the growth rates of population monetary income was consistent with the estimates of the 5-year plan, in 1986-1987 the trade system received goods worth 33 billion rubles less than planned. A drastic reduction of stocks in trade began and such stock declined by 13.8 billion rubles. The disappearance of goods from store shelves was nothing but a clear reflection of such economic processes.

The efforts which were undertaken in 1988 to increase the production of consumer goods made some positive changes possible. Whereas in 1986-1987 the growth rates of output of industrial commodities in group "B" fell substantially behind the growth rates in group "A" despite the 5-year plan targets, the situation changed last year and the production of consumer goods increased at a faster pace. However, what influenced the situation on the market the most was not this but the drastically accelerated increase in population monetary income, which became virtually uncontrolled. The 5-year plan stipulated that wages would grow more slowly than retail trade. Actually, between 1985 and 1988 wages increased at nearly double the rate. In 1988, according to the annual plan, the average monthly wage should have increased by 4 rubles; its actual increase was 14 rubles.

With the drastic acceleration in the growth of the volume of retail trade, considerably influenced by increased average purchase prices, trade stocks not only did not increase by 2 billion rubles, as planned, but declined by yet another 3 billion. Even stocks of slow-moving or unsaleable goods began to melt rapidly. In 1988 they declined by more than 30 percent.

The mechanism of the growth of the inflationary spiral, which operates when suppliers control the market, could be clearly traced in light industry. In 1986-1987 that sector was repeatedly criticized for its low growth rates of output. In 1988 the situation changed. The growth rates of output jumped from 1.5 percent in 1987 to 4.3 percent in 1988. The reason for such a tempestuous growth of output are perfectly clear: prices rose rapidly. According to the RSFSR State Statistical Committee, in

the first 9 months of 1988 the average retail price of a pair of leather shoes was 15 percent higher; that of knitted goods increased by 9 percent, and of cotton fabrics by 5 percent. Profits rose sharply (by 9 percent) and so did withholdings for cost accounting funds; the average monthly wage rose at the virtually same pace. In 1 year the sectorial enterprises failed to supply 13 million pairs of leather shoes, 48 million pieces of knitted goods and many other items.

The situation on the light industry market was worsened by the fact that in 1988 the volume of procurements compensated for the lowering of imports in 1986 and 1987 only in terms of value; in physical terms, many varieties of goods marketed fell below the 1985 level. Efforts are being made to correct this situation. In particular, several dozen complete shoe factories were purchased. Such steps can be considered objectively necessary and, if successful, they would make it possible to reduce shortages in the area of this specific commodity group. Unfortunately, however, shortages become worsened elsewhere, for physical measures are insufficient in solving a problem which is financial in nature.

Last year this law was clearly manifested in the marketing of goods, the significant and real increase in the production of which was made possible by converting some heavy industry capacities to their manufacturing. The assignments of the comprehensive program for the development of the production of consumer goods is being overfulfilled for a number of items (washing machines, electric vacuum cleaners, etc.). In physical terms, the production of television sets increased by 6 percent (by 22 percent in the case of color television sets); it increased by 10 percent for tape recorders, 8 percent for vacuum cleaners, 5 percent for sewing machines and 6 percent for washers. Naturally, not all such increases went straight to the market. Thus, in particular, the entire increase in the production of refrigerators was for export. However, in the case of a large number of goods deliveries to the trade system increased rapidly although commodity stocks were depleted even faster.

A clear example in this case is the situation involving the procurement of synthetic washing detergents. Naturally, when we discuss the worsening availability of a given commodity, we can and must remember the major unused capacities for its production such as, for example, the fact that equipment for the production of 200,000 tons of washing detergent, purchased in 1980-1982 at the cost of 29 million rubles in foreign currency, is still not yielding any output. However, there is yet another side in this matter: although the production of synthetic detergents and their sales significantly increased in the past year the situation in the trade system worsened drastically.

Practical experience indicates that whatever the growth rates of output of commodities may be, the putting of money in circulation could increase at an even higher

pace. With a disturbance of the monetary system and the loss of confidence in the ruble, in a few days demand could increase several hundred percent. The deformed market immediately reacts to the changed situation: the mechanism for the distribution of scarce resources is activated: lines, rationing, orders. The status of authorities and groups interested in the marketing of said goods is enhanced; groups interested in maintaining the shortage develop and the black market becomes more active. Increased procurement volumes simply fail to find their way to normal sale outlets. As the population stockpiles items and as production increases, such scarcity may be replaced by overstocking. Meanwhile, however, demand has switched to other commodities.

Last year conflicting trends interacted on the food market. The continuing increase of productivity in animal husbandry made it possible to increase meat and dairy product sales. We must acknowledge that compared to international standards, the consumption of meat and meat products per capita was not 65 kilograms annually but significantly lower (8 kilograms, according to USSR State Statistical Committee data). Naturally, the practical method for such accountability was developed and applied some time ago and has long been based on a distortion. It is equally true that some of the increased procurements of meat are caused by a reduction in the size of the herds. According to existing assessments, the share of this factor does not exceed 25 percent and the continuing increase in milk production has proved that, so far, this has not harmed animal husbandry.

The restructuring of the economic management mechanism in the agroindustrial complex, although slower than one would wish, is nonetheless taking place and its results are becoming apparent. For example, in the RSFSR more than 80,000 families contracted for the full cycle of production of farm goods. They were given land, livestock premises and other means of production. Labor productivity in such collectives in Vologda, Orel, Tula and Omsk Oblasts and the Chuvash ASSR, is higher than the average kolkhoz and sovkhoz indicators by a factor of 3-7. Although the introduction of the leasing system still suffers from a number of elements of formalism, studies have indicated that those who have adopted the new working conditions rate their potential highly. Some of the most difficult obstacles in this area are frequently caused by violations of obligations assumed by the farm administrations, the short terms of contracts and the unavailability of minor mechanization facilities.

Things are substantially worse in crop growing. The RSFSR grain crop fell 11 million tons short of the average level reached during the first years of the 5-year plan. Procurements of fruits and potatoes to the state trade system dropped substantially.

In terms of value, increased sales of foodstuffs were also largely the result of higher prices. According to the RSFSR State Statistical Committee, in the first 9 months of the year retail prices of potatoes rose by 18 percent,

and of meat, sausages and canned meat, by an average of 3.2 percent. Only 23 of the 211 groups of foodstuffs, watched by the all-Union Scientific Research Institute for the Study of Population Demands for Consumer Goods and the Trade Situation were among those which, as a rule, could be purchased by consumers without difficulty. The range of scarce commodity groups is continuing to widen. Thus, gradually it is beginning to include fresh and canned fish. The stocks of canned fish in the trade system, which seemed inexhaustible, were reduced by nearly 50 percent in 2 years in the RSFSR.

At the beginning of September, rationing of meat and sausages was introduced in 24 autonomous republics, krais and oblasts in the RSFSR, and of butter in 13. The paralleling fast increase in population monetary income and the increase of rationing, spreading over ever new commodities, became, generally speaking, last year's characteristic features. Wages in depreciated rubles are rising but wage differences have a small influence on the working people's access to goods.

Under such circumstances the development of cooperatives becomes seriously distorted. By nature they are inseparable from the market and market price-setting. However, with a high growth rate of money in circulation, unsecured demand pushes the free cooperative prices upward and, with them, the income of cooperative members. To blame the cooperative for both is unjustified in the majority of cases, for such events are determined by the financial situation. However, the development of this trend could result in both prices and incomes in the cooperative sector reach a level which would virtually isolate it from the rest of the legal economy. Furthermore, it is easy to understand the way prices of cooperative goods are perceived, against the background of a growing deficit in state trade.

### III

The most typical theme sounded in the statements made by enterprise managers last year was complaints about continuing excessive administrative control and the fact that state orders and contracts which, under the pressure of superior authorities, must be concluded, failed to take into consideration actual production possibilities and fetter the freedom of economic maneuvering, as well as the fact that suppliers are unwilling to sign economic contracts and the superior authorities do not ensure supplies of necessary equipment, raw materials and semi-finished goods. All of this is essentially accurate.

The mechanisms, the purpose of which is to ensure the coordination of interests, have been distorted by the low purchasing power of the ruble. There is no shortage of money. As in the past, there is a surplus of cash in the national economy. The situation is controlled by those who control natural and material resources. This is clearly manifested in the conditions for signing contracts imposed on consumers. Even the most simple-minded managers have sent letters openly stipulating that they

would sign contracts providing that they could get, in exchange, scarce materials, such as cement, lining tiles, pipes and steel. In the majority of cases, they do without such written documents. Unobliging consumers are informed that they will not be receiving the goods they need. Truly gigantic efforts must be made by the procurement authorities to compensate, somehow, for the weaknesses of the financial-credit policy and to prevent the breakdown of the system of economic relations. Information on the course of the contract signing campaign is discussed by the superior management authorities like communiques of combat operations. New problems constantly arise, such as supplying the Extreme North with bearings, files, crane engines and other equipment, etc. For example, when the enterprises formulated their 1989 plans for the production of low-power electric motors, without which household electrical appliances cannot be produced, it turned out that the production quotas called for 6 million pieces less than requested by the consumers. A solution had to be found: either to curtail demand or else impose additional assignments to suppliers. Both suppliers and consumers, who had been unable to discuss the problem directly, could reasonably complain that the rights granted to them by the law had been usurped by the superior authorities.

The domination of suppliers was manifested also in the obvious acceleration of prices of industrial commodities. In machine building the production of most of the important items, measured in physical terms, was either reduced or, at best, increased insignificantly (metal cutting machine tools, presses, weaving looms, bridge cranes, bulldozers, freight cars, motor vehicles); in terms of wholesale prices, there were substantial increases (instruments, means of automation and spare parts for same, blast furnace, steel smelting and metal rolling equipment, medical equipment, etc.). In construction as well, the amount of construction and the profits of construction organizations increased in value significantly faster than the volume of most important projects, assessed in physical terms.

For the national economy as a whole, the growth rates of profits rose from 6.9 percent in 1987 to 9.5 percent in 1988. Increased withholdings for the material incentive fund became the most important factor determining the dynamics of wages. The unsaturated market makes it possible to raise prices, increase profits and cost accounting funds and raise wages with which people come to an even poorer market. Another modification of the inflationary spiral develops as well: increased solvent demand provides extensive opportunities for the growth of cost accounting funds used to finance production development and, at the same time, contributes to increased demand for investment resources.

Increasing economic efficiency is inseparably related to the success of the economic reform. Nonetheless, its role in the development of national economic complexes is by no means always the same. In the fuel and energy

sectors a great deal was achieved by putting things in order. Here positive changes are obvious. Once again, in 1988, the plans for the procurement of petroleum, natural gas and coal were fulfilled. Particularly clear, against this background, stand failures in sectors in which nothing can replace the flexibility and reliability of economic relations and the producer's interest in the use of scientific and technical achievements, in machine building above all.

Actually, the dangers of excessive optimism in the drafting of plans were manifested particularly clearly in machine building. It was precisely in this area that a real economic miracle was expected as a result of organizational steps. It was necessary drastically to upgrade the growth rates of output and to conserve resources, to accelerate the updating of goods and radically to improve production quality and carry out a broad modernization of the production apparatus. Despite the plan guidelines, however, compared to the 11th 5-Year Plan, capital investments between 1986 and 1988 increased insignificantly. Average construction time was 12.8 years for the Mintyazhmash and 11.6 years for the Minavtoselkhoz mash.

Failures in machine building and the considerably slower growth rates in the production of resource-conserving equipment, compared to the plans, are delaying the lowering of metal- and energy-intensiveness in the national economy.

The situation with the electric power industry remains stressed. Here, despite the documents which were passed and despite common sense, construction is continuing to grow. In 1988 the cost of industrial construction included in the plan was 17 percent higher compared to 1985, totaling 82 billion rubles. Meanwhile, the 5-year plan assignment for the commissioning of capacities for 1986-1988 was fulfilled by less than 50 percent. As in the past, the sector is operating with a reserve of capacities which are significantly below standard. One-half of the assets in the electric power industry show a 50 percent or higher degree of wear-out.

In metallurgy the production of high-quality goods and the use of resource-saving technologies is taking place much more slowly than expected. Whereas the plan for 1986-1988 called for installing 15 machines for continuous ingot casting, actually only 4 were installed. The equipment in use is continuing to wear out and the use of the most obsolete, uneconomical and ecologically harmful assemblies is continuing.

Capital investments channeled into meeting the needs of the country for fuel, energy and metal increased faster than in light industry in the 1986-1988 period. Gradually, the national economy is returning to the unpromising way of compensating for the low level of efficiency in the use of raw materials and fuels by increasing their extraction as a means of fulfilling the present 5-year plan.

#### IV

At the start of the campaign for the accelerated reduction of the sales of alcoholic beverages, great hope was put on the fact that the growth of labor productivity would more than compensate for losses to the budget. A lowering of expenditures which had been financed out of income from the sale of wine and spirits was not contemplated. In 1988 the market situation made it necessary to make some alterations in this course. In the course of the approval of the annual budget, although it was a question of reducing earnings from alcoholic beverages by 11.5 billion rubles, actually, such income was raised by 3 billion rubles. We repeatedly mentioned the negative influence of lowering the production of alcohol on the statistically established dynamics of the national income. We must also point out that the changed trend is contributing to the accelerated pace of its growth. But let us not surrender to illusions. When the confidence in the ruble was undermined, inflation acquired a momentum of its own. The trade system became distorted and replacing serious measures aimed at improving the financial health of the economy with increased sales of alcoholic beverages can only lead to the fact that such beverages will appear on the otherwise empty store shelves.

It would be an error not to notice the efforts made to correct this situation. Defense enterprises are becoming actively involved in the production of consumer goods, and in the technical retooling of light industry and the processing sectors in the agroindustrial complex. A clear proof of the new approaches to shaping national economic priorities is seen in the decision to redesign the largest tractors plant which is under construction in Yelabuga to produce passenger cars. However, all of this was insufficient in order to put an end to negative trends.

At its two-day session at the end of December 1988, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo once again addressed itself to problems of the financial situation and monetary circulation. Measures aimed at improving the balance between monetary and commodity resources are being drafted.

It is important to understand the complexity of the problem to be solved. It is easy to lower the budget deficit by manipulating financial statistics. A great deal of experience has been gained in this area. However, any serious and real lowering of governmental expenditures requires a large-scale redistribution of material resources in favor of sectors working for the consumer market, changing the nature of the jobs held by millions of people, firmly closing down inefficient production facilities, ensuring the radical restructuring of the entire organization of the economy and turning it around so that it can address itself to the needs of the people.

The scale of financial disproportions is such that the possibility of quickly correcting the situation and blocking inflationary processes can be achieved only as a

result of major changes in three key directions: reducing construction and centralized state capital investments, reorienting the structure of imports and easing the defense burden on the economy.

If an example of the negative influence of economic anarchy on economic development were needed, it would be difficult to choose a better one than the situation which has developed in recent years in capital construction. Because of its excessively broad front, it is difficult to trace the connection between the funds spent by the state and the results achieved in this area. Last year of one-third of the most important projects included in the nomenclature of state orders were not completed. Above-rate volume of unfinished construction increased by more than 5 billion rubles.

It was decided to freeze a number of major hydraulic projects which were doubtful from the viewpoint of their economic efficiency and ecological consequences. As a whole, the value of the frozen projects in 1988 reached 24.2 billion rubles. However, that same year new construction of industrial projects worth 59.1 billion rubles was undertaken.

The budget approved for next year involves a deficit of many billions of rubles. Essentially we have acknowledged our inability to spend money as confirmed by the fact that major investment projects yielded no returns. Perhaps this is the right time to understand the reasons for the low efficiency with which state resources are used. For example, why is it that so far the capacities of 211 production projects in the chemical-timber complex, commissioned or reconstructed between 1981 and 1987, have not been reached, and those of 170 other were not fully used. Why is it that those located in the RSFSR alone produced in 1 year goods worth 2 billion rubles less than planned? We must analyze and bring order in the mechanism for making large-scale investment decisions involving the appropriation of state funds, so that after the failure of the latest project we would not console ourselves with an interesting discussion among foreign trade departments, builders and customers as to who is to be blamed for the failure. However, one method would be immediately to start a new construction project, compared to which the importance of the others would simply shrink. This applies to the creation of an entire series of very big petroleum and gas chemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast. This is a standard move. Billions of dollars will be spent. The volume of capital investments for this project exceeds the initial cost estimate of the construction of the BAM, made at the end of the 1960s, by a factor of 8. It can be compared only to the estimated cost for the transfer of river waters. According to the specialists, the overall actual outlays will, in all likelihood, once again turn out to be several hundred percent higher than planned. For the time being, their precise estimate is impossible, for not even technical and economic proofs are available. No one has determined what it is that we shall have to give up for the sake of such complexes: programs for increasing housing



construction, enhancing the processing sectors of the APK, the development of machine building, or something else. Nonetheless, the construction is already under way.

Although for objective reasons one cannot put an immediate halt to economic autarchy and ensure the convertibility of the ruble, it is within our possibility to act in accordance with the laws of the market and not despite them. Nonetheless, in recent years, although we were forced to reduce imports, we totally ignored the budget efficiency of the various commodity groups. Their increase or insignificant reduction of purchases of goods, which is a heavy burden on the state budget (chemical fertilizers, pesticides, grain, and machinery, a considerable share of which adds to the growing volumes of uninstalled equipment), paralleled reductions in imports of industrial consumer goods which are the most profitable in terms of budget revenue. Savings of no more than a few hundred million foreign exchange rubles between 1985 and 1987 on such commodities led to reduced supplies of goods to the trade system worth 8.2 billion rubles and became an essential factor in the worsening of the financial situation.

In 1988 deliveries of imported goods to the trade system were reduced by yet another 400 million rubles. The share of this group in imports, paid for in convertible currency, continued to decline. Compared to 1985, it dropped by more than 50 percent. Meanwhile, purchases of industrial resources, which are used extremely inefficiently, but are substantiated by the need to implement the assignments of the 5-year plan, increased substantially. Combined with the further decline in exports, this resulted in a worsening of the trade balance. Whereas in 1987 our trade balance with the developed capitalist countries was positive, in 1988 it became negative by \$2 billion. According to Western financial statistics, the net indebtedness of the USSR in convertible currency more than doubled between 1985 and 1988. We must pay almost \$3 billion annually to service the loans. Our obligations to many socialist countries are increasing as well, such as to Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. If such a trend is continued in the future, the possibility of significantly increasing budget revenue by restructuring imports will be lost.

Information restrictions, which are still in place, greatly hinder any serious discussion of the development and problems of converting the defense sector. This journal has already discussed this topic (see KOMMUNIST No 13, 1988). For the time being, however, we are forced to make use of indirect assessments, which enable us to determine only the scale of the figures. When multi-billion unidentified revenues and expenditures appear within the state financial system, usually the simplest explanation is the most accurate. Specialists have long understood that the undisclosed "other budget revenue" consists, above all, of income from foreign trade and budget deficits. Whatever the breakdown of information on budget expenditures in the national economy may be,

whether by sector or area, after we subtract all known expenditures unclear the purpose for which the Supreme Soviet is allocating tens of billions of rubles remains unclear.

The new defense doctrine and the concept of sensible sufficiency, as well as the already made decisions on reducing armaments offer extensive opportunities for radically reducing defense expenditures which weigh today as a most heavy burden on the national economy. If the defense burden on the economy, expressed in terms of a share of defense expenditures in the gross national product is be higher than the corresponding Japanese figure by several hundred percent, it would be senseless to include in the plans any duplication of the Japanese economic miracle. The conversion of the defense sector could become the most important factor in the reduction of expenditures and increasing state revenue, saturating the market with new generations of consumer goods and acting as a catalyst for the efficient structural reorganization of the national economy. However, in order for this to become reality, the radical nature of economic decisions must be on the level of that of political decisions. It is a question not of reducing the growth rates of defense expenditures but of substantially lowering their absolute amount. In the long term, the security of the country is determined by the dynamics of scientific and technical progress and the growth rates of production efficiency and, therefore, the success of the initiated economic reorganization.

## V

In 1988, despite the fact that the situation on the consumer market continued to worsen, major centralized steps were taken to increase the population's monetary income by nearly 4 billion rubles. It is absolutely impossible to postpone increased payments in many areas such as, for example, increasing the wages of health care workers.

It is essentially inaccurate to use present difficulties as an argument in favor of postponing the pensions reform. The strictly fiscal approach to financial problems and efforts to compensate for the inefficiency of the structural investment policy by eliminating social guarantees directly clash with the objectives of perestroika. Their sociopolitical consequences would be severe.

Today the need to take immediate steps aimed at increasing the level of pensions and indexing them in accordance with cost of living increases, is becoming increasingly obvious. At the present rate of price increases it is simply impossible to pretend any longer that the state does not notice the way the real income of the retired is declining and to shift to them the responsibility for its own errors. However, we must realize that such steps will, in themselves, increase inflation. Generally speaking, reducing taxes and increasing wages and appropriations is a simple matter. However, in order to have healthy state finances, such steps, the social support



of which is always guaranteed, must be combined with other—a search for additional income sources and for reducing budget expenditures.

The study of economic policy pursued this 5-year plan, considered from the viewpoint of the correlation between difficult and easy decisions, shows a strikingly obvious violation of proportions between them. The increased allocations for the development of sectors which truly need additional resources was not combined with a respective reduction of outlays for other purposes. In order to make ends meet somehow, however, super-optimistic hypotheses of increased production efficiency were included in the plans.

Nowhere or ever has a reduction of state expenditures been easy. In analyzing the process of state control over the U.S. economy, the noted American economist and Nobel Prize winner J. Stiegler has pointed out that if a congressman were to refuse 10 major sectors their special subsidies, these sectors would concern themselves with choosing a more accommodating successor, for the stakes are simply too high.

A major obstacle on the way to implementing the necessary yet difficult decisions in our country is found in existing relations between the state and society. As in the past, the stereotype of economic paternalism predominates. Now, however, as a rule, it carries a minus sign: the state shows poor concern for the people, increasing prices and failing to ensure the satisfaction of needs. In discussions among the enterprise, the sector and the state, public opinion is almost always not on the side of the state: the state should lower taxes yet allocate higher budget appropriations. The origins of this view are obvious. However, without surmounting it we cannot hope for success in the struggle against inflation. The opposition of individual sectorial and parochial interests with the help of the proper measures aimed at the financial improvement of the economy, and the profound restructuring of the archaic national economic structure which developed during the period of industrialization are possible only on the basis of broad social support and awareness of the emergency of the developing situation.

Last year's experience convincingly proved that the tremendous difficulties accompanying the reform do not require in the least an ideological fight, blaming the market or proving its incompatibility with socialism. Nor is there any need to hinder the initiative of enterprises with bureaucratic means. The combination of measures to restructure the economic management system with a conflicting financial policy could lead to a situation in which a considerable segment of society would be ready to hurry back into the arms of an economic reality described as the command-administrative system.

The pursuit of a financial policy, the failure of which has become patently clear, inevitably leads to well-familiar consequences: increased surplus of cost accounting funds which cannot be supported with material resources, their freezing, and stricter control over wages, increased administrative regulation of prices and the breakdown of the wholesale trade system before it has had the opportunity to develop, as well as of the entire mechanism of economic control introduced with the reform. Today the success of the entire course of perestroika in the economy depends on the ability of the state to take difficult but absolutely necessary anti-inflationary steps. It is only on their basis that a new impetus can be given to the reform.

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#### **Dynamics of Social Change: Analytical Possibilities**

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[Text] The current period in the life of Soviet society is characterized by a profound break in the social structures, which brings to light the hidden springs and mechanisms of life of the social organization. Some of these "springs" become noticeable when they fail while others, conversely, when they are activated (such as, for example, group and individual components of social life). Such complex events could be considered favorable in the study of current processes and in understanding the nature of social phenomena, providing that our social science have at its disposal suitably reliable tools for the study of similar situations.

This is not a question of the obvious imperfection of our sociological cadres and institutions or adequate equipment. We believe that the main difficulty here is the underdeveloped nature of the methodological set of instruments of social thinking, and not only ours exclusively. Sociology has extensive experience in the study of "completed" and existing social structures and the interaction and balancing of their components. Much less studied are imbalanced interconnections, which are characteristic of the processes of the change and the conversion to new social structures and types of social organization. Marxist historiography has traditionally considered primarily the forms of social change related to the open struggle among classes, the clear confrontation among social forces and parties, etc. The current situation is quite different. This necessitates the use of instructive although not strictly historical analogies. It is true that this material as well is not all that abundant.

The closest point of comparison in domestic history is that of the situation which prevailed during the summer and autumn of 1917 (this, naturally, is not simply an analogy but also a source, a point of reference to which researchers turn again and again in their quest for the prime reasons and roots of our own development options).

The most characteristic feature of that time was the universal, fast and seemingly total rejection of the obsolete system of social relations, of the "old regime," including its recent supporters (somewhat later V.G. Korolenko provided an accurate and amazingly timely description of the sharp turn in the social consciousness: "Suddenly, some kind of logical bolt was turned"). However, the difference between "unity against" "unity for" was quickly sensed: there was a violent shaping and division in the interests of different trends operating under similar slogans of democracy, freedom and revolution. In particular, an ideological self-determination of the ethnic periphery of the empire was initiated. The old economic base was becoming increasingly weak while no new base existed. The weakness of the center which ruled under revolutionary slogans was becoming increasingly apparent in its inability to cope with crises and to retain the initiative. Increasingly, a yearning for order and the "firm line," which radicals holding opposing views tried to use with fluctuating success, strengthened among the tired masses.

However, this historical model (and, probably, any other) does not include the main factor. Paradoxical though it might seem on the surface, today's change, which does not take society beyond the accepted boundaries of that same socioeconomic and sociopolitical system, is much more complex than the one which existed at the fall of autocracy. At that time it was believed that a movement was taking place according to a model repeatedly tested through the history of different countries. Even Lenin, who emphasized the unique nature of the situation prevailing in revolutionary Russia, frequently, in the course of that summer, felt possible to compare the changes which were taking place with the events of the 18th century French Revolution. The present base on which historical experience is founded is subject to significantly fewer comparisons, such as the experience of reform in foreign socialist countries (Hungary, China, etc.), and weak analogies with democratization processes in other countries.

Open political and theoretical debates occurred in the short period of Russian democratic development between clearly confronting forces, as to the ways of possible social progress and the outcome of the war, the revolution and the state. Today the situation is immeasurably deeper, and the actual variety of approaches is still hiding under some kind of overall "blanket," the semblance of administrative unanimity or vestigial concepts of the lack of alternatives to the only possible path.

This makes it all the more important and interesting to try to present, albeit as a first approximation, some aspects of a possible study of social changes which are taking place or becoming apparent.

### Inner Logic of the Process

The social process, particularly if it is major, and the resulting actions and aspirations of the multiplicity of groups and people involved in it, mandatorily has some kind of order, i.e., an interaction among its trends or components (the structure of the process) and a correlation among the different phases of its dynamics.

Most frequently the concept of structure is applied to a certain reliably operating entity: the structure of a society, an economy or a city. Occasionally, structure means simply the composition, the qualitative correlation among accountable units in terms of population, production, trade, etc. But what if we are faced with a flow, an avalanche, landslide or movement of entire social strata or even continents? Naturally, at this point the concept of structure assumes a different meaning.

It would be very difficult to find a social river which does not consist of a number of interacting "spurts," "currents," or "whirlwinds" with their own direction, velocity, density, power, etc. Russia's October became great by merging at a given historical point, into a single channel, the flows of antiwar and anticapitalist, peasant and national and central and local streams. Something similar—despite all caveats—may be seen today. This is both the strength and weakness of many of the changes occurring in the society. The "upper" reaches of perestroika, which are based on specific concepts of the status of the country in the world and the assessment of resources and existing opportunities, are activating with difficulty and quite slowly the lower, the "stickier" social strata and apparatus. Meanwhile, on the social periphery, centers of activity are being quickly established and activated, oriented above all toward "local" interests. (The correlation between the center and the periphery, in this case, as is generally the case in the sociological study of society, may not coincide with the respective administrative or geographic concepts. It is a question of the dissemination of universal models and the interpretation of initiatives on different levels).

In recent months the problem of combining national interests with trends toward national self-assertion has almost become the most pressing. In a number of cases tension among ethnic groups could obviously be considered a derivative of that same more general problem. If we are able efficiently to combine the enthusiasm of democratic renovation in the center with the democratic potential of national revival in the periphery, both trends will strengthen and benefit. If matters are reduced to a confrontation between the trends of rejection and containment, both would lose. Furthermore, the subsequent progress of the entire society would be inevitably obstructed.

The various currents in the "perestroika" stream have their own velocities which, incidentally, leads to growing fears concerning "falling behind" or "rushing ahead." But how can such a complex and multi-component movement take place as a simultaneous act or resemble an evenly advancing rank (after numerous rehearsals)? The idols of blind faith or universal fear inevitably fall before the skeleton of the new social self-regulation and corresponding social and moral control mechanisms can take shape. Sociopolitical structures lose their efficiency just as inevitably before a sufficient consensus has been developed on the ways to change them; this may explain the inconsistency and haste of some of the initial steps in the present reform. As we know, the principles of the radical economic reform were proclaimed before defining the real conditions for its implementation. All in all, in this respect, and entirely in accordance with the historical experience of revolutionary transitions occurring at different times, the processes of the breakdown and dismantling of obsolete social forms clearly precedes the establishment of the new; destruction processes take place faster than the processes of construction and reconstruction.

All of this makes it possible to compare the status of the society at the present time with a profound revolutionary situation. It would be hardly accurate, however, to consider this condition only from the viewpoint of the classical correlation between opportunities and aspirations of the "upper" and "lower" strata. The differentiation among social trends and their interaction are considerably more complex and, at the same time, less obvious, than such a contraposition.

Is it possible, in general, strictly to divide our still seemingly monolithic society of yesterday and present society, which is separated into "upper" and "lower" strata, not in terms of sociomenclatural status, income levels, and so on, but in terms of the real role played in the restructuring processes? Therefore, how suitable is the equally classical pitting of the revolution "from above" against a revolution "from below?" Obviously, in terms of the methodological task of social analysis, today we can discuss not only the means of studying the dissemination and transformation of initiatives which originate from the top or from the bottom, but the study of the potential of self-dynamics and self-organization of the process. In the final account, it is precisely to such trends that we find tied assessments concerning the power and irreversibility of the entire process. With a certain scope (quantitative parameters are difficult to determine in advance), it involves in its current and transforms into its own components also the elements of the "upper" "lower" and "middle" strata which, with different power correlations, would be a resource for conservative opposition. Naturally, this influences the nature and trend of the process.

Experience has long confirmed that along with the substantiation of historical action and the increased strength and variety of the forces involved in it, the complexity,

contradictoriness and comprehensiveness of the entire process increase. (Uniformity and simplicity increase only in the course of the processes of breakdown, decay and degradation.) The initial stage of perestroika earned virtually unanimous support (once again in the traditional style) not only because it earned the sympathy of virtually all active forces in society—despite their heterogeneity—in the rejection of obsolete customs but also because it overwhelmed the possible opponents and, furthermore, at that point the ostentatious obedience of the apparatus was still functioning. Now it would be very interesting to trace the transformation of this initial unity into the complex variety of interrelated processes of certain groups and trends, each one of which tries to ascribe a certain shade or meaning to the same slogans and resolutions. The year 1988 was exceptionally indicative in this respect. Within a single year (or a slightly longer period) a number of divisions and regroupings were noted with different degrees of clarity: old and new conservative forces, cautious and radical quests of new ways, open and concealed neo-Stalinists, complex centers of new movements and contradictory efforts to determine the type of relations maintained with them. Nothing of the kind occurred in our post-NEP history. Furthermore, even the earlier stages of social development were hardly noted for such intensive processes of social diversification.

Any process of change or motion has certain features which lead to order in the course of time—sequence of phases, periods of development and conditions. Prescribing or accurately guessing the dimensions of respective development segments would be obviously unrealistic, for we have had numerous opportunities to realize this, over and over again. Intensive and mobilizing development periods mandatorily alternate with relatively calm, inertial periods, in the same way that in military operations offensive activities alternate with the regrouping of forces, breathing spells, and so on. Unlike the "army" order, new forces are steadily involved in the social struggle, carrying with them their own aspirations and moods, while some personalities and trends fade into the background. Hence the complex pulsing rhythm of social dynamics. In the course of school training, let us say, it is mandatory to complete the lower grade before moving on to the next; in the social process no such procedure can be observed or is possible, perhaps for the fact alone that here the "school" is built along with the training process.

How acceptable is analyzing a situation of complex social change similar to the one in which we became participants and researchers, to the classical frame of correlation between "conscious" and "subconscious?" It was identical to the mandatory concept of social change prevailing since the start of the century. This had always been purely a model, a typological structure which, however, was quite important in terms of acquiring historically defined concepts of society, consciousness and unconsciousness.

The uncontrolled factors of social development include the results of a number of mass actions committed by individuals or groups or entire organizations, each one of which is guided by its own interests, ideals and symbols. The ideal of the all-embracing "consciousness" (ideological orientation)—the monopoly possession of a certain truth which must be introduced, "dropped" into the masses—is part of the classical concepts of enlightenment and revolutionary rationalism. This is not simply a theoretical elaboration but also, so to say, a historical-psychological one: standing behind it are real socially significant moods, expectations and illusions, on the one hand, and an equally real feeling of a mission of enlightenment and even a certain self-blinding on the part of the "torch carriers."

Neither a theoretical structure nor a psychological condition of this kind could even be imagined today. The theoretical model or idea of the social process cannot be considered in the least as ready-made. It is also the result of a process and of numerous approximations and investigations. The identification of the monopoly of office with the monopoly of truth, typical of the bureaucratic mind, played a major role in overrating the very principle of the absolute and the self-blinding social knowledge. The mechanism for the rationalizing of social processes shifted from administrative structures and the pharisaic attitude of the "scribes" to intellectual structures, not exclusively those set up by the state (institutionalized). A pluralistic situation, which is unusual and difficult to accept today, appears. It does not have a place for any simplistic pitting of orthodoxy against dissidence. Under such circumstances independence, a critical attitude and a variety of thoughts are not simply "accepted" or "permitted" but also inevitable and necessary. The fact that the intellectual potential for such a function is inadequate today and is as yet to be created is a different matter.

### Leadership and Support

One of the results of the lack of a strict line of rationality in society and the lack of strata or castes of impeccably impartial social judgment priests is the fact that waves of enthusiasm and disappointment, and of ups and downs in moods roll through all social strata, from the bottom to the top and back, as well as in all possible horizontal directions.

Related to this are some new qualities and functional components of social movements, such as leadership and support (both are clearly manifested during breakdowns). Obviously, it is precisely in complex transitional situations that the possibility appears, for the first time, to make an objective analysis of a broad range of functions and trends in the institutionalizing of social leadership which, until recently, was manifested primarily in mythologized forms of "leadership." This includes a historically retrospective analysis.

In our postrevolutionary history, with a relatively weak institutionalization of managerial functions (undeveloped legal, legislative and administrative-executive forms) and the consistent rejection of regulated spiritual structures of the traditional type ("abstract" morality) an excessively heavy sociopractical and ideological "burden" falls on the leading group. As we know, the structure of the respective organization of our awareness mandatorily includes the opposing types of the universal initiator and the just as the ubiquitous "scapegoat;" according to the laws of this type of awareness, they could change places with relative ease. In this case, however, mythology or, let us say, the charismatic nature of the "leadership" is secondary in relation to the respective social practice.

Under the Soviet system, equal tests were made of options of leadership functions, such as presenting to society a new social image, stabilizing of internal group tensions, mobilizing of willpower, personalizing social initiative, performing symbolic and ceremonial roles, etc. In this case, it is a question only of the type of functions rather than their specific bearers, the quality of performance or the source of authority. In principle, the same type of functions could be performed by different individuals or, conversely, during different periods those same individuals could perform various types of leadership functions. (Understandably, the individual psychological, mental and moral characteristics of specific individuals remain outside the range of sociological analysis which concentrates on the typology of social functions and the mechanisms of their implementation.)

The relative consideration of the circumstances which lead to the promotion of a leader of a certain type is of substantial interest. To a greater or lesser extent, the leader himself can "organize" the circumstances of his activities as would any person, any type personality. The competence of a sociological study and of the imagination may stretch to explaining the typical and socially significant forms of relations among types of circumstances and types of personalities. Certain circumstances of social activities (such as expectation and possibility) seem to "combine" suitable leadership functions and personalities: in one situation it may be a question of the ability to see farther than others; in another, the ability to organize the will of others or to subordinate it to himself, to act as the coordinator of action. Apparently, in any situation and regardless of the type of leader, it is accepted to expect inflexible confidence in the accuracy of decisions, incompatible with the skeptical sobriety of the mind. It is possible that the now familiar event of 1923, in which Lenin's effort to present his doubts concerning the efficiency of the existing mechanism of power and control was rejected by the then members of the party leadership, is related precisely to this.

The implementation of leadership functions requires a specific organization of social space, above all a close-support group ("immediate surrounding," as it is sometimes described), "an ideological stratum" and, naturally, the apparatus. It is worth re-emphasizing that it is

not a question of leadership "in general" but of those of its forms which became actual in the specific postrevolutionary situation in our country. This pertains, on the one hand, to the social mechanism for the leader's support and, on the other, to the mechanism for the interpretation and implementation of his initiatives, on which a great deal depends on the exercise of power in society, given the underdeveloped nature of the respective institutional structures.

Of late the structure of relations between the leader and his immediate retinue has been intensively discussed by history journalists although, it is true, primarily in a negative tone, in connection with explaining the role of Stalin's circle and the people close to Khrushchev and Brezhnev. It may be useful to turn such a discussion in a more analytical direction and try to determine, for example, the nature of the balancing of incentives and restraints in the leadership group, the reciprocal substitutions of individual functions with collective ones, and so on.

Usually, the role of the apparatus is considered within the framework of the overall social structure (sociopolitical, administrative, bureaucratic), but less than anything else in connection with transitional situations. This includes essential transformations of the instrumental functions of the apparatus as becoming target setting, and changes in the legal structures of the apparatus itself. Whereas, in its apparent form, after Stalin it turned into a self-seeking social force, at roughly the same time there was a transition from primarily negative sanctions which secured its activities (fear of punishment) to primarily positive sanctions (expectation of reward). The power of the apparatus management is always built on the possibility of direct command influence in all areas and parts of society, based on the right to appoint or relieve individuals holding nomenclature positions on all levels. In this case as well negative functions (the threat of dismissal) are replaced with positive ones (promise to promote), based, above all, on the need for quality control, which cannot be achieved through negative steps. However, this substitution almost immediately leads to the fact that priority in the activities of the apparatus is assigned to the purely internal and most powerful of its functions—the desire for self-preservation. Its "normal" functions, which are the transfer of command and ensuring the support of the leadership, invariably takes second priority. This means that essentially there is a general crisis affecting the apparatus and its rule.

During the period of change, in as much as the change took place with the help of the same methods and under the same conditions which exist currently, the apparatus assumes two new instrumental functions which work in opposite directions: the hope arises that through it and with its help at least the primary tasks of social reconstruction will be implemented, including the dismantling of obsolete structures; at the same time, the hope is

openly expressed that, if possible, the social reconstruction will be obstructed and held back with the help of that same apparatus. The former function relies on the executive apparatus albeit partially and, to a certain extent, ostentatiously, in confronting the superior authorities. The latter is based on the inertia of the apparatus, whose dominating feature has been, and remains, its self-preservation.

The study of the transformations which the mechanism of mass support (i.e., not specific, not the one of the apparatus, and not the one which directly relies on the instruments of cadre policy) is of special theoretical and practical interest. This mechanism is rarely simple. Its components include the habit of trusting the institutions of power, the charisma of the leader (this term, which was introduced in sociology by M. Weber, could be translated, albeit not entirely accurately, as personal authority), identification with the social and political ideals of society, hope that one's own interests will be served, and fear. All of them are subjected to a test, re-evaluation and, partially, simply destruction under the conditions of a profound social change. Obviously, here as well we have a variety of concealed components of the mechanism during the crucial situation. Thus, trust in the institutions and the leadership group demands new support and could substantially weaken unless this support is found. The function of fear as a universal regulator of social behavior vanishes forever (we are not discussing the area of criminal legislation). Let us note that the universality of such a regulator presumes the universality of the sources of constant and comprehensive fright not only of omnipotent punitive authorities which has little in common with the system of justice, but the innumerable collective lynching authorities, which are ready severely to punish any deviation from the common standard of behavior and thinking. The breaking up of this regulatory system, which still retains its supporters, opens a wide gap in the traditional support mechanism.

Equally serious or at least essential is the re-evaluation of the mass identification with the acknowledged social ideals and values or, in other words, the blind faith in the justice of the officially acknowledged and, respectively, the unfair nature of officially rejected orientations. In no period of our development has this factor been universally accepted. The predominant area of its functioning was the stratum or the cohort of activists, those promoted in the 1930s and subsequent years, i.e., during the postrevolutionary age. Unquestionably, it played a significant moral and psychological role in the period of formation of the basic mechanisms of Soviet society, in particular as a compensation for and support of that same disciplinary threatening. If current and retrospective sociological investigations could restore quite accurately the historical picture of the transformation of regulatory systems in society, in all likelihood we would be able reasonably to consider this transition about which today we judge on the basis of assumptions, ranging from blind mass faith to a more rational and,

therefore, a more critical, a more "careful" perception by the individual of social (officially proclaimed) values as correlated to his own individual interests and the values of other individuals and groups. Whatever we may think of this shift, we cannot ignore it, any more than we could ignore the fact that it expresses one of the most fundamental features of the present social change: the trend toward true normalizing of the entire system of social interests and regulatory agents.

In terms of the method of their formation and functioning, support mechanisms such as universal fear and blind faith are factors which are both exceptional and temporary, aimed at functioning under exceptional circumstances and correlation of forces. The rather lengthy period of their functioning in our society did not assume the features of normal stability. By definition, an exceptional situation does not reproduce its own prerequisites and resources. Sooner or later it exhausts them and thus destroys the foundations of its own existence.

#### From 'Monolith' to Pluralism: What Kind?

The problem of pluralism, as applicable to Soviet society, which was recently introduced in our ideological circulation, could be considered from a variety of aspects: consistency with the classical models of socialism, legal regulatory aspects, etc. In this case the approach to the problem from the historical-practical side, so to say, seems justified. We believe that it is time to take a close look at the ways in the course of which, for a few years and months, a certain pluralism practically developed, whether acknowledged or not, or whether realized or subconscious and, hence, based on minor and scattered elements of this experience, approach the study of the future and draw general assessments.

A noteworthy feature of the contemporary stage of social change is that an unusual and conflicting number of proclaimed interests, views and opinions emerge on the surface. The simplest thing of all would be to classify this variety as a manifestation of the long awaited glasnost or the real possibilities of the constitutional freedom of speech. However, naturally, it would be insufficient to limit oneself to noting what is apparent on the surface. Words are backed by opinions and opinions by interests and interests by specific social institutions and groups (although simplified, this chain of connections remains adequate). What occurs is something much bigger and more serious than a "simple" variety of voices which disturb the customary style of "choral" unanimity. A process of destruction of the monolithic and monocentric model of society, which is by no means broken down into months but is quite fast nonetheless, as well as a formation, this time not all that rapid, of a certain different but mandatorily pluralistic and polycentric process takes place.

By now a great deal has already been written about the inefficiency of the former, for which reason let us point out merely a few of its main aspects. The "monolithic"

social system, which prevailed in our country for quite a long time, proved to be inefficient, sluggish and the opposite of intensive work and creative investigation. The trouble with monicentrism has invariably been that, by concentrating the power, responsibility and initiative on the top of the social pyramid, it not only deprived of initiative and responsibility all "lower levels," but the very core of society was deprived of its specific "central" functions, reducing its activities to handling current administrative affairs. Although with great historical delay, the need to surmount this model has been finally acknowledged. The fact that this is not a whim, an act of charity or concession to critical or centrifugal trends but precisely a need for the further progress of society, is confirmed today by numerous and sometimes timid or conflicting moves toward real pluralism.

Let us once again note a methodologically important circumstance. We are not discussing merely the pluralism of judgments and opinions (if we were to limit ourselves to that alone an insoluble problem of what is "allowed" or "forbidden," of setting up frameworks, criteria, and so on would inevitably arise). Freedom of opinion and speech must be based on the development of the activities of social groups, associations and individuals, the division of powers and the autonomy of cultures and regions or, in other words, the activeness of the entire variety of social institutions and structures.

What kind of real steps and changes could there be a question of today? Let us begin with the simplest and seemingly obvious: there is the possibility, which was earned with much effort and is still being questioned and which still lacks any kind of juridical support, of autonomous and critical judgments expressed in the press (or, rather, the mass information media) on the life of society and the activities of state institutions. Whatever we may be saying about the limited or, let us assume, the inaccurate nature of some statements, what matters is not even the existence of known or possible publications. The basic opportunity for assuming an active and critical stance by the press is perhaps the most important gain of the perestroika process. It is a clear step toward the development of the press as a separate social institution and the establishment of real public opinion, again as a social institution.

In the past couple of years broad social movements, aimed at eliminating or changing a variety of official decisions, have appeared repeatedly in the arena of social life (or, adding actions taken on the local level, much more frequently). Let us recall the best-known and most successful: the struggle against the plan of turning around the flow of Northern rivers, the campaign of protest against limitations on subscriptions in 1989, actions against the "excesses" of antialcohol legislation, and actions of ecological nature. Regardless of the direction and outcome of individual movements and initiatives, considered in the context and background of the social change, all of them are manifestations of the appearance of a truly institutionalized public which can

organize itself around specific interests and act as a social force. Naturally, we should in no way exaggerate the significance of this force but nor should we fail to notice or take it under consideration.

The need for pluralizing social institutions was manifested also in a number of official documents such as the familiar measures on changing constitutional norms. In the final account, even the initial steps taken toward separating the legislative from the executive power and the state from the party-political power, for greater independence of the courts, increasing the rights of the electorate, and so on, are all the same type of recognition of the need for converting to the pluralism of social structures.

Finally, let us consider the most contradictory and (for the time being) least officially acknowledged area of new social formations: the establishment of autonomous social organizations and movements on a different scale and for different purposes, ranging from ecological to national and from philanthropic to political. They obviously account for no more than a small percentage of the population on the scale of the Union. In a number of areas, however, they are significantly higher. It is unnecessary at this point to discuss the pluses, minuses and contradictions of some such organizations. What is important is to note that these are forms of organization representing specific social interests, some of which quite widespread. Furthermore, they are a conflicting but, possibly, a promising model of active cooperation among nonparty and party people, young people and veterans, and atheists and believers, behind the slogans of a socialist social renovation.

It would be difficult to conceive of the restructuring of functions and the way of activities of the party itself outside such activities, for the party bears the tremendous burden of responsibility for achieving the most efficient and least painful transition to an essentially new model of socialist society.

In any open discussion in recent months, as a rule, the problem of the future of the party or, on a broader basis, the question of the future of the party organization within society, has appeared in any open discussion. A variety of options are discussed, sometimes guilty of doctrinairism or a far-fetched approach such as, for example, the establishment of factions, organizing parallel or alternate parties and, on the other hand, strengthening the ideological struggle and restoring the authoritarian-monolithic models of the relationship between the party and the society.

Today it is more difficult than ever before to deny the openness and unpredictability (potential, to say the least) of ways of sociopolitical development. A close study of the experience acquired of late would help us to evaluate some options, particularly if they are not simply a sum of planned measures but real results of entire series of changes which are only partially consistent with

various plans. Would it not be legitimate, for example, to see in the variety of current social organizations, initiatives and movements one of the forms of organization of social activeness, developed by "life itself," and characteristic of this turning point? This form (or variety of forms) is neither the simple extension ("instrument," "driving gear") of party and state structures such as the formal—in all meanings of the term—mass organizations of the population, or an adversary or alternate party; the party itself is not doomed to the lot of an opponent of social movements. Rather, this is a certain practical albeit insufficiently tested form of real cooperation and real dialogue between the public and the authorities and between the authorities with the public and, above all, with its most intellectual strata and the young.

Both time and experience will prove which of the currently developing forms of social self-organization could become durable and which will remain brief, secondary and transitional products of social and political change.

As we know, today the greatest activeness of social movements, with all their strong, weak and conflicting characteristics, is concentrated on the social periphery (once again not in the geographic but the sociological sense) and their influence is the strongest above all in problems of regional or local order: national-republic rights, and local ecological demands. It is precisely along these lines that are concentrated today the highest "numbers" (assuming that quantitative measurements are possible in this case) of contradictions, impatience, tension and open and potential conflicts. It is also here that we find the greatest danger that the conversion of the developing social dialogue could turn into a severe conflict, the more so since it is precisely this that is the area of the greatest emotional tensions which occasionally are based on economic or demographic reasons (such as the migration problem in the Baltic area) or, in some cases, are seated in the historical or psychological depths of ethnic self-awareness. In principle there is absolutely nothing unexpected here: whenever there is a social upheaval, a deep one even more so, the old prohibitions and controls of social behavior and social passions lose their effectiveness, as a result of which anything which took a long time to accumulate and was ready to emerge does so or, let us say, makes a splash in the arena of social life. Today's society is faced with its own old problems as a historically postponed demand.

Naturally, this is not the only possible or complete method in explaining the "peripheral" priorities in contemporary social movements. Also affecting the present situation is the obvious lagging of the pace of dynamics of the "center" from that of development of the "periphery."

We saw last year how difficult it is to avoid extremes in the demand to settle reciprocal accounts, even when such "accounts" may have historical grounds. This also indicated that administrative-command measures (including



administrative-military) are sometimes adequate in settling conflicts "in public squares" but not in the least in ensuring their essential solution.

There neither is nor could there be any "pluralism for the sake of pluralism." There should not be any pluralism for ostentatious purposes or for purposes of instilling fear. Generally speaking, the pluralism of society is not a self-seeking process but only one of the necessary features in the establishment of the type of social model which, as early as the 18th century, was described as the *civil society*. Hegel considered it a feature of development of "intermediary" social interests and types of activities, located between the family and the power of the state. It is precisely the underdevelopment of such formations (in his view) that is the foundation of despotism. The speculative model of a civil society, which developed at turning points and contradictory changes in our development, consistent with sociohistorical traditions, could hardly be considered effective. In precisely the same manner, we could hardly consider as effective predetermined limitations and tolerances, for in the final account both criteria and limitations can be defined and tested only by that same development.

#### Reference Point

It is not all that simple to recall whether at any given time and in any given nation has the self-awareness of "settling accounts" with one's own past or, rather, one's own historical world outlook, played such a role in shaping an active political self-awareness. The tense discussion about personalities and options and illusions of our immediate and more distant past is not simply an element of the social atmosphere but also an exceptionally important means for the sobering up of society on all its levels and a means of realization of one's own place in the coordinates of social space and time.

It is essential in the study of the results of the "historical" debate to distinguish between the superficial—mostly on the pages of mass publications—and more profound changes on the level of values of a fundamental order. The existence of such changes is unquestionable.

We note, above all, a clear desacralization of the historical process of the establishment of contemporary Soviet society. All different periods in its history are presented as results of struggle and quest and not of the implementation of previously formulated plans. Invariably and with no exception whatsoever, historical personalities are denied their halo of infallibility (or their mythological "negatives") and begin to be treated as real people, in the full variety of their social and human qualities (it is true that today it is easier to detect such changes in mass debates than in the works of professional researchers among whom are still popular concepts of the confrontation between heroes and criminals and the "ascent toward shining heights," and so on. However, such changes are unquestionably taking place deep within the social consciousness).

The soothing model of the global historical process and the place which socialist movements and revolutions play in it, which have long become customary, is quickly losing its meaning and authority. Familiar attempts at proclaiming a new and even completed human civilization turned out to be not only utopian in terms of their very methodology. Clearly, they included a strictly pragmatic aspect which was not realized by everyone: to elevate the attempt at self-isolation and backwardness to the rank of a historical advantage.

In this case we cannot go into even basic essential arguments, for which reason I shall limit myself only to a single consideration: we know that in his final summing works, Lenin discussed the question of the possibility of a "different transition to the creation of the basic postulates of civilization compared to all Western European countries." In earlier works as well, the leader of the Russian Revolution repeatedly considered Marxist theory and revolutionary practice in the context of the "high road" of global progress. This context included the dynamics and values of democracy, humanism and the socialism of the new times. One may assume that the real prospect for the fuller and more durable "return" to that road was related not to confrontations but to establishing a principled dialogue among various cultural and socio-political traditions which followed the single path of civilization and progress.

Common values alone could serve as the language for such a dialogue. Today they are most frequently mentioned under the threat of the "sufficient unto the day is the evil" of universal ecological, nuclear and other threats. Therefore, the turn to the values of civilization assumes the appearance of some kind of superdiplomatic imperative for the survival of mankind. Also appearing is the not entirely harmless illusion that some kind of roof could be built over the separate and conflicting systems and seek under it shelter from global threats. However, one cannot survive or save oneself from nuclear or hungry death "at all cost," merely through diplomacy or by returning to the "caveman's" simplicity of life. "Simple" survival can only be the result of a rather complex process and of higher achievements of human civilization, scientific, technological, social and economic. Such accomplishments include the principles of humanism, democracy, and free development of the individual, as well as the principles of efficient economic management, the economic institutions of our time, parliamentarianism and the separation of powers....

The "historical" discussion of which it is a question leads to a reinterpretation of our status in time and space without, however, changing it. However we may be assessing one turn or alternative of social destiny or another, whether today or the day after tomorrow, the real point of reckoning is here and now. It is precisely here that we find the "Rhodes" from which, as Marx liked to say, one must "jump." The reinterpretation of the past is needed in order to measure this "jump" more accurately.



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### School of Democracy

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[Discussion between Yu. Ryzhov, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission For the Election of USSR People's Deputies, and N. Starovoytov, member of the task force drafting the respective bill and senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law]

[Text] The elections for people's deputies of the USSR, which will be held on 26 March of this year, will be a school of democracy in the full meaning of the term. Elections are an inseparable element of democracy, its key link. The present electoral campaign, organized in an essentially new fashion, is assuming particular importance: the most important political decisions, and the nature of the laws which will define the further destiny of perestroika will depend to a tremendous extent on the people to whom we shall grant deputy mandates and, therefore, the right to represent our interests in the country's superior state power body.

That is why we must become thoroughly familiar with the details of the new electoral mechanism and be suitably acquainted with the basic stipulations of the USSR Law On the Election of People's Deputies of the USSR which, as a whole, regulates quite fully the course of the electoral campaign. Nonetheless, practical experience indicates that this law requires some quite substantial clarifications, particularly concerning the procedural order, for no legislative act can cover all "irregular" situations which inevitably emerge in any new project. As requested by Yu. Kudryavtsev, *KOMMUNIST* correspondent, these questions were the subject of a discussion by Yu. Ryzhov, secretary of the Central Electoral Commission On the Selection of People's Deputies of the USSR, and N. Starovoytov, one of the members of the task force in charge of drafting the law and senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the State and Law.

[Correspondent] Above all, Yuriy Ivanovich, could you tell us more about the work of the Central Electoral Commission, its composition and its prerogatives?

[Yu. Ryzhov] In accordance with the law, the commission has been granted a broad range of rights in all matters related to the organization and holding of the elections: the setting of electoral districts, which was previously the prerogative of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, supervising over the entire Soviet territory the implementation of the Law On Elections, ensuring its uniform application, and solving problems related to the material and technical facilities for holding elections and those related to by-elections, the recall of deputies, and so on. For that reason the commission was set up as

a permanent authority for a 5-year term. It is important to emphasize that it is also, so to say, the highest authority in solving all problems and claims related to the elections (with the exception of complaints of irregularities in electoral tickets, which are considered by the courts).

The rights of lower-ranking electoral commissions have been broadened as well: in the past, they simply acted as observers and recorders of balloting results. Now they are their full-fledged organizers. This precisely means democracy in action, when the representatives of the people independently solve all electoral problems, from their initial to their final stage.

[N. Starovoytov] Obviously, Yuriy Ivanovich, it is worth emphasizing that the nature of activities of the commissions has changed as well.

[Yu. Ryzhov] Yes, it is no secret to anyone that under the old conditions a number of problems related to elections were actually predetermined essentially through directives. Hence the meetings of the commissions were boring and bureaucratic, although official. Now this calls for real work, with arguments, suggestions and investigations, which are inherent in any live action.

Let us also mention the composition of the Central Electoral Commission. It includes people with great practical experience in social activities and, as you have probably noticed, people who do not hold high positions. In other words, the membership is not only able-bodied but, which is also very important, neutral: no one can "pressure" anyone else by virtue of his position.

[Correspondent] What were the problems encountered at the very beginning by the commission and which had to be basically solved?

[Yu. Ryzhov] Many problems have already been solved. Electoral districts were formed within the time stipulated by the law; forms of new electoral documents were drafted and approved; explanations were provided on basic problems of organizing the work of district commissions and commissions for the election of people's deputies for the USSR by public organizations; financing has been secured. In short, everything has been done not to obstruct the electoral process. There have been difficulties as well. It was impossible to draft in advance detailed instructions on the organization of elections, for the law had just been passed and many of its stipulations had to be refined in the course of the nationwide discussion.

Territorial electoral districts have been reorganized differently. Whereas in the past the criterion was the size of the population in a specific territory (which, incidentally, is the custom of most countries throughout the world), now it is based on the number of voters. The new

principle reflects the specific nature of the Soviet population: for example, in the South, although the population may be numerically the same, there are more children than in the North and, consequently, correspondingly less voters. By setting up districts based on the number of voters, we thus equalized all republics and areas. As a result, for example, Georgia, Latvia and Lithuania will benefit, for the number of their districts was increased.

Furthermore, let us note the qualitatively new electoral ballot, which presumes the conscious and mandatorily personal casting of the vote by the voter for or against any specific deputy. For many decades formalism had become so deeply entrenched in our lives, including voting procedures, that frequently the voters not even knew or cared about whom they voted. Now the slate of candidates of the district will indicate not only their names but also their positions, place of work and place of residence. The voting procedure as well is defined: the voter must strike out the name of the candidate for whom he is not voting. It will be stipulated that any ballot in which more than one candidate has been left will be considered invalid.

Finally, an essentially new phenomenon is the election of people's deputies by public organizations. We have no such previous experience. Each organization, based on the stipulations of the law, will take into consideration the suggestions received from local authorities, primary collectives and members of organizations, in defining its own mechanism for the nomination of candidates for deputies. In most cases, it is such as to allow virtually any primary organization or member of a public organization to voice his opinion on any candidacy. This was, in particular, the way the system was organized within the CPSU. Out of more than 30,000 candidacies suggested by the primary organizations, in the course of gradual debates the candidates to be nominated by the Central Committee plenum were determined. This took into consideration numerous suggestions which were sent directly to the CPSU Central Committee. Never before had such a democratic procedure for the choice of candidates been applied. This is an acquisition of the new electoral campaign.

[N. Starovoytov] Naturally, the choice of candidates suggested by the primary party organizations would have been substantially facilitated had the number of nominations been initially reduced to a minimum. For example, several primary organizations could have joined in nominating a single candidate. In a number of cases this is precisely what happened.

The question of apportioning mandates among specific social organizations within the limits of the quotas set for many of them, which was 75, turned out to be complex. On the basis of what principle was such an apportionment to take place? If it were based on the importance of the organization in social life, this would have been tempting but, in my view, rather loose and

subjective, and not entirely democratic. What about membership strength? In that case, for example, the Komsomol or the trade unions would have obtained many more mandates than the CPSU, which would have been politically erroneous. Obviously, as we gain experience, additions will have to be made to the law regarding the criteria for the apportioning of mandates.

[Yu. Ryzhov] I would not exaggerate the importance of this problem, for in practical terms it was solved with no conflict whatsoever. The law lists nine categories of public organizations. The commission did not start to add up the number of their members or to assess their activities. This is not our field of competence. We tried to proceed on the basis of the law and common sense, which enabled us, together with the representatives of the organizations, to solve quite accurately and without major differences, the question of the number of mandates whenever it was not stipulated by the law. Naturally, the role of the organizations in social life was taken into consideration.

[Correspondent] The various groups I visited frequently asked the same question: Was this new development—elections by social organizations—not a violation of the principle of equal voting rights? For in this case some voters would be voting twice: by territorial and national-territorial electoral district and also as members of the CPSU, a trade union, a creative association, and so on. Understandably, in considering this question we must bear in mind that in the past as well people who lived in an autonomous republic, autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug voted for three candidates. Clearly, what matters is for every voter to vote for one candidate no more than once. Nonetheless, one-third of the people's deputies will be elected only by a small percentage of the population. In this connection, Nikolay Georgiyevich, how are scientists rating the specific nature of elections from public organizations?

[N. Starovoytov] Let me immediately point out that elections for people's deputies, nominated by public organizations, are an essentially new type of election. This is due, above all, to the fact that unlike territorial and national-territorial electoral districts, here not all members of an organization vote but their "electors," i.e., delegates to congresses and conferences or participants in plenums of their all-Union bodies. The law describes them as "voters." Multiple-step elections are extensively practiced throughout the world. Such was the case in the elections to the USSR Central Executive Committee prior to the adoption of the 1936 USSR Constitution. Multiple-step elections have their advantages, some of which are even purely technical; this does not mean in the least any "less democracy" as some people believe. Let me emphasize that the "electors" are people who have been elected to the leadership of the public organizations or to be delegate to a conference. If we have entrusted leadership to them, why not entrust them with voting in our behalf? Naturally, today the very

attitude toward the establishment of the leading authorities of public organizations should change: by giving them a mandate to elect people's deputies of the USSR in our behalf, we must become more exigent in our approach to them as well.

An important stage in the electoral campaign is the nomination of candidates, which ends on 24 January. What has changed here compared to the old practice? The law grants the right to the voters in territorial and national-territorial electoral districts to nominate candidates at electoral meetings at their place of residence. In the past such right was granted only to the public organizations, labor collectives and meetings of military personnel in their units. Now we are adding to them the population of the specific territory. Such an assembly has a quorum if it is attended by no less than 500 voters residing on the territory of the given electoral district. The main idea of this innovation is that it enables the people to nominate those with whom they meet frequently, who are directly involved with the satisfaction of their daily needs such as, for example, a sales clerk, physician or teacher. The practice of the elections to local soviets in 1987 confirms the efficiency of this new development. What happened in the past was that there were those who nominated candidates, a labor collective for instance, while others voted for them—the district's population. Today this gap is being filled. Here is another new requirement: as a rule, the candidate for people's deputy of the USSR must reside or work on the territory of the electoral district from which he will be elected; in elections based on national-territorial districts, he must reside on the territory of the respective Union or autonomous republic, autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug. The practice of nominating candidates directly by the population will be of invaluable significance in the development of local self-management, the law on which is as yet to be drafted.

As to the public organizations, their rank-and-file members will submit nominations at meetings of primary party organizations. This is worth noting, for in the first stage of the electoral campaign by no means did everyone realize the difference. Several such agencies, with a small membership, can nominate candidates for plenums of their all-Union authorities or joint sessions.

[Yu. Ryzhov] The following trend was noted in the course of the nomination of candidates by labor collectives in the districts: preference is being given to the manager or a member of the intelligentsia, bypassing workers or rank-and-file kolkhoz members, whose candidacies are not even discussed. It has also happened that in the collective no single candidate is nominated and efforts are made to shift the final selection to the electorate which, naturally, is less well informed about the personality of the candidates, although there is absolutely no logic in this: it is much more efficient to struggle for a single candidate backed by the entire collective rather than for part of a candidate.

[N. Starovoytov] Obviously, the "culprit" in this case is Article 37 of the Law On Elections, which does not directly stipulate that after a discussion of several candidates the collective may nominate only one and request his registration. It is now obvious that this article must be interpreted precisely in that sense.

[Yu. Ryzhov] Naturally, the right of a labor collective to nominate a candidate for the electoral district does not mean that this is what each collective will do. Practical experience has indicated that usually it is large, prestigious and famous collectives that nominate their candidates—plants, institutes, and so on. However, at the very start several districts nominated five or more candidates. This proves once again that the final selection of candidates for a district is necessary; henceforth this function will be performed by the district electoral assembly. The representation rates for such an assembly will be determined by the district electoral commission, based on the number of collectives which have nominated their candidates and in accordance with the possibility of holding meetings. At a meeting, naturally, the collectives which have nominated candidates must be equally represented. However, we also need an independent judge, so to say. This role will be performed by the district electoral assembly, representing the labor collectives, assemblies of citizens at their place of residence, and military personnel who previously did not participate in the nomination of candidates. They must account for no less than one-half of the participants in such assemblies.

[N. Starovoytov] As you can see, the social base for democracy has been broadened at that stage as well. As to the "technical aspect," it would be best to reduce the number of candidates to two. If there are more, there is a great likelihood that a second round of elections will be necessary although, naturally, the final decision is that of the electorate.

[Correspondent] Incidentally, as we read Articles 55 and 56 of the Law On Elections, we note different principles governing the counting of ballots by electoral district and public organization. Also distinct is the principle of counting first- and second-round votes by districts. Furthermore, could it happen that, based on the results of the vote in a district (from which, according to the law, one deputy is elected) for two people to garner more than one-half of the vote?

[Yu. Ryzhov] This is hardly possible. I already pointed out that the voter must strike out on the ballot the candidates from the electoral district for whom he does not vote, leaving on the slate a single candidate. Otherwise the ballot will be considered invalid. In other words, if two or more candidates garner more than one-half of the votes each this could mean only one thing: in a certain number of ballots several candidacies were not checked out, which makes such ballots invalid.

[N. Starovoytov] Naturally, it can perfectly well happen that no single candidate is elected in an electoral district. In that case, if there were more than two candidates, there will be a second election in which the people will vote for one of the two candidates who have garnered the largest number of votes. At this point the counting of the ballots will be based on the principle of a simple majority: the candidate who has garnered the largest number of votes will be elected.

[Yu. Ryzhov] Unlike the territorial electoral districts, the public organizations will operate on the basis of the principle of multiple mandates with all the deriving consequences, namely: the voter may strike out the names of some candidates or even not a single one of them. The candidate with the largest number of votes will be elected but, mandatorily, if he has obtained more than one-half of the votes of delegates to congresses, conferences or members of plenums. In the case of an equal number of ballots, second elections will be held.

[N. Starovoytov] Nonetheless, even under the new conditions, the voters could "out of habit" simply drop the ballots in the ballot boxes and thus make them invalid.

[Yu. Ryzhov] In the experimental multiple-mandate districts, that was precisely what we feared in the 1987 elections. However, it turned out that we had no reason to fear: this happened in only two of the 23,000 electoral districts! This instills optimism.

What was amazing was the desire of the organizers of the elections to regulate everything and everyone and, sometimes, to prevent the voters from voting. For example, in the voting booth there would be a small stool on which a huge vase with flowers was placed. This may not seem wrong at all, for this was a solemn day. But then that stool was to be used by the voter with his ballot and there was no space left for him! Frequently difficulties were due to the fact that there were few voting booths, located in inconvenient places. The power of inertia was felt as well: many voters simply shied from entering the booth.

[N. Starovoytov] It is becoming clear now that both election officials and voters must learn democracy. In the past people would vote on behalf of their relatives as well, dropping a bunch of ballots in the box. Now voting becomes a personal matter and let me emphasize, precisely the concern of the individual. The new law requires a proper approach both on the part of the voter and the electoral commission. Now it is important to make the people realize that the fate of perestroika, and this is no exaggeration, depends on every single voter.

[Correspondent] A major and difficult stage in the electoral campaign is the campaigning for candidates, and the candidate's speeches which present programs to the voters. Obviously, here as well a great deal will be new.

[N. Starovoytov] Unquestionably. In accordance with Article 45 of the law, the candidates must submit programs detailing their future activities. Furthermore, the position of the campaigners is very important. In the past they went to people's homes to update the lists of voters, to remind the residents that they must vote, and that was all. Now they must truly promote one candidate or another and make active efforts.

[Yu. Ryzhov] I would argue this point with Nikolay Georgiyevich. Today a new institution is entering the stage: a "team" of people, as many as ten, speaking for the candidate. Initially, both campaign headquarters and campaigners will most likely work in the spirit of existing traditions. Collectives which have nominated their own candidate will probably work quite energetically to have him elected. Collectives which have been "assigned" to an electoral district but which, themselves, have not nominated candidates will, naturally, be less interested in the struggle. However, they too must be active in organizational work and in mastering the information, and must be able efficiently to spread it among the public.

Essentially, the entire system of campaigning work will be restructured, for the old one has become hopelessly obsolete. We need new promotional standards. Let there be propaganda centers, debate clubs, etc. The voter should hear out the candidates, understand their arguments and determine his own preference. We realize that initially many people may support speakers who can "sell" themselves. But, let us repeat once again: democracy must be learned. It is in that case that the representatives of the candidate must play their role of explaining to the people who is who.

Particularly valuable today are the novelty and the nontrivial nature of the ways and means of campaigning. Making use in such work of the biography, and features of the life and character of the candidate, and developing the idea of the candidate as a person, an individual, is psychologically quite important.

In speaking of campaigning, let me especially discuss the role of the party agencies in this matter and, in general, their position in the course of the electoral campaign. The criticism of party agencies in which virtually everyone has become involved, has led to the other extreme: they are now afraid to "interfere" in the elections! This is a wrong position. The party organizations must be active. They must pursue a line in the interests of perestroika and socialism. The trouble, precisely, is that campaigning is the most neglected sector today.

New forms of work should be sought. The voter must be helped to determine who is his preferred candidate. Detailed information on every candidate must be supplied to the population. Meetings between candidates and the broadest possible electoral circles must be organized more frequently. It must be explained to the voter that the structure of the supreme authority depends on

him. In short, one must fight for the candidate if one is convinced that this person is needed for perestroika. However, we must also see to it that Article 44 of the Law On Elections is observed. This law calls for equal rights of candidates to speak out at electoral and other meetings, conferences, and sessions, and via the press, television and the radio.

[Correspondent] The question of campaigning in an electoral district is more or less clear. But how to campaign among the electors of public organizations, who are "scattered" throughout the Union?

[N. Starovoytov] Naturally, in this case matters are somewhat more complex. I can think of two basic ways: meetings between the candidates and the aktiv of the public organizations and campaigning through the mass information media. Furthermore, meetings between electors and rank-and-file members of public organizations are of tremendous importance. At those meetings, those who will vote could seek the advice of those on whose behalf they will vote for the candidate.

As to the equal rights of candidates to address the voters, that is where the difficulty lies. The point is that some candidates register earlier than other and, therefore, some may have more time for campaigning. The law has not considered this aspect. Therefore, I think that in order to somehow find a solution to this problem, the electoral commissions themselves and the elected authorities of the public organizations must take matters in their own hands. In the electoral districts this should be the job of the district electoral commissions, with the active help of the local soviets and the public. Obviously, it would be expedient to develop a schedule for their speeches and addresses, coordinated with the candidates for deputies. Naturally, the candidates should be given equal access to mass information media, assembly halls, etc.

[Correspondent] It seems to me that the Law On Elections includes a serious contradiction. Article 47 stipulates that no campaigning will be allowed on elections day. Yet we read in Point 3 Article 29 that the electoral commissions for the election of people's deputies nominated by public organizations will "sum up suggestions and remarks expressed about the candidates for deputies by the local authorities, primary collectives and members of public organizations and private citizens and will report such remarks at the congresses or conferences of public organizations or else at the plenum of its all-Union authority." Obviously, this will be done on elections day, the moment the authorities at the sessions have been named. Is this not campaigning?

[N. Starovoytov] That is not my assessment of the reports submitted by the commissions. They should be considered rather as instructions issued by the members of the public organizations to their candidates and their wishes for the future.

[Yu. Ryzhov] Nonetheless, all the elements of campaigning are present in this case. The report of a commission could lead to a discussion and, therefore, to inevitable evaluations of candidates, which is nothing other than a form of campaigning. Naturally, there is a problem. For that reason, it would be more accurate to divide the plenum, conference or rally of the public organization into two parts or else hold their meetings on different days. One part would deal with a discussion of the report submitted by the commission and the other with the voting. In other words, once the voting is under way all discussions will be stopped. We must also bear in mind that conditions for campaigning at plenary meetings or on the territory of a city rayon may vary greatly.

Generally speaking, in itself the prohibition of campaigning on elections day is a major step in the democratization of the electoral process and is consistent with worldwide practices. On that day a calm and businesslike atmosphere must prevail throughout the country, so that both the electorate and the voters from the public organizations, who have made their decisions in the previous stages will be able to express their will definitively.

[N. Starovoytov] In my view, nor should we ignore the system of instructions by the voters, which I already mentioned. This is a very democratic institution. As to the present elections, the activities of the voters are increasing, for which reason the proper choice of instructions becomes particularly important.

Odd situations are also possible. For example, the voters may issue instructions to three candidates but only one of them may be elected. The question is, what will happen to the other instructions?

[Yu. Ryzhov] A variety of opinions exist. The instructions of the voters are an expression of their vital needs and they should not be left unattended. Obviously, a candidate who has been elected cannot ignore them.

[Correspondent] Indeed, such a solution becomes necessary but it is hardly accurate under present-day conditions. Why should the elected deputy have to implement the instructions addressed at other candidates? We are speaking of a competition among programs and of electoral struggle. The logic, in my view, is precisely that the winners in the elections may refuse instructions which the voters have issued to his rival, the more so if they are different from his own program. Naturally, in that case the "losing" voters will inevitably suffer. A certain compromise should be sought. Why not, for example, issue instructions to the already elected deputies, as is clearly stipulated in Article 10 of the law? This would solve the problem.

[Yu. Ryzhov] In this case we are still affected by the old custom that this is the way it was always done. Naturally, it would be more logical to issue instructions to someone who has already been elected. Generally speaking, we

must recognize that the institution of instructions in our country is archaic perhaps because instructions are issued to the candidate but are subsequently approved at the session of the soviet, i.e., it is as though he is not responsible for them. Such an institution must be revised radically. However, the deputies themselves must have a feeling of duty, of moral responsibility to the voters.

I believe that it would be expedient to issue instructions at meetings involving the participation of all the candidates of a given district. Incidentally, the discussion would cover not only the views of the individual candidates but also their attitude toward the instructions.

As to instructions issued by public organizations, they could be formulated at congresses, conferences and plenums in the course of the election of deputies. This, probably, is what will happen.

[Correspondent] Judging by our discussion, there will be a clear need for recommendations and explanations by the commissions....

[Yu. Ryzhov] Such recommendations have already been distributed concerning many problems, and such work will continue. Generally speaking, we are not going to those elections with empty hands. It would be no exaggeration to say that work on the Law On Elections began immediately after the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The main idea on which the law is based is the discussion and nomination of an unlimited number of candidates.

Elections were held for local authorities in 1987, in the course of which, for the first time, the multiple-mandate system was tried. This was a major sociopolitical experiment which indicated how tremendously attracted were the people to democracy. We realized that on the primary level of the soviet, where the people know each other well, as a rule, particularly in rural areas, it makes sense to use precisely the multiple mandate system by electing a group of deputies from a consolidated but monolithic electoral district, such as a village, street or precinct.

As you know, this experiment was made in 162 rayons in the country. We realized that the less the voters knew the candidate the more formal was their attitude toward the elections. The voting revealed the following pattern as well: they voted "for their own" candidate, striking out the "outsiders;" unfamiliar with any name on the ballot, they would strike people out either because of their positions or because their names were at the tail end of the list.

We learned a great deal from the experiment with the multiple-mandate districts. In particular, this eliminated speculative concepts on the attitude of the population toward some groups of candidates. Thus, negative votes were cast on an average of 11.8 percent "against" party workers, 10.9 percent "against" managers of Soviet

agencies and 11.3 percent "against" personnel of economic authorities. All of these figures were below the average overall indicators. Based on the existing views that usually those whose names are stricken out are, as they say, people who "stand out" and are responsible for everything, we expected the worst. It turned out that in their majority, both party and soviet workers enjoyed the population's active support.

The elections revealed something else as well. For example, more than one-third of the chairmen of city executive committees were not elected. This was the influence of the problems of the small towns under rayon administration which are, as a rule, the most neglected economically and socially. In other words, the elections, the true and democratic elections, highlighted a number of economic, social and psychological problems.

[N. Starovoytov] Unquestionably, the institution of reserve deputies is useful as well although, initially, the attitude toward the term itself was negative. Yet life proved that this was a worthy innovation: should the "main" deputy be unseated, his place is automatically taken by the reserve deputy without elections. Now, when the local soviets as well will be elected to a 5-year term, the role of the reserve deputies will become particularly noticeable, for as such they steadily participate in the work of the soviets. I believe that it would be more acceptable, nonetheless, to change the term to "substitute deputy." In my view, this matter should be discussed further.

To the best of my knowledge, the question of the multiple-mandate system, as applicable to the superior authorities and the reserve deputies on that level, has appeared as well. The Hungarian experience was studied. We must bear in mind that in the Supreme Soviet replacements, naturally, are less frequent. Yet, had there been reserve deputies, they would have hindered the influx of fresh forces on the higher levels. As to the use of a multiple-mandate system for the higher echelon, it is obviously unsuitable: the people, who are not suitably familiar with the candidates, would adopt a formal attitude toward the vote.

[Yu. Ryzhov] As we can see, the current law encompasses extensive experience. In the immediate future work will begin on republic electoral laws for superior and local authorities. Every single bit of experience acquired in the forthcoming elections for USSR people's deputies and from the 1987 elections must be taken into consideration. In particular, the multiple-mandate system could become the base for the law on elections to local soviets.

A law is tested through practical experience. It is already clear that in this law some things will have to be changed or refined. We shall learn from life, and something will have to be taken into consideration in the republic laws and, subsequently, in the Law On the Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR.

[Correspondent] The Central Electoral Commission has been assigned a very difficult and responsible function: to explain the stipulations of the law and to study developing situations. It seems to me that under the current conditions many items should be interpreted in a broader sense, thus offering greater scope for the political and social creativity of millions of people. To paraphrase the familiar postulate of the criminal procedure law, we can clearly say that in any doubtful matter the commission would interpret matters in favor of the voter and, on a broader basis, in favor of democracy.

[Yu. Ryzhov] Unquestionably! Only thus can we broaden the framework of activeness of millions of Soviet people who are undergoing these months a difficult yet a very necessary political training for all of us.

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#### Time to Repay Debts

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[Article by Oleg Vasilyevich Kuprin, deputy department editor, *KOMMUNIST*, and Aleksey Valentinovich Ulyukayev, consultant, *KOMMUNIST*]

[Text] Preparations for the Krasnoyarsk Kray Accountability and Election Conference were proceeding as planned. But then there was the weather.... The Krasnoyarsk Airport was open. Meanwhile, however, there was a snowstorm in Norilsk and nearly 80 conference delegates were pining away, as they waited for the flight. The moment a "window" would open, they would be the first to go. The flight would take no less than 2 hours. Such are the distances here, such is the nature of this area. The problems as well here are bigger than elsewhere, and errors and blunders are greater. In short, there is something to think about, both on the kray and, so to say, the all-Union scale. An impressive example of this is that this covers almost one-half of Eastern Siberia.

In the final account, the weather as well decided not to provide surprises, and the people of Norilsk flew in. The conference opened precisely on schedule, at 9:00 a.m. local time.

#### A Turn?

The socioeconomic problems which life itself raised for discussion by the delegates to the 25th Kray Party Conference were complex and unusual. Like the rest of the country, the kray is encountering problems which are no longer merely economic but political-economic, in the full meaning of the term. This is a political economy not discussed in books but seen on store shelves, at the dining table, on the roof over one's head, in terms of clean air, the family hearth and prosperity.

Was the 200,000-strong party organization aware of their urgency and significance? Was it prepared to act as the true vanguard in the struggle against the consequences of stagnation? Did it realize that without efficient political decisions and without open and honest dialogue with the people it could not come out of a most dangerous crisis, the crisis of trust?

The accountability report submitted by the kraykom and the talks with O.N. Shenin, its first secretary, revealed that such an understanding did exist, in any case as far as the food problem was concerned. His firm confidence expressed at the conference was that unless the kray reaches an 8-10 percent growth in food production the people will simply refuse to trust their leadership, and replace it. Currently a comprehensive program is being drafted for improving food supplies. The program is what a program should be: firm, thorough and promising, if not rivers of milk, at least a sufficient amount of meat and dairy products. However, in the past as well, when it came to drafting programs, everything was in order. Yet their implementation was clearly weak. Year after year and 5-year period after 5-year period the development of processing facilities was postponed "for later." Only six of the 59 major Agroprom projects scheduled for completion in 1988 had been completed and 32 of the projects had not been undertaken at all. This was in addition to the fact that one-half of the functioning meat combines, for example, built 60 to 70 years ago, were in pitiful condition.

The scale of industrial capital investments was (and remains) huge; the deadlines of the notorious "use of funds" were excessive. The kray looks like a huge uncleared construction site, a warehouse crowded with unused or poorly used disorderly stored valuables. For many long years the departments promoted, like an incantation, Siberia's incalculable wealth which, as M.V. Lomonosov said, would increase Russia's power. Yes, such wealth does increase but also remains frozen here. Furthermore, how much of this wealth was left for use by the people of Siberia and invested in improving their lives? Natural resources and material conditions for social development, for a well-organized life and for an unpolluted environment were owed to this land and its people. Has the time not come, finally, to repay that debt?

It is true that now, under the conditions of perestroika and, particularly after M.S. Gorbachev's September trip, the situation has been changing. This year the share of nonindustrial construction must reach 27.8 percent (until recently it did not exceed 20 percent). The trouble is that only a small share of this will be handled by the local soviets, for all the rest will still be dependent on those same omnipotent departments. The people of the kray realize that such dependence can always threaten the implementation of their vital plans. That is why a course has been charted toward developing a domestic



construction industry: plants for the production of bricks, slate and facing tiles, and sanitation equipment. This includes agreements made with foreign companies.

However, departmental diktat and annoying "failures" in the social area can hardly be surmounted with purely quantitative growth. What is needed is a breakthrough in terms of achieving a new quality of economic thinking and practice and going beyond the framework of ordinary stereotypes. Relations between the kray and the departments, between producers and consumers, must be converted to a healthy cost accounting basis. Naturally, territorial cost accounting is not a cure-all for all diseases. In this case some people may be "for" or "against," but it was precisely such differences of opinion that were not heard at the conference. No delegate was interested in the problem of the kray's finances as well. Were they aware of the kray's budget deficit, running into the millions of rubles?

The dialectics of the party approach to economics is complex. However, the kray's party members are beginning to realize that "today there is no need for the party leadership to interfere in the economic mechanism under all kinds of pretexts, but concentrate its attention on solving the key problems" (V.A. Murysin, shipyards party committee secretary).

The crux of these problems is the scientific and technical standard and efficiency of output, disproportions, and lack of coordination in the development of production forces. They were discussed at length in the accountability report. The party members are worried by the significant drop in capital returns and increased unfinished construction, as a result of which every year the kray has a shortfall of 400 to 500 million rubles in profits (approximately as much as is spent here on housing construction every year), and the long time it takes to design, build and start-up enterprises. Essentially, these are resource-intensive projects which manufacture semi-finished rather than finished products and have a high "impact coefficient" on the environment.

The regional economic structure is aimed not even at yesterday's development but of the day before that, in terms of its advance and strongly resembles a colonial system. It is obvious that obsolete, ecologically dangerous and economically inefficient production facilities must be closed down. This would inevitably lead to manpower surpluses. This looks like a paradox: we keep talking of the need to involve more people and to keep the working people in Siberia. So how could there be a surplus? In Norilsk, however, the extensive development of capacities has reached a limit which, under cost accounting conditions, has already led to the point of lay-offs. No one wants to leave the area. To begin with, the regional wage coefficient is high; second, conditions for marketing goods are favorable and supplies are good.

This has brought about a most urgent social problem: there are several thousand people who are actually unemployed. Is the kray party organization prepared to solve it?

Problems of developing new economic relations, leasing above all, were also discussed at the conference. It is gratifying that the delegates tried to analyze such problems comprehensively and that they were able to see them more closely and comprehensively than the personnel of the kraykom agrarian department. I.Sh. Zabbarov, director of the Sibir Sovkhoz and delegate to the conference said that "there can be no independent lessees without an independent sovkhoz or kolkhoz. The owner is the main feature in agriculture. With the present dictatorship exercised by the command authorities, there will never be a true proprietor." A.F. Veprev, Nazarovskiy Sovkhoz director, said that "the kray agroprom and its deputies are not the commanders of agriculture; agriculture means producers: kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and leasing, contracting and family collectives and cooperatives. All others are only sitting on their shoulders. Therefore, economic management must be integrated only horizontally in order to avoid the creation of new bureaucratic systems."

Let us add that this is occurring today as well. In Lenin's words, the administrative-distribution structure creates such systems on a daily and hourly basis, on a tremendous scale. The kray agroprom system used to have 930 officials dealing with agriculture. Today, A.F. Veprev pointed out, there are 1,500. What is happening? It turns out that scientific-production systems are now being set up for the individual crops, such as "barley," "Rapes," and others. This appears as though the Hungarian experience has been applied, which is an entirely honorable thing. However, in Hungary such systems were based on specific farms, the best, the most advanced. Their task was to disseminate progressive technologies. In our country, the project was started by creating "staffs" of 30 to 40 people who immediately began to generate papers and make demands on the producers.

Today the food supply system cannot be solved by simply increasing capital investments, the more so since under the conditions of the scarcity of means of production and capacities in the construction industry, they frequently remain unused. In this case we must make use of the additional production force provided by the division and cooperation of labor and equivalent trade. It must not be a question of replacing agrarian with industrial labor within the framework of traditional "sponsorship" or auxiliary plots but organizing in the countryside fully "urban" construction and installation projects which would supply the people not with golden (in terms of cost) but entirely ordinary eggs, meat, butter and vegetables. A.F. Veprev described at the conference the "alliance" between his sovkhoz and the coal miners. They will build a livestock breeding complex and will



invest in it 1.5-2 million rubles and against this sum they will be receiving meat and dairy goods, the production of which, in their own private plots, would cost several hundred percent more.

The kray's ecological situation has become aggravated to the utmost. The people are justifiably indignant at the condition of the air and water basins, industrial dumps and the predatory departmental use of nature. And who, if not the party members, should sound the alarm and demand the solution of such problems?

A.D. Timoshenko, brigade leader at the Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant, and A.D. Malinovskiy, first secretary of the Leninskiy Party Raykom, severely condemned the lack of a clear ecological concept in the party authorities. They demanded that the resolution of the ecological problem be considered a most important political task and to demand of the departments the strict implementation of respective resolutions, including the restructuring of a number of enterprises.

The statement by I.A. Kirillov, general director of the Krasnoyarsklesprom Association, who defended the antisocial practice of increasing logging in convenient and settled areas, sounded strange against this background, as though coming from the period of stagnation. This was despite the fact that in the flooded area of the Boguchansk GES alone 120,000 hectares of timber would have to be cleared. A deserved rebuff to such departmental ambitions was provided by O.S. Shenin: the party organization will not allow such a barbaric economic management method.

On the day of our departure from Krasnoyarsk the kray radio gave its usual weather forecast: the air temperature was 15-17 degrees, no precipitation, the wind was slight and the enterprises were working normally. What did this mean? It meant that they were not discarding the many tons of their waste consisting of multiple components. Otherwise, if no wind was blowing, such waste could be quite costly to the people who are hostage to departmental expansion. To the departments nature is not a temple or a workshop, but an endless barrel from which they extract resources and into which they throw their waste. Today the comprehensive and balanced development of the kray is impossible without "ecological cost accounting." The collective reasoning of the kray party organization is beginning to realize this.

#### More Questions Than Answers

"It has become clear that we will not be able to solve topical problems relying only on the old arsenal of ways and means of ideological work," the accountability report of the party kraykom stated. "Practical experience acquired in recent years has indicated that the ways and means of ideological work can be updated only through its democratization."

Have successes been achieved in that area? Unquestionably, they have. Secretaries and members of the kray CPSU committee buro regularly speak on television and radio and write in the kray press. The greatest changes have taken place in the mass information media, but...

A.P. Basov, head of an assembly brigade, at the Boguchansk GES, addressed the conference. We hope that his recorded statement will give an idea of the intonation and mood of the speaker: "The order has been given to commission the first two units by 1994. I cannot tell you how many such orders have been issued. Orders called for commissioning in 1991, and then 1992; yet start-up slogans were also heard the 1980s.... In filling the water reservoir more than 36,000 hectares of farmland, 15,000 of which are cultivated, will be flooded. The plan calls for restoring 10,000 hectares of arable land. We shall be flooding land which has been improved and cultivated and instead we shall be given clay. So far 400 hectares have been restored. At this pace we shall need 25 years.... Perhaps this GES should not be built at all? Who needs it today? After the turbines have been commissioned we have no one to supply with electricity. No one intends to use electric power locally. Nothing is being built...."

We found out, after the conference, that daring and quite tempting plans have been drawn up to make use of the energy generated at the Boguchansk GES. For the time being, however, such plans are still somewhere on the upper levels where there are disagreements, for which reason it is still too early to make them public. But then, to the head of an assembly brigade, to A.P. Basov and his colleagues, this is a case of a second decade of work while they think: Who needs this? The speaker who succeeded him added: "We are now openly describing something which observant people have known for a long time."

"It is not enough for the people of Krasnoyarsk to admire the glasnost of Central Television. Why not adopt here the experience of Novosibirsk Oblast? In Novosibirsk candidacies were discussed in the press, and on the radio and television. Could it be that here we have a different type of glasnost?" (A.D. Timoshenko, head of an electrolytic brigade, Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant). "We must lift the veil of anonymity and lack of understanding of the 'informals,'" (F.P. Pogorelov, electric fitter at the Krasnoyarsk Electric Locomotives and Coach Repairs Plant).

However, many similar questions of great interest to the people remained unanswered. No single ideological worker was given the floor at the conference. We were told, it is true, that there had been no bias in selecting the speakers, that it just so happened.... Nonetheless the complex ideological situation here obviously needed a specific and thoughtful study.

On the eve of M.S. Gorbachev's arrival to Krasnoyarsk, KRASNOYARSKIY KOMSOMOLETS published an issue of the newspaper entitled "What I Would Say To

Gorbachev." This selection was included in the book *"Five Days In September,"* which was quickly put out by the local publishing house, timed for the conference. S. Malashina, head of the repair workshop, city soviet deputy and CPSU member, would have liked to discuss the rights of the deputy: "Naturally, officially both the director of a plant and a worker are equal as deputies. Actually, there is a gap between them. And if the deputy, in addition to everything else, happens to be young, he would be unable to accomplish anything worthwhile.... When I was first elected, I thought that I would move mountains.... I now say that we have no power.... I felt so ashamed looking at the people!... For an entire year during my term, not a single person came to see me!... Faith in the help of a deputy is being lost everywhere. The only reason is that he, the deputy, is always in the role of a petitioner."

For some reason, it was deemed inappropriate openly to say something at the conference about the so-called "informals." The tempestuous increase in public associations, reflecting the variety of social interests, was noted. It was said that they should be subject to constant party attention and support. Most frequently, however, the talk about the "informals" was extremely harsh: "The enthusiasm of unsubstantiated exposure is making their brains foggy;" these are "extremists who have risen on the crest of glasnost;" "brawlers who sometimes are successful with some population strata." The press as well joined it: "Some journalists, either unable or unwilling to determine the reasons for such phenomena, occasionally draw conclusions the accuracy of which is very doubtful."

One month before the conference, once again LITERATURNIYA GAZETA printed something about the Krasnoyarsk "informals." The local press published similar materials. There was a great deal of talk in the city and there were even more rumors. Diverging speeches thundered at sanctioned meetings. The city social scientists did not display their best side. It would be difficult to abstain from quoting a question which was included in that same selection on what one would tell Gorbachev, asked by O. Nifantsev, honored physician of the RSFSR, after describing the capitulation of the social scientists at a meeting of "informals:" "Are we not relying excessively today on the special subunits and do we not intend to shift to them the responsibility for errors in ideological work?"

Therefore, it was not in vain that the worker at the Krasnoyarsk Plant demanded that the veil of mystery be lifted off the "informals," and that the plant party committee secretary complained of the lack of practical experience in holding open debates and acknowledged that he felt ashamed for his own sake and that of his comrades when the time came to rebuff the demagogues.

Actually, the situation of the "informal front" in Krasnoyarsk is not all that hopeless. Two days before the conference one of us attended a roundtable meeting

between the editors of the YENISEY Almanac and readers. Rumors were being circulated in the city (rumors abound in Krasnoyarsk!) that at that meeting the personnel of the kraykom would give battle to the "informals" before the conference. To a certain extent that is precisely what happened. Passions seethed for more than 3 hours. The party workers were represented on a sufficiently high level: the gorkom secretary in charge of ideological affairs and two deputy department heads of the CPSU kraykom. The meeting was also attended by writers, journalists, scientists, enterprise managers, workers, students, etc.

For the first 90 minutes the talk, to say the least, did not go well, for many of those present were not geared for a dialogue. What prevailed were shouts, and peremptory and demagogic claims. Eventually, this confusion developed into a sharp, frank but also mutually interesting talk. Its usefulness lied perhaps the fact that the opponents learned (successfully) to listen to one another and to try to understand the other person's viewpoint. The party workers were equal in terms of logic and healthy simplicity of views, although they felt out of place as respondents in such an electrified public. It was clearly explained to them that "you are the ideological leaders of the city and the kray. You are held particularly accountable."

What were they accountable for? "Why is it that party workers are not present at charity concerts?" "Do the plans for this nearly 4 million-strong city include the publication of a city newspaper?" "When will universal legal training, which has been promised and is vitally needed by us, be organized?" This question was asked by a member of the political club, as we were told later, a noted "informal" in the city. "Recently," he went on to say, "I attended a rayon soviet session. It was quite interesting. Yesterday, however, I was removed from a session of the city soviet. I do not feel insulted for, possibly, such a step may have been legal. However, we must know our rights in order to make use of them knowledgeably."

Heated debates were held at the kray library as well. The labels "demagogue" and "brawler" do not somehow fit all "informals" without exception. It would also be useful to learn from them the art of public speaking. In particular, they formulated the platform of their speeches quite graphically: "There are two extremes in the struggle for perestroika: the upper and the lower. Between them there is insulation (bureaucratism, departmental interests, inertia and conservatism, including within the party agencies). A critical mass of moods must be created. As long as there is no critical potential which could break through this insulation, perestroika will continue to run idle."

And here is what V.A. Orekhov, secretary of the Tsentralny CPSU Raykom in Krasnoyarsk, in the pamphlet which was published especially on the occasion of the kray conference: "Shortcomings in ideological work and

in solving many social problems became particularly clear with the appearance of independent organizations, where the environment itself promotes leaders, ideologues and agitators." We shall discuss later who promotes party ideologues and how. However, even without this it is clear that the "informal" ideologues (who include professional social scientists with scientific degrees) are sometimes much more active and inventive than are party workers, and some of them enjoy a reputation higher than that of the people's deputies. The chairman of a rayon executive committee deceived the residents of a house: he did not organize house repairs on time. They turned to the "informals." The latter wrote a letter to the kraykom and the home was repaired. Naturally, the "informals" should not boast of such a victory, for it was not they who brought order into that house. However, it was they who were approached by the deceived and insulted people and not their deputy. This is a very curious symptom of the ideological situation prevailing in the city.

We heard the following in the accountability report: "It is only the preservation and strengthening of conceptual unity that can consolidate the forces of the fighters for perestroika." Honestly speaking, we expected this to be followed by a study of the complex dialectical life of such unity under the conditions of the pluralism of views. This did not happen. For decades the functions of party ideology included that of calming down, pacifying dissidents, and promoting unity, uniformity and ordinariness which, incidentally, is not inherent in the least in true socialism. Today an essentially different situation is developing in the party and society. Krasnoyarsk Kray is no exception. Having become reality, the pluralism of views presumes their open comparison and the conversion of ideological work into a dialogue system.

Let us consider, for example, the ethnic problem which is pointed in the kray. The speaker noted that many problems had developed in the life of the populations of the North and that events related to the Turukhan GES should be considered one of the manifestations of the pressing contradictions and that concern over the condition and future of the national language and culture had increased in Khakassiya. G.P. Kazmin, first secretary of the Khakass CPSU Obkom, expressed himself in more abrupt terms, in the sense that we, allegedly, are taking certain steps to exercise our legal rights and use economic opportunities on an increasingly democratic foundation. Meanwhile, we hear coming from the kray center that once again Khakassiya is leaning toward some kind of separatism.

There were obvious "pluralistic prospects" heard in the discussion of the national problem: there was disagreement in the hall with the scant statement included in the report on the problems of the peoples of the North and the relatively calm speech by V.V. Uvachan, first secretary of the Evenk CPSU Okruzhkom. However, such prospects were not to be implemented.... At around 4:00 p.m. it was decided to end the debate. Fifty-one delegates

had registered to speak and 24 did. Perhaps 1 more day could have been used—Saturday—as had been the case at some other oblast accountability and election conferences. However, it was resolved that everything should end in 1 day. Naturally, this was passed by majority vote.

The presidium asked: "Is someone insisting on being heard?" Those who insisted identified themselves. One of them was Alitet Nemtushkin, party bureau secretary of the local writers' organization, who wanted to start a sharp discussion on the problems of the small ethnic groups and had put his name down as a speaker while the delegates were being registered. The merciless majority, however, rejected the demand.

#### 'Passiveness Is Our Trouble'

After the conference and the plenum, at which the organizational problem was considered, we met with Oleg Semenovitch Shenin, the newly elected first secretary of the party kraykom. The results of the secret vote had just been made public. The election of the first secretary had been unanimous, for which we congratulated him sincerely. Was he satisfied with the state of affairs in the kray party organization? Naturally, he was not. However, the consequence had increased his optimism.

"You noticed," the first secretary said, "that practically every speech included a criticism of the kraykom. In addition to everything else, this was an indication of the feelings of the people and their bold and uncompromising attitude."

The accountability report and the delegates' speeches largely determined the critical mood and our own notes of the kray party conference. However, nor should we ignore the changes. Now the kraykom consists of seven departments, management of affairs and a party control commission. In the past there were 17 departments. Nine urban and rayon party committees have been closed down and more than 100 party workers, including 50 members of the kraykom apparat, lost their jobs. The volume of documents has been reduced by more than one-half. The number of meetings has been reduced. Many councils and staffs which had assumed economic-executive functions have been disbanded. Events which were previously considered exceptional, but are now looked at as the harsh but objective reality, took place: the work of some 200 party committees, buros, and secretaries of primary and shop party organizations was considered unsatisfactory; 40 party committee secretaries, including 16 party gorkom and raykom secretaries, lost the competition and were not re-elected to a new term. This was pointed out in the report and printed in the newspaper. Incidentally, the newspaper published the theses of the kraykom accountability report 45 days before the conference.

In short, there were achievements. However, both we and the conference delegates were more excited by the following statement in the report: "However, some elements of new developments in the nature, style and work methods of the kray party committee have still not taken shape as an integral system...." The delegates attacked recurrences of old methods: "Recently the kraykom demanded information on the availability of preschool institutions in rayons and cities in the oblast, although such information was available to the kray statistical administration" (G.P. Kazmin, first secretary of the Khakass CPSU Obkom); "four remarks were addressed at the kraykom at the rayon conference. No steps were taken on any one of them. I believe that the representatives of the kraykom, when they attend rayon conferences, should mandatorily provide information on the follow-up of critical remarks" (G.A. Anisimov, first secretary of the Rybinskiy CPSU Raykom).

Naturally, in the study of party work we must not circumvent the cadre problem, which was extensively discussed by the speaker and by the participants in the debates. But let us begin with what was not said from the rostrum but about which there was an lot of gossip and conjectures.

Two-and-a-half weeks before the conference, the plenum relieved V.A. Ivanova from her duties as kraykom secretary in charge of ideological affairs. The reason was the following: "In connection with assigning her to postgraduate training at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences." A number of questions were asked. Why was this done so suddenly? Why was it done almost on the eve of the proceedings of the highest authority of the party organization in the kray, the conference, not to mention the fact that it was an accountability and election conference, and not at the conference itself? Was it to protect the kray's ideologues from criticism? The more radical among our interlocutors defined the situation unanimously as follows: "Apparat games," although they referred with great respect to the new secretary in charge of ideological affairs, V.S. Sokolov, previously rector of Krasnoyarsk University.

We asked the kraykom personnel about the recently held extraordinary plenum. "You know," we were told, "one must not leave without leadership, even for 2 weeks, a sector such as ideology, the more so since the position of department head was vacant." We did not consider this answer convincing. The former secretary in charge of ideology had been elected to the presidium of the conference while she was already accepted as a postgraduate student which, at that time (we checked) she was not. Therefore, there was no reason for the hurry.

Let us be frank: in this case appeals to increase party democracy were not quite consistent. Any decision taken by the party committee which may be "mysterious" to the public, quite naturally creates a mass of guesses, assumptions, rumors and gossip, some of which quite fantastic. Claims of openness and glasnost are not

trusted all that much. This undermines the authority of the party committee. Actually, are this type of cadre transfers typical of Krasnoyarsk alone?

The most noteworthy statement on the problems and style of party work was that of V.N. Vashchenko, head of an electricians' brigade at the KATEK. He spoke with sadness and great knowledge about the matter, being himself or, rather, working (put more accurately) as member of the party gorkom. Why is it that the people judge of the party only by the activities of the apparat? Because, according to the brigade leader, many nonapparat members of the gorkom and kraykom are either unable or unwilling to work. They fill their seats in presidiums like token celebrities (on the scale of a city, like minor celebrities). The city has three kraykom members who have not reported even once on their work and on kraykom activities.

"Party work must be open," V.N. Vashchenko went on to say. "Yet here it is literally buried under all sorts of secrets. The publication of IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS is now being undertaken. This is outstanding! Meanwhile, so far all resolutions issued to us are marked "secret" and put in a safe. Who is affected by such resolutions? Are such resolutions issued for their own sake? We must return openness to party work, and Leninist democracy to internal party life."

It was that same Valeriy Nikolayevich Vashchenko who was the author of the most bitter admission made from the rostrum: "I would not be revealing a great secret by saying that we, party members, have lost a great deal of influence among the masses and, hence, are close to the loss of party authority. There have been many reasons for this, including discrediting the title of party member by some communists.... I believe, however, that this was not the main thing. The main thing is our passive attitude. The principle that 'it is not my business' is our trouble. Yet we must enhance the party's authority among the people."

All of this was accurate and fair. During the period under consideration, more than 50 percent of the kraykom members have not taken the floor a single time at plenary meetings, the report stated. L.S. Patrina, milkmaid at the Bolshemurtinskiy Sovkhoz, honestly and bluntly remarked: "As kraykom member, I have not done anything other than attend the plenums. Nor do I know what is what."

Before the conference we asked why, as has been the case elsewhere, the local newspaper had not published in advance the list of candidates for kraykom membership. We were answered that the list was being drawn up until the very last day and that about 20 substitutions had been made. But what would have changed had such substitutions taken place after the publication in the press, furthermore taking into consideration public opinion? When the names and positions of the candidates were listed at the conference, the usual retorts were

heard: "Let us vote for the entire slate!" No, there was no "slate vote." Nor was, however, a single candidacy discussed specifically. L.S. Patrina was re-elected kraykom member. V.N. Vashchenko was not. Rather than comment on this, let us quote a few more lines from the accountability report: "Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that shortcomings and blunders in cadre policy are being sluggishly eliminated; formalism has not been rejected and there is lack of active search for competent and thinking people although they abound in our kray."

But let us go back to the question of who nominates party ideologues and how. We were told that substitutions in the list of candidates for kraykom members had to do with the need to select people with knowledge and experience, for work in the respective commissions. So, who would be a member of the ideological commission? We noted that of the 119 members of the kraykom only a few were specialists in ideological work. It is true that the commission will be headed by the second secretary of the kraykom, who was recently the university's rector and, let us repeat it, a respected person in the kray, a professor, a doctor of sciences, a specialist in the field of magnetic hydrodynamics and mechanics of low temperature plasma.

In general, not only was there a difficult situation concerning ideological leadership in Krasnoyarsk alone. The implied rule has been that the kraykom, obkom or raykom secretary in charge of ideological affairs must be a woman. Actually, this tradition is observed to this day. Let us give the people of Krasnoyarsk their due: they violated it. Leading cadres are chosen on the basis of their practical qualities. However, as anywhere else, in ideology being a practical person is not enough. One also needs specialized knowledge so that he may discuss, at least as an equal, with people who work professionally in the field of ideology.

Here is another pressing matter of our party life: the party and the mass information media. Although the kray press was given an overall positive rating in the report, the criticism aimed at it was quite serious: in many publications and television and radio programs priority is given to emotions, sensationalism, a disrespectful attitude, and even occasionally aggressiveness and destructive criticism. However, quite aptly, something else was noted as well: within the party committees themselves the range of moods is incredibly broad, from confusion to rigid bureaucratic administration. The kraykom has had frequently to interfere in adverse relationships between party committees and the press.

The journalists were indeed guilty of errors and blunders as, in all likelihood, were some heads of party kraykom departments. Both were criticized at the conference. However, the tone of the criticism was quite different: as a rule, when it came to party kraykom departments, it was businesslike, constructive and benevolent; the one addressed at the press by the party workers was sharp

and angry. After the conference, when the kraykom department heads were being appointed at the plenum, not one person asked questions or expressed wishes, although many of the kraykom members were party workers on the rayon and city levels, who knew better than others shortcomings in the work of those who were to be approved. However, the moment the candidacy of editor of the kray party newspaper was raised for discussion, there were plenty of people who wanted to speak (by no means approvingly). Occasionally, our press is described as a zone closed to criticism. We can confirm that this was not the case in the least in Krasnoyarsk.

"It is time to repay the debt" were the words heard at the Krasnoyarsk Kray Party Conference. They graphically and meaningfully expressed our greatest priorities. It is time to repay the debt incurred for the barbarically plundered nature and our social system, which the years of Stalinism and stagnation deprived of a great deal of its essence. It is time to repay the debts to people who sacrificed such a great deal for the sake of their state and have long become worthy of living a normal life without having to wait in line for most vital items, without denigration of their human dignity by many-faced bureaucrats, without fear of being misunderstood. It is time for every party member to consider and assume the burden and to realize the great significance of his party duty.

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#### New Thinking and 'Old' Philosophy?

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[Article by Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Razumov, consultant, KOMMUNIST Department of Philosophy and Scientific Communism]

[Text] The most important feature of social life today is turning the sector of social, collective and personal expectations toward man. The power lines of the theoretical and practical projects for social development are becoming increasingly apparent in the "coordinates," in which the "human dimension" is the most adequate and privileged means of describing a social problem, regardless of the language used—economic, political-legal or humanitarian-cultural.

Speaking of spiritual processes, what is indicative in their case is that they address themselves to the spiritual world of the individual least of all not because we have finally begun to learn how to formulate claims and ask sharp and impartial questions not only of other people but (which is much more important and constructive) of ourselves. The purpose is not to relieve various authorities of their responsibility but to determine the extent to which such responsibility is necessary and possible

within the existing possible limits and the extent of our own participation in social action and the level of our own competence which, we must admit, are by no means excessive to this day.

The latter circumstance is the crux of the matter encountered by all conceivable and actually existing models of social renovation. Not even mentioning preceding periods, the 20th century has provided a number of examples of radical restructuring of the social organism such as, for example, the conversion of democratic social structures into a system of individual power and vice versa. In all cases this has triggered specific problems which no society has ever been able to avoid.

Hardly anyone would deny that radical social changes, regardless of the reasons which cause them, are impossible without a deep transformation of the mass social consciousness and without changes in its philosophical and ideological foundations. There has never been a case of revolution based on old and ossified conceptual stereotypes and we should not hope that we would be that smart as to circumvent this circumstance and deceive history by ignoring this most important requirement.

Naturally, any attempt at forecasting in detail the future philosophy and ideology not only of the current but also the expected restructuring is a rather unpromising occupation. This would be beyond the forces of an individual author or overall extant theoretical awareness. However, it is entirely possible and, therefore, necessary to note some (not all) central problems of the new philosophical-ideological thinking. One could confidently list its main ideological imperative feature: if theoretical awareness is to be a true guide in the most complex labyrinth of social changes, it must be both materialistic and dialectical.

It must be materialistic because it must be structured strictly in accordance with various objective interests and separate them from subjective interpretations and various related illusions. It should learn how to handle objective trends and factors and take into consideration various closely related types of subjective approaches.

It must be dialectical, for the interpretation and forecasting of social action requires putting together all of its most important coordinating, supplementing and conflicting components; various structural and differentiated levels of the social entity, among which relations of subordination, coordination, reciprocal influence, disagreement and clashes exist; and genetic, functional, causal and other relations.

It is only by combining these two prerequisites that we could hope to define with some accuracy the nature of social life but also to create it deliberately and, naturally, on the basis of sociohistorical practice.

It is perhaps not a question of breaking away from dialectical-materialistic tradition but of seeking its new forms which are maximally consistent with the level of contemporary knowledge, practical sociocultural experience, and requirements and political tasks of the global peace movement and the renovation taking place in the country. We shall try to indicate the specific areas in which we could possibly expect a qualitative, an intensive growth of philosophical knowledge which can have a substantial impact on the ideology of social development and, consequently, on development itself. We would like the reader to remember in that last sentence the words **try** and **possibly**.

Philosophical and ideological systems have never developed outside the influence of a certain policy, i.e., of the actually existing relations among and within large social groups in the area of power. Our philosophy is no exception. In order to understand the type of philosophy and ideology we profess (albeit closely related but nonetheless different matters), near knowledge of their fundamentals and their conclusions is insufficient. It is important to determine their position within the context of political systems of the past and present. Naturally, the true meaning of ideology is established above all on the basis of the social philosophy on which it is founded.

It is by no means mandatory for **official** ideology (not to mention philosophy) to participate in making political decisions. It could and does conceal their true underlining and the real intentions and aspirations of certain social strata. Thus, we know from the history of politics that a number of political systems which adopted the ideology of bourgeois liberalism, which may be traced to Locke, was only indirectly related to the practical steps taken by the various administrations; the ideology of Hitlerism, which concealed the interests of big monopoly capital, became most popular in petit bourgeois circles and made comprehensive use of socialist phraseology (with the crucial stipulation that it was national-socialist).

Nor should we forget that in our reality loud slogans on universal prosperity frequently concealed self-seeking aspirations of political-bureaucratic, technical-bureaucratic and even corrupt groups.

Therefore, the most important tasks of the new political thinking and philosophy of renovation are to surmount the political and philosophical-ideological dualism and decisively break with the practice of ascribing to each philosophical postulate or line of deductive reasoning one political and ideological meaning or another, and, which is even less admissible, to test them through our "feelings." Otherwise, however new it may be, philosophy will never be able to separate ideological appearance from political reality and ideology would never be able to rely on a scientific theoretical foundation.

Intellectual revolutions, wherever they may take place—science, art, ideology or religion—are characterized by at least three most important circumstances. To begin with, they never occur within the hour. They are prepared as a result of lengthy and difficult development of thought and practical experience; the radical restructuring of forms of social consciousness itself is, in general, a prerogative of social evolution, which includes revolution as well. Second, if this takes place in the area of social knowledge, it is related to an awareness of the impossibility of solving problems raised by historical development within the limits of the existing social basic and superstructural elaborations. Third, this presumes not simply the solution of old problems with the help of a more advanced conceptual set of instruments, but changing the entire spatial problem within the framework of the corresponding area of thinking or even within the entire mental area. The latter may require clarification.

When instead of drawing up an ever more refined and complex system of epicycles, Copernicus decided to abandon this effort altogether and, having decisively changed his reckoning system, restructured the problems of astronomy he, naturally, made a revolution in all sciences which, as we know, did not end in a review of the scientific method but which had far-reaching conceptual consequences.

When Marx, after making a "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy, was able to prove that many aspects of law, politics or morality are rooted in the area of economics, and that it is there that their solution should be sought; and when he developed a philosophical system which explained the tangible, active vital orientation of the human mind toward the history of labor and the class struggle, he became a double revolutionary, for he subjected to a revision not only thinking but also the entire history of social awareness and social life, i.e., human history as a whole was provided with a new problem-ideological interpretation. It is thus that Marx changed not the angle of historical vision but historical vision itself.

Realizing that the theory of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, superimposed on specific data, applying a Western yardstick to politically and economically backward Russia, inevitably had to be creatively reinterpreted in a number of essential aspects of strategy and tactics, and having created an actually new theory, essentially Lenin turned around the entire ideology of revolutionary activism by critically revising its set of problems.

Having earmarked in his "political testament" a program for changing "our entire viewpoint of socialism," he thus called for setting in its foundations a new interpretation of the historical global process, which required the reinterpretation of some basic concepts of Marxist theory. To Lenin, one would think, no choices were possible: either pure doctrine or noncoincidental

reality. He had no problem with his priority. It is precisely because he was the bearer and developer of an efficient and clear historical-materialistic theoretical system, that he made the system extremely sensitive and ready for change, registering alarm signals emanating from practical experience.

Today, when many people are disappointed in the efforts to correlate stagnant philosophical-ideological forms with rapidly changing reality, there are no substantive reasons whatsoever not to follow this critical Leninist concept. Naturally, this applies to Lenin's legacy as well.

I shall not undertake to predict whether the renovation of our current vision and understanding of the world will be just as radical and constructive as these examples. What is clear, however, is that unless this takes place it cannot be described as revolutionary. Do we also understand that the new thinking is not the same as a new political platform? If we think about it, we can see that the formulation and ideological substantiation of the new political line and new philosophy in politics are substantial, very substantial accomplishments. However, we must move on, for the new thinking presumes an intensified view on anything pertaining to the human universe and, above all, to man in history, his fears, hopes, passions, splashes of fantasy and objective interests, something which is only beginning to take place in our philosophy; man is only beginning to develop as one of the components of the problem.

For the time being, the social system is still too timid to realize that all hopes for future life on the planet—biogenesis and sociogenesis, including noogenesis—can and must be concentrated exclusively in man (compare budget expenditures on the development of the social area, education and health care and funds spent to satisfy other departmental "values" and ambitions).

Meanwhile, life at the end of the 20th century, saturated in contradictions and paradoxes, provides many reasons for and sometimes directly demands that we extend the acceleration of sociopolitical development to the mental area as well, the humanitarian-theoretical and the moral-practical. Here are a few examples:

"... History," Marx wrote, "would have had a rather mystical nature had 'accident' not played a role" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 33, p 175). Today we run across the possibility of a situation in which "necessity" may play no role whatsoever while accident reaches an almost mystical, apocalyptic scale. The existence of civilization begins to resemble the ambitions of a general, a breakdown in the work of a computer, the sense of humor of a computer "joker." Should this lead to a change in our philosophical viewpoint on the role of necessity and chance in history? Or could it be that nothing special has taken place and necessity will, as in the past, make its way exclusively through the chaos of accidents and a mass of deviations?



The understanding and interpretation of the fact that the logic of history exists not despite real contradictions but through them, through contradictions, is an unquestionable gain of dialectical philosophy. "Life goes forth through contradictions," is the widely known thought expressed by Lenin (and Hegel). Indeed, the dynamics of life cannot occur in an entirely homogeneous and amorphous environment. At this point, however, we are forced to take into consideration the extremely unpleasant circumstance that it not only develops but could also end through contradictions. Should this lead us to amending our understanding of the nature of historical development and create doubts in the cosmic justice of the assertion that it is only the struggle between opposites that is absolute always and at all times, while compromise, conversely, is conventional and relative? Or else do we prefer to think, to be guided and to act in such a way that the logic of history does not depend on our will and desire and will make its own way to the bright future through the element of armed combat, class, national-state, religious, ideological or other conceivable and inconceivable antagonisms, and the spasms of civil war, followed by long and painful economic and cultural recovery?

Let us turn back to the recent past, to the eve of perestroika and put the time of stagnation behind us. Out of philosophy departments scientific disputes spread like a storm and splashed on the pages of the press: under socialist conditions, could so-called nonantagonistic contradictions grow into so-called antagonistic ones? There were those who claimed that under certain circumstances they could while others held to the opposite, claiming that this could never happen. It looks as though currently this discussion has been revived again. In the past it was held behind closed doors, in the manner typical of that period. Ignoring some particulars and manifestations of "mental polemic games, and so on, one could daringly say that the supporters of the second view seemed to have trumped the ace of the higher authorities.

This is of interest to us for it is a good illustration of the way efforts are sometimes made to solve the real problems of social development with the help of inadequate and unsuitable theoretical concepts. The present variety of contradictory relations of attraction and repulsion among different social strata and groups, systems and ideals cannot be enclosed within the linguistic frame tightly linked to the concept of antagonism.

Unquestionably, as understood by Marx and Lenin, as the inevitable consequence of the "ineradicable division" of the earthly foundations of the material existence of labor and capital, and clashes among incompatible class and property interests, as a result of which the struggling classes perish, antagonisms should not be present in a society in which socialism has already become established. Do they exist in the developed capitalist countries and in the same way they existed at

the time of the classics of Marxism? Were these antagonisms rather than simply profound contradictions? When will the proletariat become ready to take up arms decisively and energetically, to give final battle to capitalism, resulting in reciprocal destruction? You will agree that despite all claims of going beyond the surface of phenomena, and into the area of the crystally pure essence, a theory which explains all facts of the variety of relations between workers and entrepreneurs in the presence of irreconcilable antagonisms, sounds rather strange.

In both cases the question turned out much more difficult and not lending itself to any kind of simple traditional philosophical-sociological explanation related to the complex configuration of power fields in the world arena and within individual countries. Capitalism is forced to change its "classical" forms of exploitation and to take into consideration and change in accordance with the fact of the existence of world socialism and the international communist, worker and democratic movements; under present-day circumstances, socialism cannot fail to change economically, politically, socially and culturally, bearing in mind the fact that we live in an interrelated world.

Naturally, it is not a question simply of opposing capitalism. Its traces, however, either clearly marked or barely perceptible, can be detected within any social conflict, at any point of stress within the social entity, from confrontations between governments to egotistical clashes among groups and individuals, from disproportions in the economy to contradictions in cultural life and from ecological traumas to damages caused to political and moral awareness. For example, our repeatedly and justifiably cursed administrative-command economic system would have possibly not happened had the maelstrom of the Civil War raised to the surface of social life only the "pure" social strata, leaving at the bottom all the social slime; had there not been the economic, political and cultural backwardness and Stalin and his circle and... had the broad-stepping fascist Moloch been stopped with one beautiful socialist idea and turned swords into plows; and if socialism could have developed not under conditions of extreme stress of forces, which did not leave for discussions the place and time which we have now, when we assess the various expedient options of the then functioning economic organization.

Look at the rest of the world, at nationalism which appears here and there. What is this if not a consequence of past economics, politics and ideology according to which God must agree with America in all things, Britain must rule the seas, the East must be red, the sun must rise in Japan, Russia must follow its own way to its objective, and so on, and so forth (an ideology which was opposed by the Russian social democrats but which apparently is getting its second breath in a few excited "memories"). What is this if not the derivative of mass thinking which



has mastered the essentially historiosophic and teleological idea and practice of the most profound division of the world among parts between which there can be no conciliation. This is a false awareness which sees the salvation of the continuous historical movement in the primacy of its own "chosen" and "exclusive" way....

And all this considering that, as a whole, civilization has been unable to solve a single one of its most pressing problems: it has been unable to ensure the right to work to anyone who wishes to do so; it has not fed all the hungry; it has not provided a roof over the heads of all the homeless; it has not preserved but is destroying the habitat and has not solved the problem of having a stable peace. Nationalism is also appearing on the grounds of national awareness which has lost faith in the ability of the great powers, engaged in a rivalry for world leadership, to provide a constructive solution to all of these problems. In this case nationalism triggers the illusion of the ability to solve them by all means, providing that they are strictly national. The national awareness, pushed into the impasse of global contradictions, finds its "ecological" niche in nationalism.

The world is ruled by antagonisms! We are facing the danger of a self-fulfilling prophecy: an event could take place if it is predicted by someone of sufficiently high authority. It was pointed out a long time ago that this is what happened to Oedipus. The prophecy was proved right because it had been made and accepted. When a given nation, contaminated by the temptation to solve its domestic problems at the expense of its close or distant contemporaries and, based on its own national or religious boastfulness, considers that it is historically inevitable and just to replace the power of arguments with force, a conflict arises with the inevitability of a natural law, regardless of whether its truly objective interests had any substantiation or not.

If we reduce the entire power of the historical universe to clashes, contradictions and antagonisms, where could we find a place for the ideology of cooperation, reciprocal understanding and, finally, humanity? They inevitably disappear in contacts with hostile and impersonal forces. It is as though the people have never had any more pleasant occupation than to fight and destroy each other. Life and the "thinking reed," man (Pascal) appeared as a compromise and are advancing within the limits of compromise. This, however, is a different matter.

It is of vital importance to the new thinking not simply not to lose its ties with the realities of social life by considering itself as something secondary compared of it, in the full meaning of the word, but to feel an active organizer of life, a necessary prerequisite for its existence, and a coordinator of realities. Let us turn to dialectics for help: cause and effect change places; truth establishes its own prerequisites. Within society there exists not only that which does not depend on our wish

but also that which we want to exist and, most frequently, that which exists as a result of a compromise between possibility and wish.

In short, the main problem knot of philosophy and the methodology of the renovated awareness, in my view, develops in the area of the dialectics of social development and our ability to participate in it and our understanding of its nature. We should not exaggerate, not to say ideologically intensify, the contradictoriness of the world which, as it is, is quite high. A difference must not necessarily develop into a conflict, a competition into rivalry, the struggle of contradictions into conflict, a contradiction into antagonism and antagonism into catastrophe. Naturally, however, by virtue of the objective state of affairs (once again the work of man!) or misunderstanding, man can make all this happen by surrendering to the will of historical trends or blocking them by erecting political and ideological dams.

The task of the new thinking, as seen by this author, is to draw up an inventory of the conceptual set of instruments of dialectical-materialistic philosophy, for it can be **applied** in a new way only when it is **understood** in a new fashion. Above all, it would be good for our philosophy finally to abandon its claim to absolute universality, and for the majority of its supporters, the harmful conviction that they, by virtue of their support of Marxism alone, are the bearers of eternal truths and irrefutable knowledge.

Many people in our country assume that the basic essence of dialectical and historical materialism is not subject to correction. As to basic assertions, principles, laws and categories, they are just regardless of time and space, including the time of the Big Bang, the initial singularity in which it may seem that neither time nor space, as we understand them, existed, both infinitely earlier and infinitely later. Let us not go into the philosophical analysis of the various scenarios of the evolution of the universe, although among them we consider as entirely scientific those in which the struggle between opposites and the eternal conversion of quantity into quality, the negation of the negation and the constant development from a lower to a higher status either explain very little or look entirely out of place (what, for example, would our philosopher think if all matter, together with its perishable remains became radiation?)

In the final account, however, whatever the physicists may say, for the time being we are dealing in hypotheses. Something else is much more important. A philosophy which can so easily "pulverize" the cosmos fits well as a foundation for religion, mythology or ideology, but is not a science or a scientific ideology. Scientific theory always tries to identify more strictly the specific area to which its assertions apply and where its laws are observed. Like ideology, science needs not guiding theses or meaningless universal medieval and contemporary scholasticism but productive working hypotheses.

But let us go back to the social problems. In the final account, all superior levels of philosophical elaborations and most abstract sections must be connected to social developments, for the effectiveness with which they are studied is an indicator of the cognitive possibilities of any philosophical system. A testing stone for any science or knowledge in general is historical motion, taken not in its particulars but in its overall historical totality. However, practice as well must be scientifically proven within the framework of the overall theory of practice as being either successful or unsuccessful if it is to act as a criterion of truth.

All the reasons, factors and conditions which explain the dynamics of global developments and all accelerations, inertial forces and obstructions develop and decline in the area of the general and very conflicting relations which have to do with the inevitable existence (coexistence) of civilizations in the cosmic-earth natural environment; qualitatively different, differentiated social systems within the limits of a single human community; man within the framework of a certain social system and among other people; finally, man along with this own person and the rest of the infinite universe.

Characteristic of all such dynamic formations are variability and permanence, origin and structure or, in broader terms, structure and history. No single group (type) of relations which appears here is independent. It is a variety of ties a significant percentage of which is by no means obvious or direct but is manifested only with the help of theoretical analysis and the use of special logical procedures, such as, for instance, intellectual experimentation, logical-mathematical modeling, which requires a strong theoretical support, statistical studies, the creation of multidimensional ideal structures, and so on.

It would be naive to think that this entire variety could be embraced with the help of a single philosophical theory, even though it may have three dialectics but only two means for making its study virtually hopeless. The first is to abandon an all-embracing theory. This is a type of positivism, inductivism and empiricism. This path has already been taken by empirical sociology in the hope to recreate from its parts the image of the entity, but had to abandon it, suppressed, in addition to everything else, by the overwhelming nature of the task. The second is to limit oneself to general theory. Such attempts were made within rationalism and deductivism. Despite the gigantic efforts made in this direction (the classical example here is Hegel's phenomenology of the spirit and philosophy of history), we can hardly consider these methods as having retained their heuristic value, not to mention their political sense.

Naturally, some success is possible with any one of these ideological orientations. However, it would be difficult to hope for any serious success in finding the real boosters of social processes. Historical materialism, which was conceived as the synthesis of materialism and

dialectics, postulated the following: "An empirical observation must be made in each individual case, based on experience and without any kind of mystification and speculation, in order to determine the connection between the social and political structure and the production process" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 3, p 24). However, in order to convert from structures to motion, we must include them within the overall system of historical rhythms. Otherwise the very structures in their historical determination, specificity and genetic and even functional features cannot be understood. We cannot understand their origin, and the covert and not only overt functions that they perform in society, and the conditions under which they are replaced and, therefore, to explain everything, for an explanation requires more than the study of immediate experience. In order to see what we are observing in the experiment we must know what we can and expect to see there from the viewpoint of theoretical history. Marx and Engels sketched the following system: the famous progress of forms of ownership from the primitive commune to communism.

However, at this point they warn us right away that "in themselves, and separated from real history, such abstractions are totally valueless. They are suitable only to facilitate the streamlining of the historical material and to earmark the sequence of its individual strata" (ibid., p 26). Subsequently, in a work on the "Asiatic production method," Marx himself proved that it is by no means possible to "streamline" all of history, and within it, despite all of its unquestionable merits, the rather general and approximate typology and the main historical line from ancient Greece to "Western" capitalism.

But so what? It played its role, because of its powerful heuristic charge, helping us to discover concealed dependencies, such as the influence of the means of production of material goods on the nature of political, legal and ideological structures, and to bring to light the real motor of history—the class struggle and the revolution—and to predict the dictatorship of the proletariat and the conversion to a classless society. It is quite adequate to consider it brilliant. It is brilliant but not divine.

If we limit ourselves to such a schematism, it would be difficult to explain a few essential things. In our classification of socioeconomic systems it would be difficult to include the ancient history of a number of peoples of Asia, Africa and America (was it slavery or feudalism?); the mechanism of transition from one system to another did not operate with the same degree of steadiness (developing production forces break the chains of production relations). Medieval feudalism was in a number of respects less developed than was ancient Rome, yet it won. Empires perished under the strikes of conquerors who were less developed technically and culturally but who were better organized and led by talented military commanders.

In all such cases, in order to remain on the grounds of the theory of systems, the historian must, as they say in the natural sciences, introduce ad hoc hypotheses (for that particular case). This has never been considered a strong feature of theory.

What happened was that clothing made of sociohistorical systems, sewed of "historical fabric," was considered as the skeleton of history itself, deprived of any flexible articulations, a skeleton which required only the addition of the "historical muscles" of facts. It is no longer we who streamline historical data but it is historical data that "squeezes" us to fit a rigid system. The ideal type, which remained outside the range of criticism, becomes the demiurge and not the assistant in the field of historical thinking. Nonetheless, its role must be assessed with maximal objectivity. It should not be ontologized unnecessarily but nor should it be considered a simple fabrication of the mind.

Essentially, nothing can be understood in history without making an ideal model of it. We would simply drown in an endless sea of facts. In order to understand what it is that distinguished Russian capitalism from that of Western Europe we must know what is capitalism in general, what does it represent in its ideal manifestation. But what if the entire known historical material does not fit the existing historical system? What would suffer more: the facts or the system?

Above all, however, neither Marx nor Engels were able (were not successful?) to prove, to theoretically substantiate, i.e., to explain the fact of the activeness of political-legal structures and forms of social consciousness. Let us recall this: "...Morality, religion, metaphysics and other types of ideology and their respective forms of awareness lose the appearance of autonomy. They have no history and they have no development..." (op. cit., vol 3, p 25). "The hand-powered mill will give you a society headed by royalty; the steam-driven mill will give you a society headed by the industrial capitalists" (op. cit., vol 4 p 133). This last quotation is still being willingly mentioned in our publications, accompanied by enthusiastic comments. The "hand-powered mill" led to socialism here and there, while the "industrial capitalist" was processing the crop of superprofits with the help of postindustrial millstones!

Who should be accused in this case? The Marxist classics or their contemporary followers?

Naturally, the two quotes (actually, there were many more) are taken out of context as proof of the primacy of socioeconomic conditions, in opposition to idealistic and mechanical-materialist concepts. Yes, at one point Marx points out the difficulties related to deriving Greek art and epics from forms of ownership: it is possible to understand their connection but how to explain the fact that "in a certain sense they continue to be used as a standard and an unattainable model" (op. cit., vol 12, p 737)? In many other writings he points out that we

cannot reduce to and derive everything from economics. Yes, toward the end of his life Engels acknowledged to Joseph Bloch that both he and Marx had been drawn to the economic side of the matter to the detriment of the "remaining aspects involved in such interaction." In his letter to Konrad Schmidt he substituted "reverse influence" to "apparent independence." But was this a matter merely of substitution of concepts?

The matter lies in the essential unfinished work within the framework of the initial principle of theorizing and methodology which defines the trends of social determining features. Marx, absorbed with explaining the main thing—from economics to politics and beyond—naturally did not have the possibility to deal with anything else. Suffice it that when it was a question of analyzing a specific situation, as was the case with his work "*Louis Bonaparte's 18th Brumaire*," as we know, he took into consideration the effect of a great variety of forces, in their entire dialectical interconnection. The general line of his studies remained unchanged, thanks to which a tremendous amount of work was done to bring to light the political-economic nature of the society of his time.

However, this is not something applicable to all times. For example, Marx could not include in the conceptual system of "*Das Kapital*" the problems of the future scientific and technical revolution which amended many of the results of his studies in the area of the theory of added value, the declining trend of profit rates, the trends of growth in the organic structure of capital, the natural replacement of phases of economic cycles, and so on; he could predict even less the development of political and social systems and, therefore, changes in economic policy and philosophy.

Therefore, it is not simply a question of working on yet another problem but of significantly updating a theory which shows some gaps and unsolved problems, for the problems of life itself are constantly being updated. They cannot be removed with any number of partial incantations. We have been quite successful in doing the latter. The moment the problem of the incompatibility between politics, art and morality, on the one hand, and the economic foundation appears (let us say that they clearly outstrip the latter), the label of relative autonomy is given to them. This seems to explain a few things providing that we do not go any further.

We have inherited the most extensive research program relative to the very foundations of Marxism, the doctrine of the base of society and its superstructure. This is a program the implementation of which could instill new life in Marxism, making it more like a manual for action than a dogma, which it had become in modern writings on historical materialism.

For Lenin as well viewed the activeness of the conscious influence on the historical process in a way substantially differently from Marx. According to Marx, the mass

revolutionary awareness is triggered by the worker and revolutionary movement itself; according to Lenin, all of this vitally requires the interference of an external force: the organization of professional revolutionaries. According to Marx, ideologues cannot truthfully depict life; according to Lenin, such depiction cannot exist outside of ideology (the proletariat). According to Marx, even vague concepts in the human mind are based on their material existence; according to Lenin, the mind can create the world. According to Marx, historically and logically economics precedes politics, while Lenin said that politics must be primary compared to economics. However, all of this had, in Lenin, a theoretical and practical meaning, for all of these concepts were part of a single streamlined theory of the revolutionary struggle.

Today we have perestroika in our yards and our homes. Philosophy should not be used to turn it upside down or back. If instead of engaging in doctrinairism, we were thoroughly to study the actual live processes and laws governing the development of the forms of social awareness, for reasons dependent or independent of their will, we would be prepared for nationalistic manifestations within the country and counter more actively and efficiently a variety of inertial and obstruction processes.

We are intensively studying the past in order to understand the present. We are not motivated by the desire to perform an act of repentance. Repentance may be considered useful but is a strictly individual, it is an intimate matter. Some of our comrades have undertaken publicly to repent for all preceding generations, sometimes including the revolution and Lenin, as though they themselves had been to Golgotha or, at least, were on combat duty at the barricades. In general, history is poorly adapted to repentance and major social phenomena cannot be "encompassed" within the concepts of guilt and sin. We need the past in order to understand it as a problem which must as yet be solved in terms of the categories of new thinking and practice, based on ideology and morality.

The theoretical elaborations of contemporary philosophical thinking equally reject the automatic ascension of social development and the Fichtean "I," which creates the world and history through purely subjective acts. Equally alien to it are the fatalism of historical predetermination and the metaphysics of "heroism," which creates historical movements according to the humanitarian or malicious designs of outstanding personalities.

No one has the right to violate existing objective laws, whether those of nature or society. It is true that they could strike a rather painful blow, as was the case with the deformations within our society, as would happen to a person who would jump out of the window with the ambitious intention to refute the law of universal gravitation. To make use of the laws means to observe them.

However laws (trends) of history, i.e., objectively existing interests, need dependencies, relations, contacts and corresponding standards of behavior of social groups, which could convert conscious efforts of practical and ideological influence into something which makes them operational.

We must draw all the necessary theoretical and practical conclusions fearlessly, from the fact that our society proved to be compatible with mass terror, corruption, organized crime, prostitution, alcoholism, drug addiction, economic and political alienation, and an ideology which concealed rather than identified reality, and the fact that a substantial part of the people live, one could say, below the poverty line.

We now know what a society is capable of accomplishing under the political and economic conditions of socialism and that it is only historical practice and real action that could pass the final verdict and prove that all that happened was not fatally inevitable. If we are able to build a socialism turned to man we will consider past tragedies and failures a difficult historical lesson, an error, a historical zigzag.

I believe that the nature of socialism can be manifested only through the real laws governing its development. It is those laws itself. Despite the terrible price which was paid, we have no right to reject our own history, either its victories or its defeats. In other words, we must look at it with our eyes open. I tend to agree with those who believe that no one prepared or had to prepare anything special for us in history, neither a cloudless historical sky nor the socialism of our dreams. Conversely, it is I who must preserve and multiply that which was done for me, for all of us. This does not mean that there were no disgusting individuals or political structures and ideological trends in our history which must be radically eliminated. However, it does mean that there are problems the solution of which presumes holding our intellectual and moral positions and which is a base for personal practical solutions. This includes the problem of what socialism is and what it could be as a social system, regardless of past political statements and ideological mythology.

Shall we succeed in this grandiose undertaking which has been taken up by society today? On a similar subject, Lenin pointed out the following: "We shall see. Let us not boast, as we go into battle." The winter of our discontent has not passed. We have accomplished a great deal within a historically insignificant time and solved a number of most difficult problems and triggered innumerable new ones. No other way is possible when the entire social entity becomes involved in the process of change.

One of the gravest problems is the absence of a developed philosophy of renovation and, therefore, the fact that we still do not have any efficient renovation ideologies. However, let us not throw the baby out with the

bath water. So far no one has invented an ideology without convictions and our convictions remain the same: humanism and freedom. A program is being created now, which is aimed at implementing a humane and democratic socialism and self-government as an association in which the "free development of one is a prerequisite for the free development of all" (*"Communist Party Manifesto"*).

Philosophy must include our renovation within the context of global history and check it against the scale of the universal-historical process. For if we succeed in accomplishing that which we now describe with the working term of "perestroika," this will be a revolution within the revolution. It will be a transition from coercive and forced revolutions of the past to the conscious evolutionary-revolutionary creativity.

Today we are solving not only problems which took 70 years to accumulate; society is being offered the main alternative of man in history: to be dominated by fate or to subordinate it to our objectives. The choice is ours.

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### What Kind of Letter Is This? A Look At the Editorial Mailbag

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[Review by Svetlana Fedorovna Yarmolyuk, editor, department of letters and social problems, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Text] The journal's mail has nearly quadrupled over the past 4 years. Nonetheless, this is not what I would like to emphasize most of all.

I well remember the first and then still unusual wave of letters triggered by the debate the problems of social justice. How emotional, how different and, sometimes, how intolerant these letters were, and how boldly were some views presented! The people hastened to speak out, still disbelieving the very opportunity and questioning, it seemed, everyone and everything. I have now looked at some of these letters: based on today's assessments and concepts, they seem ordinary. In any case, today they would not inflame passions. Yet, only 2 years have passed since.

The mail actively responded to the problems of economics, law, party work and Soviet history, discussed in the journal. There were ups and downs but each socially significant phenomenon was reflected in it. The flow of letters preceding the 19th Party Conference was particularly open and businesslike.

I noticed the following short line in a recent letter: "...This is the first time that I have seen my name in print" (G. Kulagin, Ufa). Yet, I would think, this is not

merely a fact of someone's personal biography. "I am an ordinary small official in a rural base (earning 150 rubles monthly), a cog in a big governmental mechanism (as at one point our "brilliant leader and teacher" dared to refer to the Russian people). A cog or a nut, whichever you may like. However, this is a nut which keeps together a bearing structure and, depending on how many turns I give it or, conversely, turn it back, it will determine the fate of the entire mechanism. Therefore, you must take me into consideration and, consequently, my opinion," was the way, somewhat challengingly, Yu. Chukreyev (Kherson Oblast) addressed himself to the editors. "Nothing about which I may be writing here will change. However, I would like to express my viewpoint," writes V. Tishchenko (Donets Oblast), as though apologizing for writing. These words as well, probably, confirm that the confidence is coming (although it has been by no means established) that one would be heard and that one has something to say.

Currently we are averaging 600 letters a month. Unfortunately, many of them still consist of complaints (approximately one-quarter of the total). Three-quarters, however, are thoughts, specific suggestions and social projects and positive, critical and skeptical reactions to our publication. This is an indication of a clearly awakened social mentality. In reading those letters, one becomes increasingly convinced that, gradually, the journal has come to a parting of the ways with subscribers "by obligation," and that the old and new subscribers are only those who are truly concerned with social problems, who are willing to engage in a social dialogue and are ready and willing to conduct it. Public opinion which, until recently, seemed an abstraction, is presented through the letters as a complex, multi-tiered and real phenomenon. It is gaining strength.

Naturally, we are not idealizing the situation. The letters obviously vary, starting with tonality. As I open the mail file, I literally read, one after the other: "According to the universally familiar rules of work with manuscripts sent to the editors of journals, you must send back my article to me, along with a scientific critical review of it. I would be grateful to you to do so immediately so that, in the future, your authors will not be forced to remind you of your direct obligations" (G. Pleshakov, Saratov).... "Dear editors, to begin with, thank you for your approving response to my letter and I greet your associates with the forthcoming holiday...." (Ye. Revyakin, Tashkent Oblast).

Incidentally, let me point out that we do not have the obligation to review manuscripts. Our task is to prepare materials for publication.

We try to publish a larger number of letters (with a view to variety and, above all, meaningfulness). One of the sections of this journal is entitled "Public Opinion," and it is characteristic that many letters are already being addressed directly to it. The practice of providing surveys of mail on specific topics has taken hold. We hope

that there will be more writings on topics suggested to the readers, which could meet with broad social response and a lively discussion which leads to the truth.

But let us take a look at the mail as a whole, and discuss some of the moods and motivations which, in my view (the view of someone who reads such letters day after day) have marked it lately.

#### Life As It Is

"Of what does today virtually every Soviet person dream? He wants to be respected in his job, for the job to be meaningful, for the salary to be sufficient to meet all his needs, and for our state and his enterprise to be model; for his children to have a future and for him to have a future as well, so that his life can steadily improve, so that there can be everywhere truth and justice, so that the black be called 'black' and not 'white.' For Soviet society to be the best in the world but, in no case, worse. For our leaders to be honest, just and truthful. And for man to be a comrade to man...." (N. Sverdlov, Leningrad).

This is a true and humane program close to everyone. Let us no longer discuss whether perestroika is needed, for essentially it is precisely these hopes that are related to it. Life, however, is complex and changes are not always tangible. The recent mail invites a comparison between hopes and reality, encompassing doubts, criticism and attempts at theoretical analysis. The people are frank in their views and, we believe, it is precisely this type of talk that we need today.

But let the letters speak for themselves:

"I am a propagandist and have frequent opportunities to talk with people. The questions are many. Of late goods of prime necessity have disappeared from store shelves: soap, detergent, television sets, refrigerators, cameras, shoes, and so on. I am asked why, what is happening? Is this the result of perestroika or the work of antiperestroika forces? What can I tell the people? Please write about it in your main party journal" (N. Pavlov, Moscow. To a certain extent an answer is provided in this issue of the journal, in our economic survey). "The shelves are getting barren and the price of goods is rising. We are not talking of a magic carpet but of products needed daily. The people have become nervous and embittered. Malice, however, is a poor companion of perestroika" (R. Sazonova, Bratsk). "Probably there are not so many veterans in the country who justify the amount of goods allocated for their use. Everyone knows that if you need something, find a veteran.... One could find other possibilities which smack of violations of the criminal code. In this case, however, the state pretends that these are strictly personal matters. Is one of the reasons that we have so many violators of the law the fact that in order to live normally one must break it?" (N. Sarsakova, Murmansk). "'Big business' is being conducted in sight of the authorities. A boy who has worked

a year as vodka salesman (a salary of 90 rubles), is able, 1 year later, to purchase a Japanese television set, a tape recorder, and furniture, and now his problem is how to procure a car, for the money for the car is also available. The question is, toward what end should our youth be guided? What ideas should attract it?" (L. Serveyeva, Saratov Oblast).

People are writing about prices with a great deal of concern. The editors have collected a number of such letters for which we are planning a separate survey ("Please no longer excite the people with discussions about price hikes, particularly on television," writes to us Ye. Frolova, Moscow). Other responses are being received to the journal's articles on pensions (see KOMMUNIST No 13, 1988). We try to acquaint with them those who are drafting the new Law on Pensions.

I realize that the prevalent feeling even in those excerpts is one of dissatisfaction and I would like somehow to balance it. I believe, however, that we have no right to pretend that no such moods exist today in our society. Unfortunately, there are reasons for this mood and, naturally, the people would like to know them.

"It may seem that we have discussed absolutely everything and that everything is clear in all its details. But then why is perestroika developing so slowly? Let me add this: Could it be because we have extensively engaged in talking instead of, rolling up our sleeves, energetically undertaking to provide such 'details'? The point, precisely, is that such 'details' although correct do not agree with each other" (V. Kuklin, Yoshkar-Ola).

"A society organized on the basis of planning must function with the accuracy of a clock mechanism. The question is this: What are we doing in this area? Virtually nothing. We are punishing people for nonfulfillment of the plans but we do not reward them for the main thing, i.e., for the accuracy with which they are implemented at any given time. We entrust our managers with huge material values and, at the same time, do not trust them with several thousand rubles to distribute among their subordinates as wages. We call for creative labor while the system of salaries keeps reducing our efforts to nothing. We are registering inventions but purchase instruments abroad.... We favor the development of democracy but, nonetheless, the superior authority has greater rights than the primary collective.... We favor the strengthening of labor discipline but do not apply the procedure of leasing and cooperative collectives to operating enterprises, and so on" (V. Dayneko, Gomel).

"Where can we find in the state an official who would be concerned not with mankind as a whole but with a specific individual, who has been brought to a situation of despair because of injustice?" (V. Asmolov, Pskov Oblast).

"The intentions of the laws and resolutions far outstrip their implementation. The results of perestroika in practical terms, 'locally' are as yet small.... The centralized management structure has cracked and a few bits have fallen off of it but, as a whole, it is still quite strong and, therefore, the trends of obstruction, the roots of bureaucratism are preserved. Having woven a huge fabric of relations, like spiders, we live and feel ourselves within it like flies.... Discussions are taking place on specific matters.... A variety of sometimes refined arguments are being brought forth 'for' and 'against.' However, no one is able to prove anything. In the final account, some of the debaters 'cannot restrain themselves' and say that 'this is the way it is done in all progressive countries.' This argument is a blow below the belt and usually cannot be blocked. And, if one were to add that '...in Japan,' this becomes a knock-out. All that is left is to drag the opponent out...." (V. Kutyrev, Gorkiy).

Naturally, the letters relate the dynamics of our life to the activities of the party and individual party members, and their practical and human potential. Let us continue with V. Kutyrev's letter: "The situation surrounding Lake Baykal, and the plan of turning around the flow of the Northern rivers clearly illumined the prospect for the renovated role of the ruling communist party in contemporary society and the expectations linked to it. The struggle against 'industrial egotism,' and departmentalism and against technocratic development trends and for the safeguard of nature and the survival of man and the harmonizing of social relations are ever new priorities in its activities. The state as such, as a machinery, cannot be directly oriented toward such objectives. By virtue of its functions it expresses the economics (rather than humanistic) rationality of society."

Another party member, M. Ovchinnikov, from Kazan, writes: "The accountability conferences and elections in the party are drawing to an close. In my view, there has been no change in the activities of many organizations. The open discussion which we heard at the 19th Party Conference did not take place. As a party member, I am concerned with the future of the country and that of the party. I believe that in order not to lose the credit of trust and in order to be ahead of our time, the party must develop within itself a level of democracy no lower than that of the soviets."

In his letter, V. Litvinov, from Tashkent, suggests the following topic of discussion: "I have had the opportunity to study the resolutions of the rayon party conference.... An entire part in the resolution is based on things with which we are already fed up, such as 'comprehensively develop,' 'ensure taking total measures,' 'increasing responsibility,' 'more energetically and persistently,' 'make decisive use,' 'extensively develop,' 'involve more extensively,' 'radically improving,' and so on and so forth. Not a single word is said about implementation or about responsible individuals or authorities. If this resolution had not been dated, one could think that it was written at the end of the 1970s, at the

time of blossoming of the 'age of glorification.' Could this, precisely, be taking place? Perhaps it was simply transcribed from an older copy?...

"Naturally, had it been a case simply of this resolution, I would not have addressed myself to you. Today, however, when the party has taken a course of radical perestroika of society, one begins to think: What is it that is obstructing the implementation of the plans? It seems to me that the party raykom apparatus, as it is set up now, is, consciously or subconsciously, one such obstruction. Naturally, all raykom personnel will be angry at me and, possibly, will start to prove how overloaded they are, and so on. However, as a party member I do not feel any real results or any influence of the work of the raykom either at my job or at my place of residence. I must point out that I fail totally to see how the raykom could do this by using the old work methods in communicating with the primary party organizations and ordinary party members.

"After the study of party documents similar to said resolution, it is unclear to me what is the objective, the basic task of the raykom and what is its way leading to the implementation of party resolutions. The impression is created that the raykom as well is not all that interested in such problems. What to do? How should we make the work of the party raykom efficient and its contacts with party members steady? How to get rid of idle talk and ostentation? For all of this would lead to enhancing the party's authority in the eyes of the entire people. Who should be concerned with this?"

I remember a letter received in the past. I do not recall its precise text but the main idea I remember well: we say that there is a revolution in our country today, the author wrote, but can you tell me what revolution is being made by people who have retired or are close to retirement?

Naturally, this is insulting to us, the people of "preretirement" age. However, we can only agree with this. During our student years, it seemed that the 20th Congress had turned our lives upside-down. However, we had to work under "traditional" conditions, with pride in our hearts when we succeeded in doing or saying anything. Things turned upside-down again with the March 1965 Plenum, when the economic reform was earmarked. However, soon afterwards everything "fell in its place." I may be wrong, but it seems to me that today it is the best forces of precisely that generation, as though trying to catch up, that are "struggling" more than anyone else for perestroika. However, even they, the best, will be unable to solve the problems which arise without relying on the new forces, on their fresh ideas and their informal work methods. Today one of the most powerful obstructions is, indeed, the apathy of those who became "frozen" in the past. It is difficult for many people to understand and accept the new time and its requirements and pace. Meanwhile, cadres are frequently "shuffled but not replaced." Letters on this topic are being received on a virtually daily basis.



"The shuffling of cadres, which has been practiced for decades within the party apparatus and the habitual nurturing, again, of cadres which have gone through the training of the apparat in the Komsomol, the soviets, the trade unions and other state and social authorities will not solve the problem..." (V. Stasko, Arzamas).

"Unwilling to offend those who once helped them reach the peak, the leaders do not understand that the awakened masses no longer believe their slogans. Results are needed" (N. Monakhov, Moscow).

"...Unless there are elections for at least two-thirds of the people's deputies, there will be no quality renovation of the deputy corps, something which is so greatly necessary to perestroika. Look at the deputies who thoroughly record the speeches which, the following day, will be published in all newspapers. The relevance of K. Lavrov's program 'Time' on upgrading the intellectual potential of the Supreme Soviet becomes immediately clear. The question of elections, I believe, is of key importance to the revolutionary process of perestroika. It is precisely at this point that the forces of obstruction will give real battle" (O. Avrov, Leningrad).

"I borrow your journal and other party publications from acquaintances who are party members and who, even without opening them, give them to me for free with total indifference. These are people who essentially joined the party during the period of stagnation. Unfortunately, their numbers are larger than you think and, as in the past, in the years of perestroika their activeness has remained on the zero level. The only use that the party has for them is that they feed the party cash register. However, I firmly reject the idea of considering this category of citizens as promoters of new political thinking" (M. Razzhivin, Magadan Oblast).

"One of the oldest stereotypes in party life is ideological work and its organization. This stereotype is among those which must be decisively deleted if we are to advance toward our objective: the creation of a democratic society. The renovation of ideological work is as needed as the air we breathe. The ideas of perestroika must conquer the masses ever more extensively, under circumstances in which the bulk of new ideas and phenomena are measured against the old concepts. How to deal with this contradiction? Is it necessary once again to 'study the materials,' to 'develop topics according to plans' (raykoms), 'lectures on various topics,' 'political information in various areas,' and so, and so forth? Today all of us are essentially literate. Lenin said that with literacy alone one would not go far and that we need a tremendous enhancement of culture. Obviously, however, we must not stop at ideology alone. Once again we need a tremendous enhancement of culture" (V. Potkin, Moscow).

I think that it would be useful at this point to quote the view of a person who describes himself as a conservative. What does he think about today?

"I am, so to say, a 'victim of the cult.' I was one of those who were blinded by the cult of personality and who are slowly seeing the light, rejecting ideological blinkers. Why do I do this conservatively and slowly? Simply because I am fed up with finding myself in the position of a person whose mind is being endlessly manipulated. For decades a vulgar-sociological perception of the true realities of life was promoted in our consciousness and dogmatism based on quotations was instilled. Today the debunking of dogmatism and conservatism in the mind is carried out with an emphasis on political and moral aspects, frequently on the level of the ordinary awareness. Few substantive philosophical works are being published and the attention paid to ideological-theoretical and conceptual substantiation of the process of perestroika is entirely inadequate. Complex gnosiological and methodological problems of the latest changes are being set aside or else replaced by emotional-sensory parts. Hence there is a juggling of facts and the lack of honest self-criticism, improper polemics, display of ambitions and even malice. I realize that this author himself is not free from such shortcomings....

"The tragedy of our generation is that for a long time and, not to put it more harshly, frequently shameless manipulations of our minds, still carried out by inertia to this day, have weakened conceptual and moral foundations and undermined faith in the authority of party decisions and leaders. The claim that there are many people who do not believe perestroika is wrong. The fact that the limit of this faith goes considerably farther than its accomplishments is a different matter.... Does this sound like a justification? Rather, it is the hope of obtaining an honest answer about historical truth and in the evaluation not only of yesterday's but also of today's social processes. This hope is not a helpless expectation of an answer provided by authoritative scientific or political bodies. An honest and convincing answer must come from ourselves.

"...I am saying that being a conservative is no simple matter. There are those who, possibly, may be dreaming of a return to the old, to the good old balmy-drunken times. Others, who are in the absolute majority, are convinced that one can no longer live and work as they did in the past. But nor are they convinced that that is precisely the right way of restructuring. They question. It is easy to blame this author for overinsurance, expectation, and so on. However, even ideological confusion is more honest than the double-dealing to which some people have become accustomed.... In my view, today the ideological substantiation of perestroika is already falling behind. The harsh and honest criticism of the errors of the past is, naturally, necessary. However, it is not the most difficult and, incidentally, the most dangerous. As a conservative, I have little faith in critics, whose courage is now oriented toward criticizing those who are helpless but who stop and think in the face of those who are in power" (D. Zakhovayev, Petrodvorets).

Possibly, there is a feeling that the letters quoted here are quite disparate, of uneven value. However, I believe that

they give an idea of the reason for which the people write and what they accept and reject from today's practices and the way they approach new phenomena and problems. The mail includes many letters whose authors draw their own conclusions. Let me mention some of them in particular.

### Doubts and Conclusions

The complexity of daily life and the doubts which arise naturally lead the people to make analyses. Dissatisfaction with "specifics" leads to a serious interpretation of the "general." This makes understandable how complex and, sometimes, groundless such an amateur analysis becomes. Loud political articles and the mass of information provided no longer makes such a strong impression as they did only 1 or 2 years back. Nor, to be more accurate, do they make a deep impression. Yet the need for depth has already taken shape. In its time, political journalism led, describing life as it is, and sharply formulating difficult problems. However, few such problems have been seriously interpreted so far. Scientists who write political articles are concerned with making themselves clear, and occasionally make concessions in terms of the theoretical nature and depth of their analysis. The time when we shall be able to read their scientific works seems uncertain.

Yet the public is full of doubts.

"Are we shifting toward petit bourgeois socialism? What do the scientists think on this account? Or, possibly, will it be like in the past: just issue an order and I shall theoretically interpret anything you wish?" (A. Vetrov, Donetsk). "My letter to you is triggered by the fact that of late all of us, people who are not indifferent to perestroika, are asking questions: What type of socialism have we, nonetheless, built? Understandably, it is not simply a question of its name...." (A. Popkov, Chelyabinsk). "Where are we going! The Western millionaires will agree to feed and clothe us, give us foreign currency and lend us equipment and share scientific achievements (not the latest) for a while. But what then?" (K. Andryushechko, Novosibirsk Oblast). "Abstracting ourselves from demagogic and dogmatic 'isms,' which set our teeth on edge, what comes out is the cure-all for all evils, that which could redress the economy and ensure true democracy: the comprehensive development of private initiative and parliamentary democracy. Is that what we struggled for and strained ourselves! Could it be that this is the right way?..." (V. Brabich, Leningrad).

The main conclusion contained in recently received letters is the following: A further theoretical analysis is needed—profound and comprehensive—of the progress of our society on the path of perestroika; we need the development of a contemporary concept of socialism. Its description may be provided in different terms but its essence is the same. That is what the people consider as being particularly necessary today.

"Today we say the following: 'More socialism!' pass the Law On the Cooperative, develop leasing relations, try to take into consideration the laws of the socialist market, shift rights and obligations in planning from the state authorities to enterprises, revise the principles of price setting, allow the possibility of the bankruptcy of chronically unprofitable enterprises, and so on. This is the cost of our haste and political bravado. Taking today's trends as an example, we convince ourselves that something we have merely skipped through will sooner or later remind us of its existence and put everything in its place. If the economy is a specific thing, with its own language and irrefutable arguments, this means that theoretical computations are worthless, for we twist them around as we wish. However, this is for simpletons. For the time being we are in a theoretical twilight. It is only now that socialism is straightening up its back. For that reason, let us help it get rid of the Stalinist idiosyncrasies" (V. Polkanov, Omsk).

"A society which was expecting that by 1980 the material and technical foundations for communism will be built encountered phenomena of stagnation and a major drop in general living standard. This leads to the appearance of quite serious theoretical problems which cannot be reduced merely to the psychological characteristics of some state leaders" (V. Magnus-Saminskiy, Moscow).

"...Initially information threw society in a state of shock which was replaced by a condition of intellectual confusion (how to teach and what type of examinations to take?), for real 'ideological obstructions' have appeared and we do not know how to 'clear them,' how to streamline, sum up and systematize all that new information, and thus raise it to the level of theoretical interpretation" (R. Aydynyan, Leningrad).

"...It is not a question of restraint, for after there has been a breakthrough, we must speak out. There must not be even a shade of suppression of democracy. It is a question of a scientific approach, of Marxist-Leninist depth and consideration of approaches and conclusions. The accurate and mature evaluation of the history and theory of socialism constitute not only a valuable economic experience but also an even more valuable moral and psychological capital" (G. Linder, Bologoye).

Views in this connection are expressed by M. Cherevko (Kiev), N. Radichuk (Volynsk Oblast), A. Kislyy (Moscow), S. Zhuravlev (Orenburg), V. Vasilyev (Salavat), I. Tyutrin (Moscow) and many others.

However, I would like to address myself to other conclusions as well. Following are brief conclusions from two recent letters which, in my view, are food for thought:

"It is worth think about slowing down our pace of progress toward 'democracy.' So far, in 3 and a half years we have not solved essentially a single major problem but have created a mass of new ones. Could we not become mired in them? One must realistically look at

things. We are still not ready for full democracy! And, before it is too late, we should amend our present course" (A. Dyachkov, Moscow Oblast).

"There will be no order in our country until we establish a stricter discipline. The mass of the people must understand what the meaning of conscience is, accept the laws and perhaps have a little bit of fear" (B. Dumanishev, Cherkessk).

Similar ideas appear in the mail. Generally speaking, one can understand their reason, for this is hardly nothing other than a yearning for the years when everything was "simpler and easier to understand." Our transitional, nervous and stressed time has already turned around and destroyed a great deal of things. There is no monolithic attitude, in the sense in which we have become accustomed to understand it. Passions and interests and ideological clashes have emerged on the surface. Those who had become accustomed to receiving instructions were given independence. Initiative is countering administrative pressure. However, this does not mean that, after acquiring independence, everyone hastened to make use of it. The fear has disappeared and the system on which it stood has been undermined. However, so far no different mechanism or motivation of activities have been asserted, based on economic relations, personal responsibility and morality. This is largely the reason for shortages and difficulties. Should we go back to fear? But then we already know where this path takes us.

Yes, we are only now learning democracy. The institutions of a socialist state of law are being established only now and it is only now that a real democratic awareness in society is taking shape. All of this is possible only under the conditions of a boldly broadening democracy. One does not learn how to swim in an empty pool. "To slow down the pace of progress toward democracy," or to yield even a single step? Today the following aphorism is frequently used: you cannot go over a precipice by jumping twice....

Nonetheless, in speaking of doubts and conclusions, we realize how important it is today to understand the people and not to ignore their doubts. We know that the foundations of an awareness lie in real life. The people need the faith that any benefit to the economy will not turn to their detriment, that the assertion of the new economic principles is not taking place at the expense of the individual, and that already now the individual is acquiring a few things and something is changing for the better for himself. This is occurring precisely today and precisely for the individuals. This is not done for the sake of cost accounting and self-financing. It is with their help that man is to restructure his own work and, largely, his own life, so that it may become more meaningful and full and so that it is not abandoned by hopes and joy and so that the dreams may not disappear.

We believe that the main question today is one of reciprocal trust. This will help us to deal with the difficulties of the years to come.

An important theme may be noticed in the recent mail. So far it has not taken shape as a clear conclusion but can be seen quite clearly in the letters.

"I am 41 years old and I can say that I have always acted in accordance with my convictions. I have suffered for this, quite substantially (I was expelled from and then readmitted to the Komsomol, I have been dismissed from my job and then rehired). However, I did not consider this to be too high a price for the right to remain true to myself. I also never realized what it is that we could seriously fear today. Above all, I was always confident that this type of behavior was the standard for many thousands of people. We knew of a few such people who had the good fortune of participating in major events and, therefore, to fight bigger battles, both at that time and, even more so, today. I believe that the majority of them did not regret entering the fray despite all the unpleasantness they experienced. It has always been shameful to be a coward (the fact that sometimes this may be forgiven is a different matter); and all societies need courageous people" (M. Mashkovtsev, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy).

"Today many people, beating themselves in the chest, and pouring ashes on their heads, claim that 'we are to be blamed for everything....' Who are those we? Who are those who formulated the policy of state investment, issued directives and implemented them? If undistinguished and ignorant people did this, who is to be blamed for the fact that such responsible work was entrusted to them?" (V. Golubchikov, Chelyabinsk).

"Finally, that which Lenin spoke about is beginning to be actually implemented: '...Glasnost is a sword which heals the wounds it has caused.' This is not being fully applied, for even in the central press and on the radio and television, we presently hear about some shortcomings in general terms—'in some oblasts' or 'in some farms.' There is still an unwillingness, a fear of bluntly and openly naming specific individuals" (A. Smelyanskiy, Leningrad).

"Let us not exacerbate feelings with considerations based on the examples borrowed from the lives of other countries and peoples for, in all respects, they are quite different from our country and the problems which have accumulated here. However, when by virtue of the established custom of being responsible for assignments or a work sector in those countries ministers resign, and when the nonfulfillment of individual promises given to society leads to the resignation of governments, and when a governmental official whatever his level and rank has committed an official or moral crime is taken to court, honestly speaking, this is something we could envy...." (V. Stasko, Arzamas).

At this point, I would like to turn to the 25 percent of our editorial mail which consists of complaints. Most of those letters usually include a copy of a petition and, sometimes, a request: "Do not send this back to the local officials." Here is one excerpt from a letter received from the Donbass, with 6 signatures: "We beg of you to come immediately to the mine, you will know who we are and you will see the situation. Do not ask for this to be considered locally, for everything will remain as it was." The position which this puts the editors was already described in the journal (KOMMUNIST No 8, 1988—"Letter About Letters"). Nonetheless, we are frequently forced to turn to the "local area." This results in numerous hurtful and unfair responses.... "How very nice of you to turn to the prosecutor's office. For this is that same office which sees nothing, hears nothing and says nothing. I truly hope that your beautiful letterhead will force their hearts to flutter and they will immediately begin to work in a way KOMMUNIST cannot even imagine: they would take the matter and kick it out." "Does the apparat once again solve everything? Where are the editors? Where is the editor-in-chief? If elements of perestroika exist among the KOMMUNIST editors, help us to obtain a real solution. It is then that I and those people close to me, including in the party organization, will believe that perestroika has indeed begun. It is then that we shall vote in the elections for perestroika deputies. Otherwise, what is the point?"

Understandably, a person who turns to the editors is not particularly interested what are the possibilities of the editors to help him. We believe that the organization of the matter itself should change and that complaints should indeed not be passed around. The situation being what it is, especially assigned personnel deal exclusively with this type of mail, assuming the functions of petitioner, lawyer and controller....

But then what happens in the local areas?

Let me cite verbatim a small letter received by the editors from a primary party organization and signed by four party members: "At a party meeting of the rolling stock service at the railroad shop of the Kemerovo Order of the October Revolution Azot Production Association, on 25 August 1988, depot fitter and CPSU member since 1960, honored labor veteran and bearer of the Order of the Labor Red Banner, who had worked for more than 40 years in the shop, Shilov Yevgeniy Ivanovich, residing at 652427, Kemerovo Oblast, Prigorodnyy Settlement, 25 Poleyaya Street, turned to the party member in this service for help in defending his rights, for the settlement soviet, the administration of the Nazurovskiy Sovkhoz, on the territory of which he lives, Kemerovskiy Rayon Executive Committee, the rayon and oblast prosecutor's office in the city of Kemerovo, and the Kemerovskiy CPSU Raykom and CPSU Obkom are unwilling to protect his rights.

"Essentially, it is a question of the following:

"In 1980 Ye.I. Shilov's neighbor, P.G. Khrapov, built on the plot owned by Yuryeva (mother-in-law), who is also Shilov's neighbor, on the other side, a new home; in May 1987 the garden, Yuryeva's home and yet another 0.05 hectares of rich land cultivated by Shilov and a part of his garden, was sold to N.G. Kovalev. N.G. Kovalev purchased all of this from Khrapov without processing the proper documents and without a purchase and sale agreement. He brought in construction materials which he piled on the land, built a fence and blocked the road which led to the fresh water well. It is thus that Ye.I. Shilov remained without part of his garden and without access to drinking water.

"All appeals on this matter, addressed to the head of the organizations we listed, have been answered with bureaucratic formal replies and red tape.

"The party members in the rolling stock service of the railroad shop of the Kemerovo Azot Production Association beg that help be given to party member Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shilov in applying the law concerning part of his land plot and access to drinking water, and trust that justice will prevail in the solution of this problem."

We are touched by the aspiration of the people to help their comrade. Perhaps it is sincere. But then how many individuals and organizations, including the obkom, have become involved in this matter! Yet nothing has happened. Everyone has become accustomed to rely on someone else. As long as this is the case, indeed nothing will happen. Last year we published the article by V. Yadov, doctor of philosophical sciences, on the social type of personality (see KOMMUNIST No 10, 1988). We received a number of objections and cautious remarks: the professor seemed to have questioned our collectivism. In my view, however, he was discussing how to break the cycle of such a collective irresponsibility by promoting the possibilities and dignity of the individual.

"Everywhere we see little signs explaining to one and all that keeping the streets clean is the duty of every urban resident. On the one hand, this is good. On the other, it is something we know from the period of stagnation. The food program is a matter for everyone and so is cleaning the streets, protecting nature and saving those who are drowning.... But where, nonetheless, is the vanguard of the people? Where are the servants of the people? And why do we need them if the people are to decide everything and do everything themselves?" (S. Ilvayskaya and V. Yurkin, Bryansk).

"Everyone of us must participate to the best of his possibilities in perestroika! But how can it be if in this case we have to deal with a superior? This is fraught with..." (Akhlebinina, illegible name of a scientific research institute).

"...The people see all and are amazed..." (I. Kozlov, Ulyanovsk).

But what do we have in mind when we say "the people?"

Not so long ago a person brought his request to our editors. He brought 19 close written pages. The request was no more than a single paragraph on the last page. The other 18 dealt with the causes. This story was simple to the point of being banal.

Eleven years ago the man started assembling trains. This was "all-in-all simple, requiring basic intelligence." The shift consisted of three assemblers, one or two couplers and three diesel locomotive engines. "We coped with the work and even had time to spare, particularly at night." This was followed, one after the other, by two or three essential reorganizations. Because of difficulties and fuss, a fourth diesel engine was brought in. "At first occasionally and, later, feeling that the work had become easier, the fourth locomotive was kept. However, the reconstruction went on. Then, quite timidly, a fifth maneuvering engine appeared. It then began to appear more frequently and more confidently. Finally, it began to be used full-time."

"The moment the fourth engine appeared, I suggested to my shift that we refuse it, the more so since we were a so-called Komsomol-youth shift (at that time such shifts were being set up along the railroad). No one took this seriously. Who are you, the idea person among us? You probably need this engine more than the others. Do you feel bad? Stop it, who needs it. Let us go to the store.... Such were the answers I heard." Meanwhile, this person could not rest looking at such stupid work. "We are asked by the television, the radio and the press not simply to increase labor productivity but also assume leading positions in the world. What kind of a position could one speak of in our station? At any given night one of the locomotives is bound to idle for hours. This has become a tradition. And if we were to agree to pull in the morning all trains with a single locomotive, this would be entirely possible without any particular effort. The second locomotive engine would be idling. The following night the roles would change. The situation with the day shift is somewhat different. Here again most of the time the locomotives are idling although they appear to be working. That is the way the work has been organized. One has to wait for the next locomotive and then wait for the other one, the third one, and so on. This is understandable, for if there is a heap of people on a small area and everyone is given the assignment to push huge but light-weight boxes here and there, something of the same sort would take place. Everyone would seem to be working but most of them would in fact be idling. Furthermore, there would be incredible noise and the appearance of active efforts would be present. Adding to this the chiefs, each one of whom starts to manage, one does not have to have any particular imagination to understand what precisely it is that I am talking about."

He was not supported by anyone, neither the collective nor the leadership. He was either pushed aside or laughed at. For the sake of formality, an "experiment"

was conducted and everyone happily agreed that it had failed. "At best, one can understand those who make the trains and who are unwilling to work with a lesser number of locomotives. They are unwilling to work more than they do now. Furthermore, one does not know whether we would be paid more for this. I am not even mentioning the ideological, the moral aspect of the work. But how can we understand the management? It would be unaffected either way. It is not they who do the work and what would they lose from it?"

This man lost years before he was able to formulate his "idea." He went to the ministry. "Some of the problems would almost reach the point of being solved but, at the last moment, everything would collapse." The man had to be hospitalized (I am even ready to admit that this "idea" became an obsession). Released from the hospital, he resumed work no longer as a coupler but as a loading worker, losing more than 100 rubles in wages. "In the final account, willy-nilly, consciously or subconsciously, for one reason or another, I was kicked out. Although, the way I understand it, the opposite should have taken place."

The petition was that he be thoroughly examined (but not at the departmental hospital) and that we help him.... Now, I see in front of me his letter and read the last paragraph: "I would like for us even slightly to start advancing toward the standard which, eventually, would also change. I see that there are others who would like to accomplish this. I do not even blame anyone who does not wish to do so. This applies to the majority. I would like, however, that they live according to their own conditions if that is what they like. I do not like these conditions in the least and I would like to be free to do what I want, the way they do what they want. I realize ever more clearly that the milk which turns sour the same day we have bought it; the huge line in which I had to stand for it; the repair of the television set, which cost as much as the set itself; the low earnings for work under conditions 'close to extreme situations'; the size of the apartment which I have; the elevator which breaks down in the house, and many others the list of which would be longer than this letter, fantastic though all of this might seem, they are all directly related to the number of locomotive engines at my station. Just so."

I do not know the way people would react to this letter. I recall the "confession" of the chairman of a big and rich kolkhoz, which, as a journalist, I received some 20 years ago. I was well familiar with that farm. It appeared to have everything: a palace of culture, a ballet school, asphalted roads, and so, and so forth. The countryside was suffering from manpower shortages while here, by special decision of the board, outsiders were not being hired. However, the more benefits appeared, the less, it seemed, the people worked. Worse, many of them were milling around their homes, stealing from themselves. The chairman was asking difficult questions to which he

failed to find an answer. His letter was made public, it triggered a number of responses, including one, part of which I would like to quote here:

"On a holiday we, the elderly," the kolkhoz member wrote, "sponsor a celebration with a harmonica, songs and dances, and the young people come. Clearly, rather than look at a classical ballet, the people prefer to dance themselves some kind of primitive 'Kamarinskaya.' This is more interesting and joyful. That is the way I understand it. Eventually, an interesting person joined our group. He was happy, capable, witty and intelligent. He spent the entire evening in an effort to make us laugh, to joke and entertain us. Generally speaking, he was an 'artist.' We, the primitives, could do nothing. A great deal of alcohol was drunk and a great deal of food was eaten but when we dispersed, we had the feeling that this had not been a holiday. We did not participate, he was the only one to perform. He was happy, he 'performed.' He enjoyed himself very much. In the morning I questioned my neighbors, and everyone concluded that it would have been better without this 'artist.'... Is your chairman of such a strong kolkhoz not something like this 'artist'?"

At that time, 20 years ago, we wrote about the need for a democratic management and for the creation of conditions under which private initiative and individual responsibility would be combined. We wrote about that which is today becoming part of our life.... Now, however, we are asking other questions: Would a person be willing to "show himself off," and "dance" his own "Kamarinskaya?"

It may be said that the desire to suggest anything or to be responsible for anything has been beaten out of the people. We cannot object to this. Today there are many contributing factors for the awakening of a self-respect within each one of us. Management specialists are claiming that democracy is leading to the transformation of that same technical progress and, consequently, to the enrichment of labor functions into the **personal** concern shown by the workers. It replaces the burden of expectation with the enthusiasm of action and the "figure of the one who waits with that of the one who transforms." These are inspiring prospects.

A great deal is being criticized in the mail to the editors but rare are those who write about the way we work.

"The main trouble is that we have unlearned how to work efficiently and qualitatively" (V. Brabich, Leningrad).

"We purchase equipment abroad which, frequently, is lower in terms of productivity because of the low skills of our personnel and specialists, while the number servicing personnel is much higher. Conversely, our equipment abroad works longer and better.... The Japanese worker goes to work on Saturdays at his (or, rather, the capitalist's) enterprise in order to improve his skill and to help

the enterprise. In our country, no one would remain to undergo professional training even "under the gun," for one hour after work and not even once a month.... Naturally, wages must be such as to reflect the difficulty of the skill and the quality of the work. Previously the only requirement of the worker was this: if you do not pay me a high wage I will quit. Now there is a second trump: if you do not pay we shall re-elect the manager.... Availability of housing is very important. I know from my own enterprise, however, that no single person who has obtained an apartment has begun to work better. What is worse is that people are noticing this. Or else, the person would simply retire." The author of this letter, S. Kravtsov (Stavropol), has added a list of specific suggestions, consisting of 11 points on how to improve the work. I believe, however, that such a list we carry within ourselves....

I may tend to exaggerate but, in my view, it has already become immoral to boast that one could find a job in which, actually, one does nothing. Once again informing has become immoral and action has become highly moral. We greatly value life already on the basis of different criteria and have felt the triumph of the only sensible ideas.

These are difficult times but they are not static.

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**'The Study of Truth Itself Must Be Truthful,'  
Notes On the Quest for Historical Truth**

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[Article by Ivan Dmitriyevich Kovalchenko, academic secretary, USSR Academy of Sciences History Department]

[Text] It is a well-known fact that social life is impossible without knowledge of one's own history. That is why history has always interested people. However, there also have been times when interest in the past has increased particularly sharply. This occurs when society is faced with problems the solution of which involves radical changes in the course of social development. Such is precisely the stage currently experienced by Soviet society. Hence an explosion of interest in the historical and, above all, the recent past of our country, unparalleled in many decades. The people would like the elimination of the "blank spots" and that "the full" truth about our past be told.

At the present stage the predominance of publicistic and popular science forms of interpreting the "blank spots" and illumining the "full" truth of history is a characteristic of historical knowledge. This is entirely natural, for political journalism has always been most efficient in formulating the topical problems of its time. In my view,

this makes improper complaints which are being occasionally heard about excessive activeness of the mass press in addressing itself to historical subjects. Despite the very specific nature of journalistic consideration, it is of major importance, to begin with in defining the range of problems which require a priority scientific study and, second, in developing historical awareness and upgrading its conceptual role. Naturally, the journalistic interpretation of the past must be improved. Today it frequently appears insubstantial, sensationalist and intolerant of other views.

However, even the broadest possible journalistic discussion of the past does not replace the need for its profound scientific study. In this connection, the science of history, as is the case with the other sociohumanitarian disciplines, is facing important problems.

Their solution requires the critical evaluation of the status of the science of history and defining ways leading to its further development. A great deal has been said and written about the unsatisfactory situation in this area of scientific knowledge. As a whole, the main shortcomings of a number of historical studies may be reduced to the following: above all, they constitute a theoretical-methodological dependency, i.e., reliance on the fact that the most essential evaluations of the past and the approaches to it (particularly concerning the history of Soviet society and the party) will not be provided by the historians themselves but formulated in party and state documents. The noncreative approach adopted by many historians in the study of the past for a number of decades triggered excessive commentaries and dogmatism, a tendency to emphasize illustrations and facts, limiting studies to the empirical level and replacing scientific interpretations and theoretical syntheses of facts with their simplest possible analysis and predetermined assessments. Many phenomena of the past have been ignored by the scientists or else depicted by them one-sidedly or in a distorted manner.

The faults in the development of historical science were the result of a summation of objective and subjective factors. The main objective factors (in terms of the science of history) were the increasingly broad spreading of technocracy and dehumanization of the science, underestimating sociohumanitarian disciplines, administrative interference in the solution of scientific problems, and monopolizing by individual institutions and press organs concepts governing the veracity of scientific knowledge and the ways and means of obtaining it. Repressive measures taken against scientists caused irrecoverable damage to society.

Along with objective factors, however, there also were subjective ones which adversely affected the development of the science of history. Demand for knowledge of the circumstances also triggered corresponding supply. There were historians or, rather, people who entered the science of history who were perfectly agreeable to creating scientific forgeries.

These circumstances not only brought about the appearance of numerous "blank spots," and use of surrogates or, in general, untruths instead of telling the truth about history, but also hindered the growth of the professionalism of historians in all of its aspects, and even lowered it. We believe that this precisely is a manifestation of the most severe and persistent consequences of the negative impact on the science of history of the cult of Stalin's personality and the embellishment trends which developed during the period of stagnation.

However, without diminishing in the least the criticism in the evaluation of the contemporary condition of our science of history, we should also take into consideration its accomplishments, which are the foundation for further progress. That is why we cannot allow the acceptance of simplifications and strictly negative interpretations of this matter.

The successful implementation of the tasks which are facing the science of history requires, above all, the intensification of methodological approaches to their formulation and solution, and the formulation of adequate ways and means of study of historical reality. "Not only the result of a study," Marx pointed out, "but the way leading to it must be accurate. The study of truth itself must be truthful..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 1, p 7). In this connection, we must firmly emphasize that without the formulation of the most topical problems or greater the access by historians to new materials, despite their intrinsic and unquestionable importance, and without enhancing the theoretical-methodological and specific scientific standard of social studies, no substantial changes in the development of the science of history can be achieved.

Therefore, let us consider a number of methodological problems which, in our view, must be developed by historians and other social scientists.

What is needed, above all, is to clarify the question of the correlation within the science of history of the moral-ethical approach, aimed at establishing "the full" truth of history with the scientific-theoretical approach, the purpose of which is knowledge of the objective historical truth. Efforts have been made to break up and oppose such approaches. Such efforts are not only groundless but also harmful. Fairness and truth in history are closely interrelated. The truth of history means, in the final account, having a true concept of historical reality. Without knowledge of the truth, i.e., without adequately identifying the objective features and characteristics of this reality the full truth about the past cannot be said. However, the truth itself will not be known without the firm intention to find out the full truth. Socrates himself said that "any knowledge separated from justice and other virtues is cheating and not wisdom." The noteworthy teacher of our time is the broad aspiration to find "the entire" truth about our past. This is a most important prerequisite for successfully knowing historical truth.



On the cognitive level the social sciences, including history, have the task of making a **breakthrough** on the research front. Naturally, the following question arises: How should this breakthrough be manifested and what specific changes in the results of the studies would prove that such a breakthrough has indeed taken place?

Without laying any claim whatsoever to solving this difficult methodological problem, I would like to raise for the purpose of discussion one of the possible options in its understanding, as applicable to the science of history. Obviously, under conditions in which it is difficult to rely on the discovery of any whatsoever entirely unknown aspects and patterns in sociohistorical developments, the research thrust should consist of the type of increase in knowledge which would provide a noticeable shift in the study of historical reality, which will enable us substantially to expand the scientific-cognitive and practical-applied significance of the result of historical studies.

As Lenin point out, in summing up Hegel's works, knowledge advances "from phenomenon to essence, from the essence of the first order, so to say, to the essence of the second order, and so on, **endlessly**" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works], vol 29, p 227).

Consequently, we can consider as scientifically significant and fundamental the type of increase in knowledge which would mark a transition to knowledge of the essence of a higher order. Therefore, in order to advance we must, first of all, know the level the essence which has already been achieved in our knowledge. This is the task of historiographic analysis. Second, we must determine the specific way which would lead to an essence of a higher order. This calls for the search for new approaches to the study of respective historical reality. The basic foundation for this is known. "...The individual," Lenin wrote, "does not exist other than in the connection leading to the general. The general exists only in the individual, through the individual. Anything individual is (one way or another) general. Anything general is (a particle or aspect or essence) of the individual" (*ibid.*, p 318). Obviously, as we study an individual fact, which is what historians usually do, we must find within it a broader general fact and, dealing with the general fact, bring to light variations which express its individual features.

Such are the general methodological postulates for the intensification of scientific knowledge. They are not always taken into consideration and practically applied by historians. In our study of specific historical events and processes we most frequently draw attention to bringing to light their characteristic features which, inevitably, in addition to an enthusiasm for details in their interpretation, leads to a reduced study of their essence. Such a study is conducted above all by considering the system as such, i.e., its nature is identified on the level of the essence of the first order. Far less

frequently do we approach a studied system as a component (as a subsystem or element) of a system of a higher level, i.e., looking for the general in the individual, which precisely enables us to become familiar with the reality we are studying on a higher level of its essence.

Separating the individual from the general is manifested clearly in the study of the history of Soviet society. In this case efforts were concentrated above all on separating anything "alien" in all areas of social life, including the development of the science of history itself. What was forgotten here was that what was considered "ours" was a structural component of universal human history, for which reason it included within it many of its features and laws.

In general, it seems obvious that in converting in the study of the past to the study of an essence of a higher order, by mastering the methods of historical-systems analysis, we are given extensive opportunities for upgrading the quality and efficiency of research and enhancing its practical-applied significance.

In this connection, two questions must be clarified. The first is the extent to which, borrowing one ideal or another or technological discovery and, in general, its historical experience, should be legitimately considered an indicator of the lagging in one country or another and speak of models of "catching up" historical development, and so on? History proves that new ideas and discoveries have appeared, as a rule, wherever the most favorable conditions existed or where there was a particularly urgent need for them and, subsequently, as "demand" increased, they spread to other countries, where they were reworked and expanded. The second is the question of the attitude toward historical experience which is significant to our time. For a long time, and to this day, the concept was held that in practical terms, almost exclusively significant is only the experience which could be drawn from the recent past. Hence the concentration of efforts on the study of the history of Soviet society and, above all, of its recent decades. Naturally, there is a certain justification for this. However, as it has now become clear (although this was obvious in the past as well), we can draw a great deal of useful benefits for us from the history of our country of the pre-Soviet period and from the histories of other countries and peoples. This applies not only to areas and processes of social life, the development of which is largely defined by long-term factors (ethnic, family, cultural, sociopsychological, etc.) but also those which carry a high degree of dynamism such as, for example, the political area.

One historical example is that of the abolition of serfdom in Russia. Preparations for the reform took place under circumstances in which the majority of the ruling class of the serf-owning nobility opposed the abolition of serfdom and actually allowed only its easing and regulating. For that reason, the usual bureaucratic way of preparations for the reform with the help of various committees

and commissions, consisting of tsarist officials and officials of the respective departments, failed. At that point the autocracy, which understood the need for abolishing serfdom and granting the peasants a certain economic independence, took an exceptional measure. A supradepartmental authority was established (drafting commissions) which were directly answerable to the tsar and included, in addition to radical officials, independent experts among landowners interested in the abolition of serfdom. It was only thanks to this that a draft reform was formulated, which was truly aimed at the elimination of serfdom and was a compromise based on the consideration of objective circumstances and the interests of the peasantry and the various groups of owners of landed estates. Clearly, this experience is of interest to our own time as well since, for the time being, the drafts of many important changes and resolutions are being formulated above all on the basis of the administrative-departmental approach, without the involvement of independent (including scientific) experts. We should not be shocked at the mention of the experience of an autocratic state. The state is a social institution which, despite all of its peculiarities in different class-oriented societies, has something in common. Let us emphasize that neither historians nor legal experts pay proper attention to the overall study of the history of the state and to bringing to light and summing up universally significant experience acquired in the course of its functioning.

Nonetheless, as we correlate the past with the present and we turn to historical experience, we must take into consideration that such correlation must be based on the consideration of the essential-meaningful uniformity of phenomena of the past and the present rather than their superficial similarity. Equally important is the fact that, as a rule, the principles and methods of activity considered useful to our time are those applied in the solution of a given social problem in the past, and not their results. Both are frequently ignored, above all by political journalism, which leads to idealizing many phenomena of the past. Thus, for example, the NEP is depicted as just about the age of universal prosperity and well-being, although at that time the overall level of economic development and the living standard of the broad population masses had remained low, mass unemployment existed in the country, and so on. The experience of the NEP is valuable above all because of the method applied in solving the most important social problems and not the type and standard of life which existed at that time.

Such are, we believe, some of the ways for upgrading the quality and efficiency of historical research.

The following question is essential in the contemporary discussion of the various types of historical research: What should historians study and for what purpose? The answer to this seems obvious. Most generally, the task of the science of history is to depict and explain what happened in the past. Here is the way Engels defined an overall meaningful and purposeful program for historical

research: "One should not complain about historical events but, conversely, try to understand their reasons and, with them, the results **which are by no means exhausted as yet**" (op. cit., vol 21, p 210). As though continuing this thought and applying it to his time, in his polemics with P. Struve, Lenin deemed that it was mandatory for the Marxists "to reduce the entire matter to explaining that which exists and why is it precisely thus and not otherwise" (op. cit., vol 1, p 457). However, by depicting the past, the historians frequently failed to pay proper attention to determining why it occurred precisely thus and not otherwise.

The all-round identification of the reasons and the results of historical events requires the identification of previous possibilities of adopting other, alternate, options in the course of historical development. Today the question of the study of alternate situations in historical development (particularly during the Soviet period) is being formulated on an increasingly broader basis. We are detecting an increasing number of such situations in the history of our country. The study of historical alternatives requires a consideration of a number of methodological aspects.

The legitimacy of pointing out and analyzing alternate situations in historical development is, above all, unquestionable. Although anything which took place in the past is invariant and fixed, all that happened ("past reality") is the result of making practical use of one opportunity or another, existing in the past, which preceded that reality ("the previous past"). The "past reality" could have been the result of the victory of any one of the alternate choices. Nonetheless, "past reality" contained one or another possibility of subsequent development ("the past future"), which also could have options. Therefore, options are a real feature of sociohistorical development, for which reason the full knowledge of this process mandatorily requires the study not simply of that which happened but also of its origins and the way in which it happened. Consequently, the problem is not whether to study options in historical development or not but why is their study necessary and how to study them.

In this connection, we must clarify the concept itself of historical alternatives. A variety of opinions prevail on this matter today. According to some, the existence of various objective possibilities of social development precisely confirm the existence of alternate options, regardless of whether their contemporaries realized the different possibilities and struggled for the implementation of the best among them. In short, alternatives appear only if objective prerequisites for their appearance exist.

The opposite approach is to derive options from the existence in the contemporaries of essentially different concepts as to the ways and means of subsequent developments, regardless of their connection with real possibilities.

In reality, the actual historical alternative takes place only when, on the one hand, objective (economic, social and other) opportunities exist for a variety of development options and, on the other, if the social forces ("forces" precisely and not individuals) exist, which can realize such opportunities, seize one and struggle for its implementation. The unity of objective and subjective factors is a mandatory prerequisite in bringing to light actual historical alternatives, i.e., historical situations which could lead to substantially different outcomes.

The correlation between historical options and the present and the future, as well as the need for and patterns of historical development, is methodologically important. Such problems require special comprehensive discussion and study. Let us merely note that we must not depict options, as is sometimes the case, as something which could be pitted against present in the future. An option is a struggle for the present existence of different choices of subsequent development.

Options and the struggle for different choices of historical progress are one of the forms of manifestation of historical necessity. In this case the possibility that one or another option would triumph has a certain probability. To learn how to determine it is a difficult yet vital task of historians. However, we cannot agree with the view that historical necessity is always implemented as a process of probabilities. To begin with, in probable (stochastic) processes an event (historical in this case) may take place but also may not. Necessity, however, is something which must take place. Second, in addition to an optional-probability form, necessity may also be achieved as something that is inevitable or random.

Let us illustrate this: the radical restructuring of all areas of social life currently taking place in our country is not an alternative to the situation which existed (and, essentially, still exists) but a historically matured inevitability of its radical change. The interests of social progress inflexibly and firmly demand a radical restructuring. We shall either make it, at which point our country will maintain and substantially strengthen its leading positions in the struggle for the most favorable ways of social progress for mankind, or else, as has been accurately noted, we shall be shoved to the side of this progress. However, since on the level of the advancing historical progress a defeat is not an alternative to victory (although in isolated specific situations such an alternative may appear), as has been repeatedly emphasized of late on the highest levels, we have no solution other than to undertake the radical restructuring in society. The ways and means of solving specific problems of perestroika may offer options but perestroika itself, as a historical phenomenon, does not.

Now as to the purposes of the study of historical options. To begin with, unquestionably, we must study the real and specific possibilities and alternatives; we must not replace them with that which we would like to see in history. Yet, sometimes that is precisely what we do.

Second, the failure to use opportunities and neglected options in historical development should be studied in order more profoundly to clarify the reasons and results of what happened and not for the sake of regretting the fact that history did not pursue a course which, in our view, it should have. In emphasizing this, Lenin pointed out that we must consider "history from the viewpoint of those who make it, without having the opportunity impeccably to take into consideration in advance the chances or the viewpoint of the Philistine intellectual, who moralizes that 'it would have been easy to predict...that we should not have undertaken...'" (op. cit., vol 14, p 379). We have had more than enough moralizing concerning the past and violations of the rules of historicism. Thus, in interpreting the history of Soviet society, virtually everything other than the activities of Lenin and the NEP triggers in many people a feeling of dissatisfaction and regret.

Here are a few remarks on various interpretations of specific alternatives in the historical development of our country. Attention is focused on the questions of alternatives to the October Revolution and the Stalinist model of building socialism. In terms of the October Revolution, one of the views (expressed above all by bourgeois historians) is that one alternative to the October Revolution and the conversion to socialism could, allegedly, be the implementation of Stolypin's agrarian reform. Allegedly, World War I prevented its implementation. The groundlessness of this option is that the Stolypin reform, which was aimed at making the landed-bourgeois ("Prussian") way of agrarian development victorious, had failed, as Soviet historians have proved, even before the outbreak of the World War in 1914.

Let us recall that, above all, the first to collapse was the foundation of the Stolypin course of abolishing communities and establishing a "Grossbauer" stratum, which would become the support of the landowners in the countryside. All that was removed from the municipalities (in many cases under administrative pressure) did not exceed 22 percent of the peasant farms, which accounted for no more than 14 percent of communal lands. Of these, less than one-half moved into farmsteads or were given their own land as consolidated holdings (i.e., consolidated land plots). Neither the landowners nor the autocracy were able to crush the attachment of the peasants for limited but nonetheless existing communal trends toward equalization and social self-defense. This voided the possibility of a victory of the "Prussian" method of bourgeois evolution. On the eve of the war, the only way in this evolution was the peasant bourgeois-democratic ("American") way. However, the fast development of monopoly capitalism during World War I, which made impossible the elimination of landed estate ownership without encroaching on bourgeois ownership, voided the possibility of the victory of capitalism in its bourgeois-democratic option as well. Furthermore, by 1917 all possibilities of progressive development on a capitalist basis had become exhausted. The country was

in the clutches of a profound national crisis which threatened to turn it into an appendix of the more developed capitalist countries.

The advent of liberal-bourgeois and petit-bourgeois parties after the February Revolution not only failed to change anything but worsened the situation even further. A historical situation developed in which it was impossible to solve the crisis, as Lenin emphasized, "without abandoning the ground of bourgeois relations" (op. cit., vol 31, p 37). "It is only the dedicated and consistent break with capitalism," he wrote in September 1917, "...that can save our revolution and our country, squeezed in the iron clutches of imperialism" (op. cit., vol 34, p 197). For that reason the October Revolution and the transition to socialism were not an alternative to capitalism, as is sometimes assumed, but a historical inevitability caused by the course of sociohistorical development.

Finally, it has been said that an alternative to the victory of the proletariat in 1917 was the possibility of establishing a military dictatorship. On the historical level, in this case as well, there was no alternative. Even if we assume that the Kornilov mutiny would have been successful and the power would have passed into the hands of the military, this would not have created any kind of alternative, for the most conservative and reactionary social strata which backed the military would not only have failed to solve the crisis experienced by the country but would have aggravated it even further. The obviousness of this to its contemporaries was, we believe, the main reason for the relatively easy suppression of the Kornilov mutiny.

In connection with the October Revolution, another question should also be considered, which is the subject of lively debates: the maturity of objective socioeconomic prerequisites for a socialist revolution. In this case attention is focused on the nature of the agrarian system and the correlation within it of semiserfdom and capitalist relations, and the level of development of agrarian capitalism. Numerous works which have come out of late specifically prove that by the turn of the 20th century bourgeois relations had been unquestionably established within this system. It has also been proved that lower and underdeveloped forms of agrarian capitalism prevailed in Russia (a petit-bourgeois system in the farms and the interweaving of strictly bourgeois with semiserfdom relations in the landed estates, in which the former predominated). That is why charges of an alleged exaggeration of the extent of development of agrarian capitalism are unconvincing. If said level has been exaggerated, the only other system of agrarian relations could be the domination of semiserfdom relations. However, even its most consistent supporters among Soviet historians have abandoned this once popular viewpoint, and no reasons to return to it exist.

It is precisely because capitalism dominated in town and country, in industry and in agriculture, that the economic and social crisis which broke out in the country in

1917 could not be surmounted on a bourgeois basis. That is why the February Revolution failed to solve the agrarian and other problems (national, ending the imperialist war), for it was no longer possible to solve them without affecting the foundations of capitalism. Had the possibility existed of limiting activities only to the elimination of semiserfdom vestiges, in its struggle for power the bourgeoisie would have unquestionably adopted it. This range of problems of the history of the October Socialist Revolution requires further intensified studies.

Therefore, the path to a proletarian revolution and the conversion to socialism offered no historical options. The country had alternatives of a different type, related to the existence of various possibilities of the shifting of power to the proletariat, which must be brought to light and studied.

As to the question of the models of building socialism, different from the Stalinist, it is considered above all in connection with the cult of Stalin's personality and the establishment and functioning of a centralized-command administrative-bureaucratic system of managing social life in the country, in all areas. Today universal attention is focused on the figure of Stalin himself. This is entirely natural, for he was the top of the huge iceberg which embodied this system. The top, however, as we know, is the most visible part. This triggers the illusion that by reaching the top one could have a look at the entire iceberg. That is why there are so many judgments expressed about Stalin's personality, his role in the historical development of the country and his responsibility for the catastrophic failures and tremendous and irreparable losses which accompanied this development. Despite the entire difference in views on the subject of the cult of Stalin's personality and its reasons, the following seems clear from the positions of the historian:

The first is assessing the cult of personality as a historical phenomenon. In this case, we must most firmly emphasize that any cult is a strictly negative phenomenon. A cult means not simply limiting but paralyzing the autonomy and initiative of all social strata and levels of social management. A cult means instilling faith in a superman and spiritual enslavement and, in its extreme forms, as was the case with Stalin's cult, violence and terror. For that reason no direct or indirect justification of the cult of Stalin could exist. However, this does not negate in any way successes achieved in building socialism which, unquestionably, took place, nor does it cast the slightest possible aspersion on those who dedicated their energy, enthusiasm, intelligence and, frequently, their own lives to socialism. The outstanding Russian historian S. Solovyev emphasized that "the arbitrary behavior of one individual, however powerful he may be, cannot change the course of popular life or life the nation off its tracks." To the Soviet people those tracks were the path opened by the October Revolution and its ideals, and the building of socialism. The unquestionable successes which were achieved here were attained through the enthusiasm, energy and greatest possible dedication of all classes

and social strata in Soviet society. In this connection, the criticism of the cult of Stalin's personality cannot cast even the slightest possible aspersion on the generations of builders and defenders of socialism and the unparalleled exploit of their life, labor and struggle.

The second aspect is related to determining the reasons for the appearance of the cult of personality. A number of opinions and viewpoints have been expressed on the subject. Today we have come close to realizing that extremes in exposing the reasons for the cult of personality begin to come together, i.e., they objectively lead us to a single outcome. One of them is that the appearance of the system of the cult may be explained by Stalin's personal features. This approach means that society has no guarantees against the appearance of a cult, for such a specific individual could accidentally find itself at the head of the social system. All that one can do is to hope that this will be a good person.

Another approach reduces the reasons for the cult to a variety of objective factors (the features which influenced the course of the global revolutionary movement, the country's backwardness, lack of experience in democracy, need for centralization, etc.). As a result, the cult is presented as a historical inevitability, which society was unable to oppose. Despite their differences, both approaches lead to a single objective result: the impossibility of preventing the establishment of an administrative-bureaucratic system and the cult of Stalin. We cannot accept this. It is obvious that the cult and the respective system were the outcome of a complex combination of objective and subjective factors, which are as yet to be identified and comprehensively studied, for this is necessary in order to formulate specific steps which would ensure that the appearance of a cult in the future will be impossible. It is unquestionable, on a general historical level, that since the popular masses are the makers and motors of sociohistorical progress, the only firm guarantee against a command-bureaucratic method and a cult of individuals heading the social system is the full and true (i.e., actual and not merely proclaimed) democratic rule, with all of its specific attributes (electiveness and accountability, controllability and replacement of the entire administrative apparatus, glasnost and collectivity in drafting and adopting decisions and laws and their mandatory observance by all members of society, etc.).

Furthermore, we can clearly say that the system of the cult and of command-bureaucratic management was not historically inevitable for our country. Other possibilities and real alternatives for building socialism existed. The main one was that despite the entire need for centralization (which indeed existed), it could have been implemented not in the form of a coercive bureaucratic centralism, which was actually what happened, but in the form of democratic centralism, as planned by Lenin. This possibility is not eliminated by complaints that we lacked suitable experience in democracy, that the cultural standards of the people were low, and so on. The

people, who were able to realize the need to overthrow the old system and make a revolution and defend its gains, would have unquestionably appreciated and supported a democratic way of development. I believe that the Stalinist model of building socialism triumphed because the ideological supporters of alternate options of progress toward socialism were unable (unwilling or helpless) to ensure their practical implementation on the scale and forms which were needed for their victory.

As a whole, the study of the problem of the cult and of alternate choices in building socialism demands that today we shift from journalistic-hypothetical interpretations to systematic specific historical studies based on documentary data. Unfortunately, a great deal of such data remains inaccessible to the researchers.

Since objective socioeconomic opportunities for alternate choices in building socialism existed, their practical implementation was based on subjective factors, future studies should be centered on determining these factors and establishing the precise correlation among them, which determined the resultant force in the struggle among different approaches. The interpretation of subjective factors should take place, to begin with, on different levels (leaders of conflicting trends-party, soviet and state "leaderships"-broad popular masses, in the entire variety of their social structure); second, they must be consistent with all the requirements and interests, aspirations and ideals, i.e., the totality of views and activities of leaders, "the leadership" and the masses.

As to Stalin's personality, a comprehensive study is needed of his views and activities, particularly during periods when he held high party, state and military positions. Until we become familiar with all of this, we cannot fully understand the way the mechanism of personal power took shape and functioned.

Particular attention should be paid to the study of the social awareness of the broad masses in its ideological and sociopsychological aspects, for without this we cannot understand the actions of individual leaders or the "leadership" not only during the Soviet period but during other historical ages as well.

Nonetheless, a paradoxical situation has developed in the area of the study of public awareness, with the exception of the history of social thinking in its theoretical aspects. Although we well know, as Engels said, that in history "nothing is accomplished without a conscious intention and desired objective" (op. cit., vol 21, p 306), actually, until very recently, we surrounded with silence and even ignored, in order to suit a misunderstood materialistic approach to history, the question of the awareness of classes, social strata and various social groups. Yet it is precisely here that are seated many long-term factors of historical development. We know that the force of habit and inertia of millions of people is the most powerful obstacle to social progress, an obstacle

which is difficult to overcome. A number of long established features of ordinary awareness and way of life remain to this day. They include, for example, the widespread aspiration toward equalization, the origins of which are seated in the thousands of years of peasant communal history.

It is obvious, therefore, that the development of new thinking must not be limited to changing it in a relatively small social stratum. The new thinking must be established in the mass consciousness. It would be unnecessary to point out the great difficulty and complexity of solving this problem. In this area we need significantly greater efforts and investments than have been made so far. Nor can this problem be solved without a radical change in the role and place in our social life of the entire scientific, cultural and ideological front, i.e., the area of spiritual production as a whole.

Naturally, the way of life determines the awareness, but this is only on the ordinary, the sociopsychological level. The conversion of social awareness to the conceptual-ideological level does not take place automatically. As historical development indicates, this requires the particular and lengthy efforts of ideologues and of respective institutions. The summation of historical experience acquired in this area is an important task of social scientists. We must also take into consideration the knowledge of the ideological influence over the masses by the church. Nor should we forget the fact that procuring food, clothing and housing is the most important but only the initial prerequisite for the solution of the basic historical task of perestroika: allowing our country to reach a new level of spiritual and humanistic-cultural developments of men and society, substantially different from that of the West. This long-term historical development must be mandatorily taken into consideration in implementing the current tasks of perestroika and the allocation of efforts and funds.

In addition to the ones we noted, a large number of methodological problems of historical research remains. Thus, in connection with the negative phenomena in the history of Soviet society of the 1930s and 1940s, there is the question of correlating the efforts invested in it in solving specific problems and the consequent results. Let us acknowledge that assessing results of historical activities on the basis of the efforts which were made is an important methodological matter worth pursuing. Understandably, this can be solved above all by determining the historical significance of the results of one activity or another. Perhaps we should consider the development of a concept such as "historical optimum," based on specific historical data.

The accurate and systematic dialectical use of the conceptual-category apparatus assumes great importance in the successful development of the science of history (and not only of history). We must totally get rid of the dogmatic one-sided approaches which exist here. We must remember this because, in a number of cases, to

this day we see swings from one extreme to another. For example, the prime importance of taking into consideration universal human needs and interests in our age is emphasized entirely accurately and timely. However, the inevitability of a socioparty approach to the present and the past has not disappeared (let us particularly emphasize that we understand the principle of party-mindedness in a Leninist manner and not in the least on a narrow sectarian basis according to which the final assessment predetermines the results of studies or even replaces the studies themselves. To us this principle is related above all to the clarity of the social stance adopted by the scientist who dedicates his forces and knowledge to the search of objective truth). However, there is less and less talk of adopting such an approach in the interpretation of the past. The concept of party-mindedness in social science, as the most important principle of dialectical-materialistic study of the course of social development, has virtually vanished. However, there is no study of social sciences outside of socioparty positions. Could Marxist party-mindedness hinder us from concentrating our attention on what is universally human, national and of the state? The most important of its requirements is the struggle for the most favorable conditions for social progress for the broadest possible masses (for all mankind). Is forgetting this permissible?

Another example of the correlation between the objective and the subjective is the following: in the past we frequently overemphasized objective factors and their separation from the subjective ones. This reached the point that occasionally what was objective was conceived as something which, in general, opposed subjective human activities, whereas in fact there is nothing objective in social life which is not related to or triggered by such activities. However, it is hardly proper, under the pretext of highlighting the role of the human factor, to focus the attention only on the subjective factor and to claim, for example, that it is still not known whether it is history that identifies the individual or the individual who identifies history.

Another problem is that of monism and pluralism. In the past all we emphasized was their opposite nature. Almost exclusively any writing in our country on the subject of pluralism was in the negative. It has now been acknowledged that Marxism does not exclude in the least pluralism of opinions and their multiplicity. For some reason, however, we have kept silent about monism. Yet we have a socialist pluralism. More accurately, we can describe it as being dialectical-materialistic. It is closely related to materialistic monism. The multiplicity of our opinions concerning the present and the past is based on the monistic understanding of the unity of objective truth, the materialistic theory of the explanation of reality and the dialectical method for its study. We must speak of this, for otherwise rejecting either extreme will create the other.

In order successfully to solve the problems facing the science of history we must perfect the art of scientific debate. Today such debates frequently suffer from major shortcomings.

Finally, progress in the science of history is impossible without radically improving its material and technical facilities. Automated library and archive information-reference systems, machine memory banks and centers for specific historical data and the possibility of making extensive use of personal computers are facilities without which today no theory and methodology of historical research in itself would provide a proper research standard. Today we have fallen so far behind historians in the developed countries that unless active efforts are made we shall soon stop understanding at all the "technology" of their work and will be unable even to check their results, not to mention to duplicate their studies.

Such is the range of methodological problems of historical research on which, I believe, it would be expedient to concentrate and which demand clarification and development.

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### **Economic Sovereignty and the Nationality Question**

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[Article by Sergey Viktorovich Cheshko, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The article in *KOMMUNIST* "From Bureaucratic Centralism to Economic Integration of Sovereign Republics" (No 15 1988, pp 22-23) is one more of the still infrequent attempts at making a scientific analysis of interrepublic and Union-republic economic relations in the context of the national problems existing within Soviet society. In addition to all its other merits, this article is useful for asking us to discuss an entire set of problems which, although indirectly related to the economy, are of equal importance to society.

Lively and exceptionally sharp debates are taking place on the problems raised by the authors of that articles, both within academic circles and among rather broad social strata, particularly in the Baltic republics. Judging by the development of events, the reorganization of the Soviet Union of states by restoring the initial principles of its structure may begin precisely in the Baltic area. This is no accident, for the Baltic area is one of the most developed socioeconomic parts of the country and the imperfection of the system applied in managing the economy and social processes adversely affects here the implementation of possibilities of further growth. The

quite high intellectual potential, level of social consciousness and political standards of the population of the Baltic republics instill the hope that the reforms will prove efficient.

Even before its birth, the "Baltic variant" of perestroika has already become a testing ground for trying ideas and development forecasting programs. In this connection, it would be worth calmly to analyze this concept, which is expressed in terms of formulas of republic cost accounting, economic sovereignty, and so on, the more so since it not only has convinced supporters but also equally consistent opponents.

V. Koroteyeva, L. Perepelkin and O. Shkaratan are among the supporters of this concept, and their arguments appear quite substantive. The author of this article is among the skeptics. For example, from the skeptical viewpoint the place which "cost accounting" republics will assume within the economic system, in the absence of a full all-Union market, remains unclear. Equally questionable is the idea formulated in Estonia of creating in the Baltic area so-called closed or separate, Chinese-style, economic zones. Could this result in making them truly closed to internal-Union economic relations and wide open to foreign economic relations? Actually, whereas answers to such questions must be definite, the evaluation of the results of such a study will depend on the selected starting point in assigning priorities. To acknowledge as primary and to give priority to all-Union economic interest is one thing; to give preference to republic interests, another.

Efforts are being made to "eliminate" this contradiction, inherent in the concept of republic cost accounting, by claiming, not without justification, that the creation of efficient republic economic systems would constitute a major contribution to perestroika and to strengthening the country's entire economy. Furthermore, to this day the specialists have not reached a unanimous opinion on the essence of concepts, such as "republic cost accounting" and "republic economic sovereignty," or on the nature of the changes they presume. By no means do all supporters of such ideas agree, for example, to the prospect of introducing republic customs barriers and separate currencies, and the conversion of Union republics into relatively isolated and autonomous economic zones. Incidentally, the authors of the article "From Bureaucratic Centralism....," who quite convincingly describe the advantages of decentralization and conversion of inter-republic economic relations to a mutually profitable foundation, have not defined quite accurately, it seems to me, their attitude toward such matters. On the one hand, they clearly lean toward the idea of self-sufficiency of republic territorial communities; on the other, they question the "expediency of creating relatively separate economic organisms within the national economic complex of the USSR." In supporting the need for granting economic sovereignty to the republics, the authors emphasize that this will not harm internal Union integration, for such sovereignty "does



not presume in the least the elimination of all-Union scientific and technical programs or cooperation on an even broader international scale."

It would be pertinent, however, to retort that if economic sovereignty is expanded only with the help of "all-Union scientific and technical programs," qualitative differences between internal-Union (internal state) integration and, let us say, the integration of the members of the European Economic Community, virtually disappear. The enumeration of economic rights of Union republics, suggested by the authors of that article, do not convince us of the opposite. Actually, in a sense, the level of integration of the Common Market may prove to be even higher as a result of the activities of multinational companies.

If such comparisons are legitimate, and I believe they are, it would be hardly possible to claim along with the authors of the article, confidently, that republic economic sovereignty does not conflict with global integration trends. Within that same EEC further integration is taking place, while the concept of economic sovereignty is based on the opposite idea of disintegration. The expediency of weakening economic relations so that, subsequently, by participating in common global developments they become strengthened again, appears doubtful. Disintegration (which is not the same as decentralization) makes sense only if it is needed for purposes of radical restructuring of economic relations and the reorientation of such a structure of economic relations toward new partners, i.e., in this case, the foreign market.

The economic side of the problem is not the most important one. The concept of republic cost accounting is distinguished precisely by the fact that it (with all the consequences stemming from and supplementing it) is not strictly economic in terms of its trend and possible consequences.

From the purely economic viewpoint, republic cost accounting could hardly be the only acceptable or optimal way of restructuring territorial interrelationships within the country's national economy. Experimentally converting several republics to cost accounting should indicate the extent to which this method is justified. In my view, it would be equally expedient to try to establish market relations among economic rayons and territorial-production complexes which do not coincide with republic boundaries.

Furthermore, it is doubtful that republic cost accounting could be considered a determining condition for optimizing the economies of the republics. It means nothing but a redistribution of economic management functions and changes in the system for the redistribution of production resources among governmental authorities—both Union and republic. Transferring the prerogative to the latter should not mandatorily and favorably reflect on the efficiency of public production. Efficiency will

depend on different factors, such as the nature of the domestic economic policy of the republic, the existence of those same resources and means for supplementing them from outside sources, and so on. We can fully agree with the authors of the article I referred to in that republic cost accounting should be more accurately described as economic sovereignty. Its essence would be not any improvements in the economic mechanism but a matter of the material foundation for strengthening the autonomy of Union republics, which is no longer an economic but a political problem. This problem cannot be considered separately from projects for other purely political reforms which are being discussed in the Baltic area.

It is quite likely that the implementation of the idea of economic sovereignty would result in major changes in the existing governmental structure of the USSR. A moderate variant, conventionally speaking, could contribute to the regeneration of federative relations, which were destroyed during the Stalinist period and have not been restored to this day. The extreme radical option, which includes the establishment of republic customs boundaries and the introduction of republic currencies, backed by the proclamation of republic citizenship, anti-emigration policy, the raising of republic military contingents and other similar steps, which have been formulated by some Baltic intellectuals, could lead to the establishment of not even federative but confederative interrepublic relations, thus extremely facilitating the conversion of the rights of republics to withdraw from the Union from a purely theoretical into a real possibility. The likelihood of such a possibility—assuming that it would ever appear—would depend on the complex sociopolitical processes occurring in the country, and in the deployment of political forces. However, it appears quite obvious that the implementation of the entire set of such steps would create the minimal necessary economic and political prerequisites for Union republics to acquire the complete autonomy of independent countries.

Ideological stereotypes do not allow for such a formulation of the question, for on the surface it appears simply sacrilegious in terms of one of the fundamental principles on which our state and society are structured—the principle of internationalism. But let us not be hasty with our conclusions. The very concept of internationalism, its seeming clarity notwithstanding, obviously demands an elaboration.

What is frequently understood by internationalism is some kind of moral category, such as the familiar laws given by Moses or Christ. Unless we correlate this category with a given historical age and specific social and political living conditions, it loses its meaning and effectiveness.

Internationalism is not an inherent property of the soul or the consciousness of the Soviet person. To begin with, internationalism should be viewed as a certain model of relations among nations (or states), which encompasses

principles, such as equality and respect for reciprocal rights, cohesion, cooperation, and so on. We have become accustomed to emphasize a different meaning of this concept, singling out the class nature and class functions of internationalism—proletarian internationalism. In a socialist society, however, where no class antagonisms exist, it is precisely relations among peoples that assume priority.

Actually, extrapolated from socialism, class internationalism, which is oriented toward achieving class (non-national) objectives, developed into the concept according to which the principle of internationalism must be expressed in the rigid structuring of a multinational state, and the priority of state interests over those of individual peoples, and Union and autonomous republics. Hence the sharp criticism by the representatives of the old school of interpretation of Marxism-Leninism of virtually any project of decentralization of the state structure of the USSR on grounds that this allegedly undermines internationalism. I believe this to be an erroneous stance.

Article 70 of the 1977 USSR Constitution reads as follows: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a single Union multinational state, founded on the basis of the principle of socialist federalism, as a result of the free self-determination of nations and voluntary unification of equal Soviet socialist republics." Today this formulation triggers certain questions and arguments. The question is asked, what is "socialist federalism," and what does a "single Union state" mean, and how are these principles correlated with the state system? Typologically, is our federation similar to federative countries such as, for example, the United States or the FRG, or is it closer (theoretically) to a confederation? Is it possible to have within the framework of the federation (USSR) yet another federation (the RSFSR), with a very definite form of state structure in mind? A major shortcoming of our state law is the fact that it does not clarify the concept of sovereignty: the sovereignty of the Union and of Union republics and its consistency with international law have not been defined.

Such lack of clarity indicates, yet once again, that our legislation on the national question needs substantial elaboration. However, this is not the crux of the matter. What matters is that the Union was created as a voluntary unification of sovereign Soviet states. This was done not for the sake of an abstract idea of unity but in order to achieve entirely specific objectives of the survival and building of socialism during the then prevailing military-political and economic situation. The voluntary nature of the unification and, consequently, the possibility of secession were emphasized by the fact that the Union republics retained the right freely to secede from the USSR; this right is codified in the present Constitution as well (Article 72).

The study of the circumstances which led to the founding of the USSR leads to a critical consideration of the idea of the priority of all-Union interests. Initially, all-Union

interests, unrelated to republic interests, did not exist at all. That is why all contradictions, and all clashes among interests could consist either of differences between republics or violations by the central management agencies of the interests of Union republics, but not vice versa. Any different logic in understanding the internationalist foundations of our state would inevitably lead to the conclusion that it was not Lenin but Stalin who, in the final account, implemented his autonomy plan by depriving the republics of their real autonomy, was the true internationalist.

Clearly, the following assumption makes sense: the initial governmental structure of the USSR was, in a certain sense, forced and temporary; it was a transition toward a more centralized structure as being more progressive and consistent with the requirements of societal integration. The adoption of such a view would make Stalin's policy of centralization erroneous not as a whole but as a result of the intolerable coercive methods for its implementation and anticipation. Consequently, today we must be guided not by the conditions which prevailed in the 1920s but by the requirements of contemporary development, a conclusion which would hardly be questioned by anyone. As to "anticipation," Stalin was not the only one, for this is precisely a case in which an unjustified pace, conflicting with objective development processes and the requirements of the time, mean losing the political course.

What is the specific nature of the contemporary period in the development of our state? Perhaps, staring now, we should engage not by restoring the initial governmental structure of the USSR but legalizing existing practices and advancing toward a democratic and a unitary state based on law. Clearly, the time for the discussion of this idea has not come yet, although in itself it deserves no less attention than any other. It is useful in such matters to bear in mind that not all centralization is antagonistic to democracy and not all decentralization is identical to it: the form of a state structure and that of its political system are different things.

One could only guess as to the situation which would have prevailed today had the USSR developed over the past 50 years truly as a Union of equal republics. It is not excluded that in that case today we may have come closer to a different type of federation (structured, for example, not on the basis of national-territorial but only the territorial principle, similar to other federative countries in the world) or even a unitarian state with broad local self-administration. However, the natural course of historical development was grossly violated, and today we are forced largely to start from scratch and, in some cases, if necessary, retreat. History does not tolerate any coercion and makes us pay dearly for arbitrariness in politics. Failure to realize this could drive the country into the chaos of even worse national-political problems and doom democratization and the entire program for social restructuring to failure.

Under the specific conditions of our reality true internationalism should consist not of coercively restraining decentralizing initiatives originating in Union republics or through the political creativity of the masses, based on republic self-awareness, but of helping to strengthen the legal sovereignty of the republics while, at the same time, strengthening the supreme legal sovereignty of the Union.

What follows from all this is that it would be unwise artificially to support any ideas of decentralization and to protect them from substantiated criticism. Conversely, it is precisely open and democratic debates that should, in the final account, give the people the opportunity to evaluate the advantages and shortcomings of a given concept and to exclude the risk of making a hasty choice. Unfortunately, for the time being we are only learning how to discuss such sensitive problems, which were previously not open to discussion. Should someone start a discussion on the need to broaden the rights of republics, it is virtually certain that someone else would accuse him of separatism. Suffice it to question the expediency of unlimited sovereignty of republics to be labeled a reactionary. If the question is raised about the natural rights of the main native ethnic group of a given republic, although in a veiled manner, the perennial scourge of nationalism emerges. If the discussion turns to the objective processes of the adoption of a given culture and assimilation and the increased significance of bilingualism, naturally this is interpreted as a call for coercive Russification. Frequently, in the heat of arguments, intermediary and compromise concepts are simply rejected: our interlocutor, who does not fully share our own viewpoint automatically turns into an enemy. There also are innocent ruses such as, for example, a program which quite obviously leads to weakening relations between the individual republics and the Union may be presented as a program for strengthening such relations.

The idea of economic sovereignty is considered not only in the context of Union-republic relations but also from the viewpoint of national relations. Furthermore, national relations are frequently even given priority, based on the logic that if a republic is a national-state formation, its status will also determine the condition of national relations. However, we must distinguish between these two questions. At this point we must return to the article by Koroteyeva, Perepelkin and Shkaratan. While I fully welcome their economic analysis of interrepublic relations and their aspiration to demythologize this aspect of governmental policy, I nonetheless cannot agree with some important concepts presented in the article, pertaining specifically to national aspects.

In the opinion of the authors, "we should distinguish between territorial communities, whose functions are the reproduction of man, and the territories of republics (ethnic territories), the purpose of which, in addition, is the reproduction of national culture and, therefore, the

reproduction of ethnic groups" (p 30). The authors formulate this claim as an important argument in favor of introducing republic economic sovereignty but, in my view, they are mistaken.

Any territory (Union or autonomous republic, oblast or rayon) performs the functions of ethnic reproduction, and equating an ethnic territory with political boundaries is by no means one of its mandatory prerequisites. Otherwise we could not explain the reproduction of many ethnic groups in the world, inhabiting polyethnic countries. In that case the phenomenon of reproduction of a dispersed ethnic population would become entirely puzzling. Nor would this be helped by the elaboration that this is not an ordinary but a first-rate reproduction.

If we speak of cultural reproduction, we would find it difficult to define the reasons for the so-called second-rate reproduction of ethnic specifics: in some cases the main role would be played by the insufficiency of conditions; in other, by the currently universal trend toward the internationalization of cultures. In principle, the conditions do not directly depend on whether a given ethnic group forms an ethnopolitical organism or does not. In simple terms, the existence and development of the Latvian or Georgian ethnic group is determined by factors different from the respective existence of the Latvian or Georgian SSR.

As to the reproduction of the social structures of an ethnic group, the authors of the article clearly imply that without the existence of the complete variety of socio-professional groups an ethnic group cannot be normally reproduced (page 30). This concept as well does not seem sufficiently well-founded. How, one may ask, could have the Jewish and Gypsy ethnic groups existed for such a long time, with their specific social structure, both in our country and elsewhere? Or what about the reindeer breeders of the North or other ethnic groups throughout the world, which have preserved a specific economic specialization? In terms of the reproduction of Central Asian peoples, the lower degree of their urbanization is important in that it contributes to the fast growth of their numbers and the preservation of many sociolegal and ethnocultural traditions. Let us not confuse the realities of ethnic development with subjective concepts of criteria of progressiveness or of the first-rate or second-rate nature of such development.

Identifying a republic with an ethnic territory seems an excessively arbitrary assumption. No single Union or autonomous republic in the USSR coincides entirely, from the territorial viewpoint, with the area inhabited by one ethnic group or another in terms of its place of origin, development and historical and contemporary settlement. In absolutely all cases the boundaries differ in both cases. An "assumption" in such matters is fraught with serious theoretical misunderstandings and national and political clashes. Having adopted such a viewpoint, the authors of the article would have to admit that Bukhara and Samarkand, for example, are not part

of the ethnic territory of the Tajiks, and that the entire Baltic area must be excluded from the ethnic territory of the Slavic peoples. The fact that such peoples have their own national-state structures is no argument, for otherwise the result would be that Tajiks in Uzbekistan or Belorussians in Latvia are clearly doomed to worse conditions of ethnocultural development merely because they live outside the boundaries of their own republics. And what would be the case of ethnic groups which have no autonomy to begin with? In that case, there would be no place or purpose for their reproduction.

Ethnic groups are original social communities, whose functions and development laws are greatly different from territorial social communities. They can exist both in territorial and extraterritorial forms (ethnosocial organisms and ethnic groups). The essence of ethnic reproduction is by no means a reproduction of socioeconomic and political structures of the ethnic group (which could be totally lacking), but the ethnocultural and ethnomental structures of that group.

At the initial ethnogenic stage, ethnic groups could not exist other than in a territorial aspect. According to one of the points of view, in general, the ethnic group was the first form of organization of social life, the life of primitive human collectives. In these collectives, already as a derivative of joint activities, the features which enable us to distinguish one ethnic group from another were formed: features of self-awareness, language, culture, etc. As the ethnic groups grew and converted into multiple-thousand or multimillion strong communities (which led to the erosion of direct intraethnic relations), these features became the essential characteristics of the ethnic group. The ethnic groups themselves turned from functional primitive collectives into communities which no longer played an important or even any kind of role in material reproduction. Their main purpose was spiritual reproduction, the reproduction of an extremely general and, at the same time, extremely comprehensive social involvement, a community of people cutting across boundaries of territorial communities, social classes and families.

I fully admit that the suggested view on the nature of the ethnic group and its origins may trigger objections (above all among my colleagues-ethnographers). However, the main reason for which I actually allowed myself to digress from the main topic is obvious. To confuse relations among political territorial communities, such as states, Union republics, and so on, and ethnic groups should not be allowed not only because the former are, as a rule, polyethnic in terms of population structure but also because interethnic relations are essentially different in nature and internal determination from intergovernmental (interrepublic): the subjects of these types of relations are different.

This circumstance is not always realized and taken into consideration. Usually, outside the science of ethnography, national relations are understood above all as

relations among republics. This confuses us in the study of national problems and, in addition to everything else, makes it possible for those who so wish it to present strictly national interests as being the interests of the entire republic and to lay a claim to priority rights for the ethnic group on the basis of which the republic was created.

Therefore, two questions clearly stand out in the entire set of national-political problems of Soviet society: that of interrepublic, i.e., of essentially intergovernmental relations, and that of national relations—relations among the ethnic groups in the country. They are interrelated but almost mechanically, to the extent to which the USSR was created on the basis of national-territorial features. Therefore, we must solve not one but two problems: the problem of improving the Soviet federation and that of regulating national relations.

The main purpose for the founding of the USSR was not that of solving the national problem as such. It was a form of organization of relations among national states, among several political self-determined nations. After the closing down of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, there was simply no one who could deal with such problems. The Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet had always acted as an authority representing national-territorial formations but not the ethnic groups in the country. Let us add to this that in the Constitutions of the USSR and of Union and autonomous republics, the rights of ethnic groups were formulated only in a most general aspect and the mechanism for ensuring them was not defined.

Due to the fact that the republics could only follow the example of the center and, in the course of time, became the same type of authoritarian state formations, by no means did they always resolve the national problem on a democratic basis. In a number of republics the main native ethnic groups obtained privileges at the expense of others, whose the rights and needs were frequently simply ignored. Tajikistan continues "not to notice" the existence of Pamir ethnic groups, a topic which was discussed by Ye. Zeymal in *KOMMUNIST* (No 15 1988, p 66). Possibly, after the next population census, we may finally find out the number of people speaking Pamir languages. As in the past, however, we shall not know the size of the Pamir ethnic groups themselves, for all of them are recorded as Tajiks, regardless of the actual self-awareness of the Pamir people. Unfortunately, the list of such examples could be extended.

Naturally, economic, social or political problems frequently stand behind national problems. However, they are problems precisely because they appear on the grounds of interethnic relations. The most important prerequisite for their resolution should be not only economic and social reforms but, above all, steps which would exclude national inequality, discrimination, coercive assimilation and scorn for national-cultural requirements and encourage a feeling of national dignity. The

equality of nations, freedom of self-determination and ensuring possibilities for cultural development are also the best means of struggle against nationalism.

To sum it up: the problem of a republic economic sovereignty, with which we started, is not directly related to the national problem. Its introduction would have a favorable influence on the state of national relations in Union republics only if it becomes possible to surmount major shortcomings in the system for ensuring the activities of the population and thus alleviate the social stress caused by the scarcity of goods, services and social benefits. However, the reorganization of the structure of interrepublic and Union-republic economic relations could be only a prerequisite for the solution of this problem. The main thing is the way the benefits are distributed within the republics. In the broader sense, it is a question of shaping a domestic republic policy for the reproduction (demographic, material, social, cultural, ethnic) of the republic's population. The elements of such a policy could consist precisely of noneconomic steps, such as the introduction of republic citizenship, a state (mandatory), i.e., privileged language, or artificial emigration restrictions. If the planned reforms in this area are not of a restrictive nature, they assume a purely symbolic significance and lose their real meaning. Restrictive measures should be considered undemocratic and discriminatory toward the non-ethnic population of a republic. Let us note, incidentally, that in the view of the supporters of such steps the problem of excessive emigration, which is the root of all evils, could be solved without their application, through the use of economic instruments. If a republic does not develop its production forces extensively, the need for additional manpower will disappear.

Economic policy can truly become one of the important means of regulating national relations providing, however, that it is directed toward upgrading the efficiency of public production. On the level of relations among republics, such a policy should contribute to providing equal opportunities and economic profitability to the republics, and the intensification of their integration; it would hinder dependency based on subsidies and the unjustified transfer of resources. Furthermore, we should also engage in structuring, in the full meaning of the term, of a cost accounting market economy on the level of the entire country, rather than erect economic barriers which would coincide with political boundaries. It is not political boundaries that should serve as a protection from the arbitrary actions of ministries and departments (Union or republic). It is the omnipotence of the soviets that should provide such protection, which is needed not only by Union republics but by all territories without exception, from rural soviets to the entire country.

Today our society is undergoing a complex transitional period. The policy of perestroika has not smoothed over but brought to light social contradictions and provided an outlet for various trends. Under such circumstances,

the euphoria of renovation should not conceal the need for a critical analysis of events. As we undertake reforms and realize their inevitability, we nonetheless should try to assess their meaning and anticipate consequences soberly and comprehensively. Above all, we must redefine some basic principles for structuring the state and society, understand the correlation among its social, political and ethnic structures and give real meaning to the concept of a Soviet socialist federative multinational state.

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### The Soviet Legal Doctrine: Experience and Lessons

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[Article by Valeriy Dmitriyevich Zorkin, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, USSR MVD Higher Correspondence Juridical School]

[Text] Today the purpose of Soviet juridical science is to develop a new way of thinking concerning anything related to democracy and legality, justice and the rights of the individual, and regulating economic relations and cost accounting rights of enterprises. In order to deal with this task, it must be freed from the heavy burden of dogmatism and stagnation. The first step in this direction is a critical analysis of its past. The present condition of our entire legal system and its accomplishments and shortcomings are closely related to the historical destinies of Soviet legal thinking and their roots can be traced to past decades.

## I

The shaping of the Soviet legal doctrine, as well as the development of our juridical science as a whole, occurred under conditions of their close interaction with the political-legal practices of the revolutionary changes which took place in the first years of the Soviet system. It was necessary to surmount the legal nihilism which was widespread among the masses and to create a legal regulatory foundation and legal mechanisms for controlling economic, political and social relations during the transitional period and secure proletarian law and order and legality.

The need for the legal structuring of the new social system became particularly urgent with the conversion to the NEP, when progress toward socialism as a system of civilized members of cooperatives took a course of developing commodity-monetary relations and cost accounting. The latter had to be linked to socialism and to a planned economy. A new socialist law had to be scientifically developed. That is why Ye.B. Pashukanis, M.A. Reysner, P.I. Stuchka and other representatives of the young Soviet legal science turned to the potential contained in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Above all, it was necessary to earmark an approach to Soviet law as a whole, by formulating the dialectical-materialistic concept of the interpretation of the law. The successful study of other problems of juridical science was impossible without solving this general one. To this effect, Pashukanis called for using Marx's method of moving from the abstract to the concrete. As we know, it was through this method that Marx developed the theory of capital: Starting from the simplest abstraction of commodity, he formulated the specific concept of capital. Similarly, in his study of juridical phenomena, Pashukanis tried, starting with the simplest abstraction—a legal relation (a social relation regulated by the law)—to reach a specific concept of the law as legal order, which is a real, a live form of socioeconomic life under the conditions of a class-oriented society.

The law experts of the 1920s emphasized that the law cannot be reduced to the standards and laws promulgated by the state. Historically and logically legal relations have preceded the law. We must point out that the practice of the then practiced development of the law contributed to this conclusion. The legislation was only being drafted. Meanwhile, reality demanded legal regulations without waiting for the promulgation of the laws. Under those circumstances, legal relations developed as though spontaneously. It was important not to allow the type of regulation which would conflict with the ideals of the socialist revolution. Therefore, proletarian, revolutionary legal awareness was considered a direct source of socialist law, as reflected in the No 1 Decree on the Court.

By then it had already become clear that laws and jurisprudence are not synonymous. The legal experts of the 1920s reached the conclusion that Soviet law develops through its interconnection with spontaneously appearing and reproducing social relations and the creative efforts of the legislator. Aware of the fact that laws play a tremendous role in jurisprudence, they nonetheless emphasized their limitations. With the help of a law the legislator shapes and codifies his policy as the "art of the possible" under specific historical circumstances. He cannot exceed the limits of the actual economic potential and culture. Beyond them lies adventurism and the legislative codification of the arbitrary behavior of the leader. Nonetheless, the legislator should not fall behind reality. He must be sensitive to the needs of the time, create new laws and ensure social progress. Otherwise, the law becomes a conservative force which leads to stagnation and the deadening of the social fabric.

Finally, a legal act by itself does not make the law. In order to become real, it must be embodied in the behavior of the people. Otherwise a legal act remains nothing but a "good intention" on the part of the legislator, a dead standard, a "paper" law. The Soviet jurists of the 1920s precisely concentrated on this "live," actually functioning law. It is thus that juridical science assumed a sociological trend which gave it vitality and practicality. A socialist orientation made it possible to

chart the right course to knowledge and improvement of real law: to establish whether various legal standards were functioning or not and, if not why, what were the reasons and factors of deviations and faults, delinquent behavior, and so on. On this basis scientific forecasts could be formulated concerning legal policy, correct the legislative process and the law-implementing mechanisms, encourage legal prevention and strengthen law and order.

The sociological approach to the law meant not the belittling but, conversely, enhancing the prestige and role of laws and standards: their study and actual enactment and efficiency created opportunities for blocking negative processes on time and seeing the changes which had become necessary.

At that time the question of the nature of Soviet law and its class orientation reached its full magnitude. There were, then, five different socioeconomic systems coexisting in Russia. Soviet law, which had developed from the actual relations of the transitional period, was linked by the jurists of the 1920s to the wishes and interests of the revolutionary proletariat, organized as the politically ruling class. Hence the class nature of Soviet law was that of a proletarian law, expressing the basic interests of the working people, i.e., oriented toward the defense of socialist changes and the victory of relations of a socialist type.

The socialist legal scale and extent of regulating labor and consumption were provided by the principle of scientific socialism "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work." This principle, which constituted the profound essence of socialist legal relations, presumed the elimination of relations of exploitation and private ownership and, consequently, bourgeois law. The works of jurists in the 1920s considered the socioeconomic foundation for this legal scale and its progressive nature along with its historical limitations. This principle opened the way to previously unparalleled broad horizons of socialist equality and equal rights. To build socialism meant, for the first time in history, to grant man socioeconomic rights and, above all, the right to work and to deprive others of the right to live through the labor of others. However, this scale does not provide material equality which is anticipated only at the higher phase of communism ("to each according to his needs"). Although it is a law of equality, socialist law is, nonetheless, in a certain sense also a law of inequality.

Therefore, in its very essence it is incompatible with equalization and barracks communism, which undermine the initiative and incentives for work, trigger social apathy and stagnation and, in the final account, lead to despotism. Equalization is not a law. It is anti-law. It is a characteristic variety of unearned income. The socialist labor scale is the key to social justice in distribution

relations. Their subsequent deformation during the period of stagnation dealt, as we know, a tremendous blow not only at the prestigious socialist law but also at socialism as a whole.

The question of the socialist legal scale assumed particular relevance in the 1920s, in the conversion to the NEP. The NEP meant the rejection of distribution relations based on the principle of "war communism," which were emergency principles and, as a whole, were incompatible with the socialist legal scale. It is no accident that it was precisely at that time that the Soviet jurists addressed themselves to developing the concept of legally regulating distribution relations. It was important to find flexible legal instruments which would make it possible organically to link commodity-monetary relations and cost accounting to planning and allow them to work for a socialist future with maximal returns.

Noteworthy in this connection is the fact that Ye.B. Pashukanis considered the contract as the initial legal relation in economic life, as a typical form of commodity-monetary turnover and equivalent exchange. As a legal form, the contract is based not on subordination or command-administrative relations between rulers and ruled but on the democratic equality of the sides, the free manifestation of their will, coordination and cooperation. A contract and enterprise rather than order and prohibition are the basic legal form of the socialist system. The contract is precisely the type of optimal juridical form which enables us systematically to implement the principle "from each according to his capabilities and to each according to his work," to enhance capabilities and labor and, at the same time, to distribute, reward and stimulate, on the basis of socialist a equivalent and socialist proportionality, i.e., depending on the labor contribution of the worker. Finally, the contract eliminates from economic relations bureaucratic arbitrariness by eliminating the slavishly degrading dependence of the customer on the monopoly diktat of the supplier, imposed to him from above, and offers an opportunity for initiative and enterprise, linking distribution directly to end results and stimulating conscientious, high quality and highly efficient work. Therefore, the Soviet legal experts of the 1920s concluded that the contract was a necessary juridical form of socialist cost accounting and commodity-monetary relations.

Furthermore, they saw in the contract the most suitable legal form for socialism as a whole, bearing in mind its democratic nature. Thus, M.A. Reysner noted that the contract is the foundation of legal regulation of both economic and political relations and, in particular, the basis of the 1924 USSR Constitution. In this case the problems of relations and consistency between socialist economy and politics and the interconnection and interdependence between economic and political democracy were reflected through the lens of jurisprudence. The contemporary democratization of our political system is inseparably related to the radical economic reform, which is also democratic in its trend. The one is impossible without the other.

In addressing itself to the ideas of democracy and equality, the young Soviet juridical science was, in the course of its establishment, a structural component of the revolutionary democratic process. Various approaches were being suggested and lively debates were taking place, in the course of which scientific truth was being born. Naturally, there were also errors and extreme revolutionary haste (such as the concept that both law and state will wither away with the building of socialism). However, no single opinion was elevated to the rank of dogma. No one held the monopoly on truth. The democracy of science was the antidote to dogmatism and authoritarianism. The variety of views helped to see the various facets of the law in its dynamics and in its interconnection with the different factors of social reality. Guidelines for juridical practices were being formulated in the course of the debates.

## II

A complex and contradictory situation developed in Soviet juridical science in the 1930s. On the one hand, jurisprudence had made a substantial contribution to laying the legal foundations for developing the building of socialism. The 1936 USSR Constitution, which legally codified the major results achieved in the course of building socialism in the economic, political and spiritual areas of life, was a significant event in legal life. The adoption of the Constitution and the creation on its basis of a legislative system confirmed the higher standard of legal thinking. Juridical cadres were trained. A young generation of legal scientists was starting its career. The science strengthened organizationally.

Nonetheless, during that time deformations, related above all to the violation of democracy and the growth of processes alien to the nature of socialism and its principles and ideals, showed up in Soviet juridical science. With the conversion from the NEP to rigid centralized-pressure means of industrialization and collectivization, the administrative-order system of management and juridical control appeared. Orders replaced contracts. Bureaucratic-centralist concepts of socialist property and economics prevailed in juridical science. The situation was worsened by the fact that the country lacked strong and developed traditions of democratic standards which could have blocked the appearance of that system. Bureaucratic and authoritarian trends and the autocratic style of leadership and way of thinking intensified. The cult of the leader's personality developed. Gross violations of legality, abuse of power, arbitrariness and mass repressions became part of the system. This led to the appearance of a wide gap between legal science, as codified in the laws, and its real exercise.

Unfortunately, juridical science proved unable to oppose such negative processes. A spirit of anti-democracy and authoritarian-dogmatic thinking prevailed in jurisprudence. A small circle of administrators, headed by A.Ya. Vyshinskiy, usurped the monopoly on truth. All that was left for the scientists was to comment on a number of



concepts, which had been raised to the rank of dogma and were largely erroneous, including the notorious concept of the "aggravation" of the class struggle in the 1930s. Scholasticism and quotation-mongering overwhelmed juridical science. Hiding behind "monolithic unity," subservience, servility, and intolerance of any formulation which may differ from the officially accepted one, blossomed. Juridical personnel were subjected to repressions. Lysenkoism entered jurisprudence as well.

Juridical science was assigned the degrading role of housemaid of the autocratic regime. This role assumed truly sinister aspects in criminal law and procedure, and in corrective labor law where the overall trend of strengthening political repressions predominated. Rejecting elementary legal and moral principles, Vyshinskiy and his retinue formulated the concept of "conspiracy in the broad meaning of the term," which was terrible in terms of its practical application, in order to provide a legal "backing" of mass reprisals against the "enemies of the people." This voided the need to establish a direct causal relation between the activities of the conspirator and the perpetrator of the crime, before he could be criminally prosecuted. The concept of conspiracy, which had been developed by humanistic science and practice, was replaced by the loose "rubber" concept of participation and connection, which in fact opened the way to unlimited judicial-administrative arbitrariness. It was with the help of such a "juridical" structure that the blasphemous accusation of "conspiracy" with the "common act," and "attempt to overthrow the Soviet system," and "criminal activities typical of gangs of professional saboteurs, spies and murderers" was raised against many most noted leaders of the party and the state.

The range of actions subject to criminal punishment was drastically expanded. The maximal terms of deprivation of freedom were increased (to 25 years), and so was the use of the death penalty, above all toward the "enemies of the people."

Furthermore, Vyshinskiy introduced the formula that culpability is the causal link between an individual suspected of having committed a crime and the crime itself. This "juridical structure" must be clarified. Actually, it meant a rejection of most important aspects of the concept of guilt such as intent, purpose, motivation, and others, replacing them with an "objective" and frequently fictitious connection between his actions and real events, regardless of his own attitude toward his own actions, the type of objectives he pursued, and so on.

Such an elaboration opened the way to the so-called objective liability and unrestricted judicial opinions. The actual principle of individual guilt as a necessary element of a crime was rejected. In practice, Vyshinskiy's formula was convenient by allowing easily to identify "culprits" for the occasionally occurring breakdowns in production, accidents, and so on.

The consequences of this "theoretical" step were manifested with truly horrifying tragic consequences in the repressions which affected not only the accused but also their relatives and friends. Suffice it to recall the decrees of 1934-1935, according to which members of families of "traitors to the homeland," who were even unaware of the latter's activities and were not involved in any complicity, were subject to exile for 5 years. Such repressions affected even children: Criminal liability for a number of crimes was applied to 12-year-old children.

Under Vyshinskiy's pressure the suggestion of progressive Soviet scientists of abolishing the so-called criminal law analogy was rejected, i.e., the right of the court to impose a criminal penalty for actions which were not directly contemplated by the law but which the court could consider socially dangerous and, in such a case, impose a penalty based on similar articles of criminal law. This legal analogy, which was explainable under conditions in which the system of criminal legislation had still not been formulated, conflicted with the democratic principles of socialism at a time when such a system already existed. The preservation of this analogy prevented the implementation of one of the most important axioms of a humanistic criminal law: There is neither a crime nor punishment if it is not stipulated in the law. In opposition to another democratic legal axiom, according to which the court alone has the right to pass sentence, an extrajudicial authority was created, the so-called "special conference," under the people's commissar of internal affairs, which actively undertook to deal with the "enemies of the people." Totally conflicting with the democratic foundations of criminal law procedure, the burden of proving one's innocence was that of the accused, thus rejecting the presumption of innocence. The medieval and essentially inquisitory principle according to which the "queen of proof" was the admission of the accused, thus excluding any further investigation, was resurrected. By now we have learned a great deal about the way such admissions were obtained at that time. To ascribe to an admission such an exceptional role could only stimulate the official zeal of the "organs." The testimony of the accused themselves was also assigned a decisive significance in the case of state crimes. A sad indictment of this monstrous doctrine and practice was found in the famous book by Cesare Decaria, the 18th-century Italian humanist, *"On Crimes and Punishments,"* which was essentially a code of human rights in the area of criminal justice, which was published in 1939 in translation, and edited by Professor M.M. Isayev.

All of this sharply clashed not only with the principles of socialist law but also basic universal human values, which had been won in the struggle against tyranny and arbitrariness. The concept formulated by Vyshinskiy and his retinue spread a "legal" gloss on crime and mass repressions, based on abuses of power under the conditions of an autocratic regime.

Under said circumstances the scientists, who were unwilling to justify anti-democratic theory and practice

but were deprived of the possibility to voice their true views, increasingly moved into the area of abstract theorizing. As a whole, the formal-dogmatic interpretation of legal phenomena was established in juridical science. The broad sociological approach to the law, which had been noted in the 1920s, was replaced by a strictly normative approach. The legal system was actually identified with individual laws and legal orders and instructions.

The dogmatic and narrow-normative understanding of the law was based on and supported by a number of circumstances, above all the role which the administrative-pressure system began to play. The illusion was created that an order was omnipotent. All that it took was to promulgate a legal order and proclaim its mandatory nature and, allegedly, the real law would appear. The inflated power-coercive aspect of the law and vulgarizing its links with social and, above all, political relations all led to the formalistic interpretation of the law. In that case it was not economics, the level of development of culture or the principles and values of socialism that were its initial determining foundations but, essentially, the order of the political authorities and administrative instructions. All of this was quite unrelated to the historical-materialistic understanding of legal phenomena as earmarked in the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, which the legal experts of the 1920s had tried to update. The formal-dogmatic approach to the law, regardless of the subjective intentions of the scientists which supported it, was objectively the result of the negative trends of the 1930s and was dominant in the juridical outlook of the bureaucracy.

Formalism in the law was encouraged by other circumstances as well, i.e., the disparity between statements and reality. A Constitution was promulgated, which guaranteed the working people a wide range of rights and freedoms, strengthened the full authority of the soviets, and earmarked a legal foundation for the development of socialist democracy. However, the deformation processes we mentioned, which were taking place in actual political and legal life, could not fit such a democratic constitutional structure. The formalistic approach to the law ignored this contradiction. The law was interpreted only as formulated in the legal texts. Actually, it was used to justify the existing situation. Regrettably, no proper democratic opposition was raised to such formal-dogmatic structures, which were apologetic in their meaning. The thundering public charges against the "enemies of the people" were welcomed, as was then noted in official reports, accounts and minutes, with "laughter in the hall" and tempestuous and sustained applause which "turned into endless ovations and which rolled like waves from one end of the hall to the other."

The formal-dogmatic approach to the law doomed juridical science to isolation and prevented the use of the potential of other sciences in improving juridical theory and practice. They were harmed from all possible viewpoints, the sociological, political and philosophical above all.

From the **sociological** viewpoint, the harm caused by formalistic and narrow-normative jurisprudence was that it was unable to bring to life and explain the actually applied law. The horizon of the dogmatist is limited by the text of an instruction. Paradoxical though it may seem, this concept, focused on the law, in practice leads to its devaluation rather than strengthening. A peculiar fetishism of legal orders developed on the grounds of dogmatic jurisprudence, which was cultivated along with the fetishizing of the laws of social development. The concept of the automatic effect of the laws of socialism dominated. This approach was extended to jurisprudence as well. This eliminated the study of the variety of factors which define the functional law. Practical experience indicated that many of the laws were ineffective while jurisprudence was unwilling to accept this. Furthermore, the sociological approach as well was proclaimed bourgeois, allegedly leading to the corruption of legality. Yet it was precisely under the protection of the formal-dogmatic and narrow-normative interpretation of the law that the mass repressions took place and legality was grossly violated.

In its **philosophical** aspect, the narrow-normative concept of the law does not allow us to interpret it as a superstructural phenomenon with a corresponding base. It hinders the realization of the fact that the law is based on real and existing, economic above all, relations and a given cultural standard of society. A juridical illusion is triggered according to which life is based on legal laws. This approach makes it impossible to conceive of the law as a complex phenomenon with many aspects, as the conflicting unity within variety. For a law is merely a general formulation of typical life situations and human behavior.

In its **political** aspect, the formal-dogmatic approach is directly oriented toward anti-democratic trends. It encourages absolutist claims on the part of the legislator. This approach ignores the many-faceted nature of the law and its interconnection with and determination by social relations, for it is actually considered as the product of the will of the state. What is ignored is the fact that political power itself is based, above all, on material relations and is interrelated with a variety of factors including the natural historical laws of socialism. The more educated and democratic become society and the state, the stronger should their legal foundation become. In this connection one can speak of the "rule of law," i.e., of a socialist state of law and of legal socialism as a whole.

From the strictly normative viewpoint, the rights of the citizen and the individual are considered as automatically deriving from the law, from the standards issued by the powers, i.e., actually as a "gift" of the state. It is precisely this that is consistent with the administrative-command views on political-legal life and its pattern. This is supported by authoritarian-arbitrary thinking and practices. Man with his rights and freedoms is pushed into the background while the foreground is

assumed by the bureaucracy, which tries to substitute its own egotistical interests for the interests of the state. This opens the road to the so-called residual principle in social policy, to technocratic distortions and violations of legislation.

The prevalence of such views created prerequisites for a certain alienation on the part of the toiling masses from the socialist state. The value of Soviet law and its moral potential as a just regulator in implementing the main law of socialism was ignored, which is the comprehensive and harmonious development of man and the increasing satisfaction of his material and spiritual needs. However, the moral qualities of the Soviet people are so high that despite the tragic events of the 1930s they did not lose their faith in the ideals of socialism, which withstood the harsh trials of World War II and, within a short time, rebuilt the dislocated economy and looked at the future with optimism!

### III

After the 20th CPSU Congress a favorable situation developed for Soviet juridical science. It was a question of rejecting the deeply seated authoritarian-dogmatic way of thinking and formulating recommendations for the legal backing of the economic reform and the democratization of the political system. Under those circumstances, the new generation of Soviet researchers turned to the works of the jurists of the 1920s. The initial efforts were made to surmount the narrow-normative and formal-dogmatic interpretation of legal life. A comprehensive and integrative approach to the study of legal phenomena, based on the interaction among the legal science and philosophy, sociology, psychology and other sciences, became gradually noticeable. Problems of the real effect of the law in life and its efficiency, value, functioning of legal mechanisms, in a broad social context, began to be reviewed actively. Encouraging results were achieved in the study of legal awareness, legality and order, as well as improper behavior and its reason and ways of elimination. It gradually became clear that although many scientists continued to emphasize in the definition of the law essentially the individual laws and regulations, actually in their studies they were addressing themselves to overall legal reality. This created prerequisites which made it possible for Soviet jurisprudence to lay the foundations for democratic changes in the realm of juridical practices.

All of this confirmed the increased possibilities of Soviet juridical science. Nonetheless, it was unable to implement the tasks which appeared in the light of the resolutions of the 20th Party Congress. Gradually, the practice returned to the ruts of the administrative-command system. There was a growth of stagnation phenomena which, by the end of the 1970s and beginning of 1980s, led the country to a pre-crisis condition. Under these circumstances legal control became distorted as well. Administrative-command arbitrariness and so-called departmental law-making actually swept

the law under them. The word "legislation" began to be used in a distorted meaning, to indicate also acts which were not laws. This led to the violation of the principles of the supremacy of the law and the devaluations of laws and, above all, the Constitution. Scorn for the law increased. The vicious practice appeared according to which the law is inoperative until it has been so ordered by a department and covered by instructions which frequently distorted its initial meaning. The principle of social justice was violated and the legal scale used in controlling labor and consumption was distorted. This opened wide the way to equalization. Conscientious and high-quality work became gradually depreciated. At the same time, "shady" distribution and "shady" regulation intensified. Deviations from the Constitution and the principles of socialism and scorn for the law created a convenient atmosphere for a variety of abuses, arbitrary actions and even crime. The mechanism of the legal protection of human rights, combining its interests with those of society, proved inefficient. This led to an intensification of the processes of alienation of the working people from the state. Unfortunately, these negative phenomena affected legal science as well. It actually followed the practices of stagnation and turned largely into its defender.

A journal entitled REVOLYUTSIYA PRAVA had been published in the 1920s. The term revolution in the law is relevant to this day. Since time immemorial mankind has tried to make the science of jurisprudence "an art of what is good and just" in sociopolitical intercourse. The universal human value of the law became increasingly manifested with the development of civilization and the principles of humanism. All nations in the world (as reflected in their languages) have linked since ancient times the concepts of law and justice. Soviet juridical science must do everything possible for this connection to become even stronger.

In developing its creative potential and relying on the fundamental achievements of the past, the law has joined the process of perestroika. Jurists actively participate in work aimed at the qualitative renovation of the legal foundations of socialism. In order successfully to advance along this way, our jurisprudence must critically interpret previous experience and take into consideration achievements, errors and occasional bitter lessons.

Above all, we believe, it is necessary to surmount the deeply seated formal-dogmatic and narrow-normative perception of legal reality according to which resolutions which ignore the principles and values of socialism and the requirements governing its development are presented as the actual law. Such a theoretical concept hinders the progress of scientific thinking and creativity, which can advance practical work.

The situation in which our juridical science found itself was precisely related to the formal-dogmatic interpretation of the law. Essentially, it performed two main functions: to comment on the promulgated laws and to

defend the administrative-command system which had existed for many long years, and the authoritarian thinking on which it was based. No serious criticism and, therefore, no perestroyka is possible within the framework of such defense.

Furthermore, democracy is a political form consistent with normal socialist economic relations. This also presumes democratic legal forms of social relations. One of the most important among them is the juridical structure of contracts, based on the free manifestation of the will of equal participants, which is of both economic and political significance. Let us emphasize, in this connection, that the socialist state of law is impossible without a socialist legal economy.

History proved that without a good theory and without the participation of jurists in the law-making process, practice risks to follow the wrong way. Therefore, no single legal act should be adopted and implemented without a profound scientific expert evaluation and extensive discussion.

Finally, the most important historical lesson, in the light of the strengthening of democratization, is that the dynamic development of society, as was also the case in the 1920s, is possible only under the conditions of socialist pluralism and free exchange of opinions and views in science and politics. In the 1930s to the 1950s juridical science proved its inability efficiently to oppose authoritarian and dogmatic thinking and practice. To a certain extent this was also due to the lack of strong democratic traditions in our society. The revolutionary changes which are taking place today in the country, and which have encompassed the legal system and juridical science, demand the intensification of democratic processes and the development in scientific circles of a democratic standard and an active life stance.

Based on the ideals of humane socialism and universal human values, today Soviet juridical science is called upon to formulate a new, a democratic legal thinking as a structural component of a socialist culture focused on man and his rights and interests. The rights of the Soviet person to democracy must be secured with firm juridical and organizational guarantees. Today there is no alternative to this.

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### Seventy Years of Struggle

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[Article by N. Maslennikov]

[Text] Seventy years have passed since the founding of the German Communist Party. This event, which became a starting point in the subsequent development of the revolutionary German labor movement, was the

topic of the anniversary 11th/12th issue of EINHEIT, the journal of the SED Central Committee, which is dedicated to the theory and practice of scientific socialism.

E. Honecker, chairman of the GDR State Council, and general secretary of the SED Central Committee, emphasized in the preface that a Marxist well-organized proletarian vanguard was restored in the flames of the German November Revolution, under the influence of the victorious Red October, by K. Liebknecht, and R. Luxemburg, a vanguard which was able to lead the working class and the other toiling strata in the struggle against imperialism, militarism and war and for socialism and peace.

The GCP formulated a clear revolutionary program based on the ideas of Marx and Engels and consistent with the historical mission of the working class. Under the leadership of E. Thalmann, it became a mass Marxist-Leninist party which covered a heroic and glorious path. The main landmarks along it are listed in the "Theses of the SED Central Committee On the Occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the German Communist Party," which were adopted at the 6th SED Central Committee Plenum. "We proceed from the fact," E. Honecker writes, "that history provides the present and the future with priceless knowledge. We accept historical facts as they are, without excluding or embellishing anything. It is only with this kind of approach that one can fully understand reasons, interconnections and dialectical contradictions and it is only thus that we can determine the true significance of historical results."

It was precisely the GCP that provided on German soil the most decisive opposition to Hitlerite fascism, rallying for joint action all opponents of the "brown plague." It suffered immeasurable casualties for the sake of the liberation of the German people and for a just cause, which was crowned by the victory of the Soviet Union and the other members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition in May 1945.

The fact that a historical opportunity was used is to the credit, above all, of the communists, who were the first to call for the rebirth of the country. Emerging from the underground, jails and concentration camps and returning from exile, together with the social democrats, trade union activities and other antifascists, they rebuilt the material and spiritual wreckage left by fascism and World War II.

The GCP Central Committee appeal of 11 June 1945, the essential content of which was manifested also in the resolutions passed several days later by the German Social Democratic Party Central Committee, earmarked a clear program. Taking into consideration national conditions and acquired experience, this program directed the masses toward antifascist democratic changes.

The very fact that the German Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany rallied within the German Socialist Unity Party in 1946 meant that the most important lesson of the past had been learned. A united Marxist-Leninist party, related to the masses, arose on a revolutionary basis. It was a party needed by the working class which had been called upon to assume a leading role in the struggle for socialism and peace.

The founding of the German Democratic Republic on 7 October 1949 marked a turning point in the history of the German people and Europe. The German communists had always dreamed and struggled for a state in which the people themselves would determine their own fate.

"Linked with permanent ties of friendship with the Soviet Union, and as a firm structural component of the socialist community of countries, the German Democratic Republic is developing in all areas stably and dynamically. Our party," E. Honecker points out, "has a clear concept of socialism which is being successfully built in our country and which is consistent with modern requirements. In close unity with the friendly parties, the SED is implementing, within the framework of the National Front, a policy of alliances aimed at the future.

"In this case we must constantly seek answers to new questions raised by life. To do everything for the good of the people is the meaning of our unified economic and social policy and of our active contribution to the solution of the most important problems of our time and to ensuring a lasting peace for all mankind."

Eight of the articles on this anniversary issue are written by members of the SED Central Committee Politburo. They include essential concepts pertaining to the historical gains of several generations of German communists in the course of building socialism in the GDR and the tasks of the contemporary stage in perfecting socialism.

In explaining the dialectics of patriotism and internationalism today, G. Axen emphasizes that their indivisible unity is a manifestation of a characteristic feature of the policies pursued by the party of the working class, steadily implemented by the GCP throughout all the stages of its history. Thus, it systematically opposed the Versailles Treaty, the occupation of the Ruhr, unemployment, and the decisions of bourgeois governments aimed at the remilitarization of Germany; it defended proletarian internationalism in the struggle against chauvinist demagoguery, nationalism and anti-Sovietism. "Hands off of Soviet Russia!" was a slogan which defined the party's activities in the defense of the October Revolution in 1920. The GCP firmly supported the establishment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the "Rapallo Policy" and "Russian orders" which took Germany out of international isolation and provided bread and wages to hundreds of thousands of working people. The attitude toward the October Revolution and the building of socialism in the USSR was not merely a

measure of proletarian internationalism and solidarity. "It was also an answer to the question of who is in what camp when it comes to problems of German policy, the camp of the revolution or the camp of the counterrevolution," E. Thalmann pointed out. The unity between patriotism and internationalism was vividly manifested in the documents of the Brussels (1935) and Bern (1939) GCP Conferences, and in the heroic antifascist struggle waged by the German communists. Hundreds of thousands of men gave their lives for these ideals.

The founding and development of the two German states reformulated the question of patriotic thinking and patriotic action. Their main content were the establishment and strengthening the power of workers and peasants and the building of a socialist society.

The article by E. Nuckenburger discusses the problem of the class nature of patriotism. Based on personal recollections, the author traces the process which led, in 1946, to the merger of the GCP with the German Social Democratic Party within the German Socialist Unity Party. The unity within the labor movement, based on a revolutionary platform, which was achieved at that time, the author writes, was a prerequisite for strengthening the power of workers and peasants and the successful development of the GDR.

Thanks to this unification, the author writes, it was no longer necessary to waste energy in fighting each other. On the contrary, prerequisites developed for directing such energy to rebuilding the homeland, establishing an antifascist democratic order and building socialism.

One of the most important prerequisites for upsurge in all areas of social life in the republic and its transformation into a political stable and economically dynamic socialist state include the establishment and constant strengthening of the alliance among all classes and strata of working people under the leadership of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party. This is the topic of the article by J. Hermann. The author writes that the principles governing the policy of alliances pursued by the SED stem from the traditions of the struggle waged by the GCP against reaction and militarism and for the unification of all patriotic forces of the nation within the anti-Hitlerite front. The experience which was gained became the starting point for the joint participation of all progressive and democratic forces of the people in the socialist reorganizations which took place during the first postwar years.

The GCP proceeded from the fact that, as a result of its industrial development, Germany had a greatly differentiated social structure which, in addition to a strong working class and a significant peasantry, was characterized by a big although heterogeneous intellectual stratum, a substantial share of urban middle classes and a large number of small and medium entrepreneurs. Although persistently calling for the expropriation of the

property of the monopoly bourgeoisie, the big landowners and the Nazi and war criminals, the party opposed the expropriation of the property of other classes, strata and groups. The task was for democratic changes to ensure a guaranteed future for all.

At the present time, J. Hermann goes on to say, improvements in the class and social structure of the GDR are based, above all, on qualitative rather than quantitative factors. A consideration of the commonality of classes and strata and incentive and productive application of specific social interests and features have become the key problems of the policy of alliances. Today parties which are friendly with the SED realize much more than in previous decades their responsibility for the state of affairs in society. Their own political features are becoming clearer as well. The allied parties are making noticeable efforts to implement economic strategy, develop socialist production relations, intensify the statesman-like awareness of their members and promote the further development of socialist democracy. The close cooperation among allied parties is taking place on all levels of the GDR political system and has a guaranteed long-term future.

The main topic of the article by E. Krentz is the development and progress of the socialist German state based on law, the essence of which is the fact that laws adopted democratically are mandatory for all and that in its activities the state obeys the laws it has promulgated itself along with other legal prescriptions. Furthermore, the state authorities, like the combines, enterprises and organizations, must ensure through active efforts the exercise of the rights and the interests of the people, protected by the law. This is related to the requirement of steadily expanding and intensifying legal knowledge among the personnel of state agencies.

Other features of the socialist state of law are developed legislation, which covers all basic areas of social activities, the guaranteed equality of the citizens in the eyes of the law, the inviolability of the rights of citizens, the independence of trial judges, the presumption of innocence, the right to legal defense, and so on. Statehood based on law is manifested also in the fact that in the GDR any decision made by a court on the petition of an affected citizen must be reviewed by a superior court.

Finally, the nature of a state based on law is determined by the extensive representation of the working people in the legal institutions. In describing the qualitatively new requirements concerning socialist rule by the state, the author draws the conclusion that the role of the creative organizing and structure-determining functions of the state has increased. This applies, above all, to strengthening relations of trust among all classes and strata and guiding the unified activities of all social forces and their coordination. Naturally, this includes taking into consideration the specific interests of the individual classes, groups and private citizens, the needs of enterprises and territories, and ensuring the priority of the social interests.

Several articles in this issue deal with the main problems of socioeconomic development of the GDR. Thus, H. Mittag, in discussing the conditions and main factors for the fullest possible achievement of a unified economic and social policy, points out the special role played by the introduction in the national economy of new progressive technologies, improving socialist production relations and intensifying socialist democracy at work.

The organic combination of the scientific and technical revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system, the author emphasizes, is one of the fundamental programmatic stipulations of the SED. Modern technologies are the key to substantially upgrading labor productivity and greater savings in the entire national economy. In this case the leading role is played by microelectronics, to the development of which the GDR relates the preservation and strengthening of the country's international positions.

The author discusses extensively the problem of the interaction between production forces and production relations. "In accordance with the time-tested party practice," G. Mittag writes, "we are guided by the fact that specific forms of socialist production relations are in no way static...." The further development of the system of national economic management and planning should, according to the author, be based on the following principles: reliable state control of basic economic processes, central state management and planning, which guarantee that everywhere labor is directed toward the common objective and that the interests of the entire society are expressed in the 5-year plans and the annual national economic and budget planning; central management and planning, combined with increased efficiency of the creative activeness of the working people and the independent and responsible activities of combines, enterprises, cooperatives and local governmental authorities; socialist competition, extensive discussion of the formulation of plans, use of tested methods for organizing the economics of the socialist enterprise and a thorough comparison of results of economic activities, as inseparable parts of such cooperation; and the fact that the combines are the nucleus of the socialist planned economy of the GDR.

One of the main tasks facing the GDR national economy, the author writes, is to upgrade the economic responsibility of combines and enterprises on the basis of cost accounting and the planned use of value categories, such as prices, profits, costs, money and interest rates. The plan with cost accounting, and the plan with self-support must be considered in this case as one.

The article by H. Klaiber discusses socialist economic integration and the specific participation of the GDR in the implementation of the comprehensive program for scientific and technical progress of CEMA members until the year 2000. The author points out that the GDR is engaged in research and development on 700 specific topics. These assignments account for 50 percent of state

expenditures on science and technology and most of the funds of the combines. As a result, in 2 and a half years 230 new items and technologies have been applied in industry. During that time more than 2,000 licenses have been sold to CEMA countries.

The author notes that intensifying interaction within CEMA is an objective requirement in order to improve socialism in the GDR. According to him, reaching the highest standard in scientific and technical cooperation among CEMA countries formulates new requirements toward the national economy and the economic policy of the socialist German state.

The article emphasizes that the current stage sets new tasks to the combines and enterprises in the GDR in working for the Soviet market. The key to success in this case is high scientific and technical standards, excellent quality, reliable availability of spare parts and adequate follow-up servicing.

The author writes that the GDR, which ascribes great significance to the further improvement of the mechanism of socialist integration, intends actively to participate in developing ways for the future establishment of a joint CEMA market. This problem will be solved in several stages within which the essential problems of its functioning should be theoretically and practically clarified. A joint market, the author believes, should be consistent with specific requirements under the conditions of socialist production relations. The possibility of its establishment also presumes the thorough study of related social aspects, taking into consideration the specific conditions of the CEMA members.

One of the outstanding manifestations of the unity of the SED economic and social policy is the systematic implementation of the housing program. In his article, W. Ederlein, says that the party's course charted toward solving the housing problem by 1990 as a social problem is an example of the preservation and multiplication of the revolutionary traditions and objectives of the German labor movement. The SED believes that housing should not be a matter of monetary accumulations. As one of the basic requirements of human life, it must be guaranteed to every citizen, regardless of social status.

The topic of G. Koessler's article is the reliable protection of the gains of the socialist German state. The historical mission of the working class, the author emphasizes, is not only to eliminate exploitation but also to exclude the possibility of the destruction of man by man. In making public the content of the military doctrine of the members of the Warsaw Pact, which was adopted in Berlin in May 1987, the author notes that the military doctrine of the GDR fully coincides with the line taken by the allied countries in the area of military policy and strategy, as defined in the Berlin document.

The article emphasizes that the successful defense of the peaceful building of socialism, today and in the future, means maintaining the country's defense capability on the proper level, with a parallel readiness to engage in respective bilateral reductions under the conditions of equal and reciprocal security.

Two other parties of the German communists—the German Communist Party and the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin—are, along with the SED, the heirs to the great military traditions of the GCP. The important current period in the life of the West German communists is the topic of the article by H. Mies, GCP president. The author describes the new programmatic document "FRG-2000," which was offered for discussion at the 9th GCP Congress. In particular, the document calls for the further development of the party's positions in the struggle for peace and in solving the ecological problem. The question of the significance of reforms at the present stage has been reformulated. The party was the first to submit a general concept for change, all the elements of which are interrelated and supplement each other.

The article by H. Schmitt, chairman of the West Berlin Social Unity Party, discusses the basic tasks of the party under contemporary conditions: first comes the need to increase the contribution made by West Berlin to improving the international situation and securing peace in Europe; to promote or stimulate related initiatives; to wage a decisive struggle for full employment and against the loss of social and democratic rights of the working people; use of scientific and technical progress in their interest and for their benefit; to pay particular attention to developing a class awareness among hired labor; to contribute to ensuring the guaranteed future of West Berlin in a rapidly changing world, which is largely determined by the development of relations with the socialist countries.

Other articles in the issue deal with the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution on the contemporary world, various aspects of the socioeconomic policy of the SED, its international relations, the foreign policy course of the GDR, the activities of women in a number of free German trade unions, and the activities of the Pioneer Organization of the Young Thalmannists. Great attention is paid to the history of the revolutionary German labor movement and the German November Revolution. The recollections of Wilhelm Pieck on the founding of the German Communist Party and of Hugo Eberlein on the constituent congress of the Comintern and documents on the November Revolution are published.

Quite clearly, the content of the anniversary issue of the journal EINHEIT proves that the great 70-year path covered by many generations of German communists, which was crowned by the founding and successful development of the socialist GDR, is the heroic and most significant chapter in the history of the revolutionary German labor movement.



The SED, the German Communist Party and the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin, having adopted a great revolutionary and international traditions of the GCP, the party of K. Liebknecht, R. Luxemburg, and E. Thalmann, are continuing and enriching them under the new circumstances.

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**Cambodia: Course of National Reconciliation**  
*18020008m Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 89 (signed to press 17 Jan 89) pp 120-126*

[Article by Yevgeniy Vasilyevich Kobelev, candidate of historical sciences, deputy chairman of the central board of the Soviet-Cambodian Friendship Society]

[Text] On 7 January, together with its friends throughout the world, the Cambodian people celebrated a noteworthy historical date: the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Cambodian People's Republic.

Ten years is not a very long time for a state, the more so if it began its development virtually from scratch. The Pol Pot-Yeng Sari Regime, which was overthrown in January 1979, destroyed in the course of its barbaric rule the country's social structure virtually to its foundations, deprived the people of normal living conditions and threw Cambodia back by several decades in its economic and cultural development. The material and spiritual consequences of the rule of the Pol Pot Regime and its policy of genocide are still being felt.

Anyone who walked the streets of the ancient Pnom-Penh during the hot spring days of 1979, a city which the Pol Pot people had turned into a stone desert, would have seen, with pain in his heart, machines in factories covered by cobwebs, warped hospital equipment, libraries turned into hog pens, and house windows staring like hollow eye sockets, would mentally ask himself whether the necessary force would be found to revive this tortured city, this entire suffering country. Today, when the republic is summing up the results of its 10 years of development, one can confidently say that despite the many problems and difficulties which still exist, the main thing has nonetheless been achieved: there has been a rebirth.

The economy was the first to be brought out of its state of dislocation and chaos. Starting with 1983, self-sufficiency in the main food crop—rice—was essentially achieved. The production of raw rubber, which is exported, is increasing; most of the industrial enterprises have been restarted. Two million Cambodian children are attending school and hundreds of thousands of adults are attending literacy courses. The system of higher and specialized training was restored and medical services are being organized.

The new governmental-political system was totally established and is successfully functioning after the universal elections for the national assembly were held in 1981. At its first session, the national assembly set up the supreme state authorities and adopted the Constitution of the Cambodian people's republic.

The authority of the Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party—the leading force of society—is increasing. Whereas by the time the country was liberated from the Pol Pot regime the surviving party members did not exceed a hundred, today the party numbers more than 20,000 members. It relies on its activities on the mass public organizations, which rally hundreds of thousands of people, in the Unified Front for the National Building and Defense of Cambodia, the Alliance of People's Revolutionary Youth, the trade unions, the women's associations and the Buddhists. This is a powerful force which supports the policy of the party and the government. Energetic steps are being taken to strengthen the stability and security of the republic. Its armed forces are being strengthened and their combat capability is improving.

The PRK is an active participant in international life. It pursues a consistent peaceful course and develops relations of friendship and solidarity with the socialist countries, the countries which have gained their national independence and the national liberation movements. Together with Vietnam and Laos, it makes efforts to improve the political climate in Southeast Asia and make the area a zone of peace, stability, good neighborly relations and cooperation.

The republic's leadership is leading the country, step-by-step and on a democratic basis, on the path of national renaissance. It is building an independent, neutral, nonaligned and prosperous Cambodia. However, we must admit that despite the steady trend toward the stabilization of the situation, economic upsurge and the development process are largely held back by the armed operations of opposition groups relying on foreign support. The PRK has lived these entire 10 years in the abnormal condition of "half-peace-half-war."

The largest and best armed is the "Khmer Rouge," which numbers 30,000 to 40,000 men. It consists of elements of the defeated army of the Pol Pot Regime, under the leadership of its officials who escaped to Thailand, where they established camps, depots and bases. The Khmer Rouge receive extensive foreign aid in arms and money.

The best known personalities in the Khmer Rouge leadership are former Prime Minister Pol Pot, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yeng Sari, Defense Minister Son Sann, and Khieu Samphan, chairman of the state presidium. After a special trial, which was held in the PRK in August 1979, which sentenced to death in absentia Pol Pot and Yeng Sari for the crime of genocide and for their crimes against the world public, Khieu Samphan, who had not been named in court as one of the direct culprits

for the genocide, emerged on to the forefront. However, as informed observers of the area assert, the real power in the group to this day is in the hands of Pol Pot, who is keeping to the background, and to five or six of his closest accomplices. The Pol Pot people provide political guidance to the Khmer Rouge through the still functioning sinister Angku which was officially disbanded in December 1981 but which, essentially, remains in operation.

The second largest group (from 12,000 to 15,000 people) but which, judging by all available information, is first in terms of political power, is headed by Prince Norodom Sihanuk. This name has been familiar for nearly 5 decades. Sihanuk was king between 1941 and 1955, after which he became head of the Cambodian state. In the 1950s and 1960s he pursued a policy of neutrality and established relations of cooperation with the socialist countries. He participated in the Bandung Conference in 1955 and in the first conference of the Nonaligned Movement, in Belgrade, in 1961.

After Sihanuk was overthrown by the military, in March 1970, he headed a patriotic front and government in exile. After the victory he returned to the homeland but soon afterwards the Pol Pot people put him under house arrest. During the frenzied Pol Pot terror his five children and 15 grandchildren perished. In January 1979, on the eve of the fall of the Pol Pot regime, he was taken out of the country and, subsequently, joined in the struggle against the PRK. Currently Sihanuk is the top leader of the Khmer Opposition, enjoying some support in the international arena, above all from Western countries and ASEAN.

The 67-year old Sihanuk considers himself the "father of the Cambodian nation" and, according to people who have been in touch with him in recent years, believes that the meaning of his life is to be able to return to his homeland and once again earn the recognition of the people and be remembered in the country's history.

The smallest group (5,000 men) is headed by 77-year old Son Sann, who was Cambodian prime minister in the 1960s.

Naturally, the scale of activities of the opposition forces in Cambodia cannot be compared to the events in Afghanistan. However, its adverse effect on the country's life does not make it any lesser. It is difficult to live and progress normally under conditions of constant tension and uncertainty concerning the future. The Cambodian people continue to suffer. They are tired of the bloodletting which has lasted on this land for slightly less than 20 years.

Taking all of these factors into consideration, and guided by good will and the supreme interests of the nation, the PRK government submitted two programmatic statements in October 1987. It proclaimed a course of just political settlement of the Cambodian problem on the basis of national reconciliation.

This major political act was assisted by the radical changes for the better which had taken place in the world arena. Thanks to the general warming up of the international climate and the influence of the concept of new political thinking, formulated by the Soviet Union, the interest of the global community in regional conflicts substantially, including Cambodia's. The parties involved in this conflict increasingly realized the need to settle it on the basis of a direct talks among opposing Cambodian forces. Under those circumstances, the program of national reconciliation which was proclaimed by the PRK government, was welcomed with approval by the world public, as opening the way to easing the intensified conflict situation in and around Cambodia.

We must point out that long before the policy of national reconciliation had been proclaimed, the leadership of the PRK had done a great deal to ensure the maximally possible broadening of the social base of the people's regime and the creation of prerequisites which would give the Cambodian internal system a multipolar nature in politics and a mixed economy. Thus, in 1984 the All-Cambodian Conference of Cambodia's People's Revolutionary Party passed a special resolution on encouraging private enterprise in the economy and the Council of Ministers issued a directive on pursuing a humane policy toward individuals who were no longer fighting against the people's regime.

In correcting the policy of "rushing ahead," which had been inherent in the party's previous activities, its 5th Congress (October 1985) drew the basic conclusion that Cambodia had reached the stage of a people's democratic revolution, for which reason efforts toward an immediate "conversion to the building of socialism" were premature. Under Cambodian conditions, the congress pointed out, decades will have to pass before the people's democratic revolution could develop into a socialist revolution, for it was necessary to begin with a national revival, rebuilding the economy, eliminating the consequences of the regime of genocide and the creation of prerequisites and conditions for a gradual conversion to socialism.

These important theoretical conclusions and practical steps were subsequently expanded and developed. Active harnessing of domestic capital was undertaken. Mixed private-state enterprises were organized. The port city of Kompong Som and the maritime Kas Kong Province were proclaimed open to foreign investments. A major shift occurred in the views of the Khmer emigres living in France and the United States. Some of them began to trust the PRK and visits by emigres to Pnom Penh became more frequent (thus, the former Cambodian prime minister In Tam attended the 7 January ceremonies in Pnom Penh). Some of them, who owned capital, began to invest their money in the building of hotels and other projects in the country. All of these changes contributed to substantial improvements in the political climate in the country and to the revival of its economy.

The positive moves in the Cambodian situation, and the policy of national reconciliation proclaimed by the PRK government, as well as political realism displayed under these circumstances by Sihanuk who, starting with December 1987, began regularly to meet with Hun Sen, the head of the government, cleared the way for a direct dialogue between the opposite sides. The great powers and other countries, the members of ASEAN above all, actively joined in the effort to achieve a settlement. Currently talks on this problem are following four main trends:

1. Talks between Hun Sen, the head of the PRK government, and Sihanuk, in France. Three meetings have already been held, in the last of which Son Sann took part. An important result of these talks is the agreement reached on the general principles for solving the conflict: by the Cambodian sides themselves, on the basis of talks; future Cambodia must be an independent, neutral, non-aligned country; international settlement guarantees will have to be provided.

2. The Jakarta Mechanism. In July 1988, on the initiative of Indonesia and Vietnam, the first informal meeting among the heads of the four opposing Cambodian sides took place in Bogor, a Jakarta suburb, involving the participation of Vietnam, Laos and the six ASEAN members, at which essentially international aspects of the Cambodian problem were discussed. The main result of the meeting is that its participants, with the exception of Khieu Samphan, agreed on the fact that the two interrelated key problems for a settlement are the total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the creation of conditions which would exclude a repetition of the policies and practices of the Pol Pot regime of genocide (the "Jakarta linkage").

3. The nonalignment initiative. The chairmen of the Nonaligned Movement of the past few years—Cuba, India and Zimbabwe—offered to the four Cambodian sides their mediation services in organizing meetings among their representatives and bringing closer their views in the search for a settlement acceptable to all sides. In 1988 two such work meetings were held, in Harare and New Delhi. By decision of the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Nonaligned Countries (Nicosia, September 1988) a Committee of the Movement for Nonalignment for Cambodia was created, with the task of assisting in settling the Cambodian question.

4. The direct contact on this matter by the great powers and countries involved in this conflict, which are becoming systematic, are developing as an increasingly important trend in the search for a political solution to the Cambodian problem. Particularly noteworthy among them are dialogues on various aspects of a Cambodian settlement, currently under way between the USSR and the PRC, the United States, France and Thailand; and between Vietnam and Indonesia and Thailand.

Until recently, one very important link—a dialogue between Vietnam and China—was absent in this variety of talks. The leadership of the SRV had repeatedly proclaimed its readiness to hold talks with China "any time and anywhere." The USSR supports this constructive position. As M.S. Gorbachev pointed out in his talk with Qian Qichen, PRC foreign affairs minister, the dialogue between China and Vietnam could play an important role in bringing the solution of the Cambodian problem to its final stage. Let us hope that the Sino-Vietnamese meeting, which was held last January in Beijing, will mark the beginning of this dialogue.

In the course of meetings with the leaders of the opposition, the head of the PRK government offered an expanded compromise settlement program which he steadily concretizes and develops. The program calls for the creation of a national reconciliation council, headed by Sihanuk, which would prepare the country for general elections and write a draft constitution; the holding of elections for a national assembly 3 months after the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces under international control; the adoption of a new constitution and the establishment of a national reconciliation government; the creation of an international commission to monitor the implementation of agreements; the convening of an international conference with a view to guaranteeing for Cambodia the status of an independent, neutral and nonaligned state.

Therefore, a major "psychological breakthrough" has been made in the efforts to solve the Cambodian problem. After many years of confrontation the opposing sides have finally set down to talk. This makes anyone sincerely interested in the fastest possible settling of the conflict situation in Southeast Asia, which appeared in connection with the events in Cambodia and around it, optimistic.

How soon can a political solution be reached for the Cambodian problem and what will its parameters be? Four possible scenarios for a Cambodian settlement were studied at the International Conference of Scientists and Political Experts On Problems of Indochina, attended by the author of this article, which was held in Brisbane (Australia) in 1988: 1. A coalition between the PRK and the Sihanuk group; 2. A coalition between the PRK and the Khmer Rouge; 3. A quadripartite or multilateral coalition; 4. The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia between the end of 1989 and start of 1990 without any agreement having been reached among the Cambodian sides.

Relatively little attention was paid to the fourth scenario, for the firm conviction was expressed that, after the total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, the PRK will be able to ensure its own defense. To begin with, one of the greatest irritants, i.e., the presence of Vietnamese forces, which allows hostile outside forces to encourage the struggle against the PRK and to pursue a policy of isolating it,

will disappear. Second, "the PRK is much stronger and much more confident in its own strength than was presumed in many assessments of the situation."

As to the first scenario, the possibility of a Cambodian settlement on the basis of forming a bilateral coalition between representatives of the PRK and supporters of the Sihanuk group, was expressed by Sihanuk himself during his second meeting with Hun Sen. If the Khmer Rouge continues to sabotage the dialogue among Khmers, this possibility could fully become a reality.

Views differed on the subject of the second scenario. Some considered it unattainable because of the extreme irreconcilability of the views of the Cambodian Peoples Revolutionary Party and the Khmer Rouge. Conversely, other participants in the conference supported it as a possible option, if China and Vietnam were to normalize their relations and jointly help to organize the cooperation between the party and the Khmer Rouge, naturally without Pol Pot and his close accomplices.

The third scenario was considered the most desirable. It was pointed out, nonetheless, that all indications are that it is the most difficult, for it could be implemented only as a result of lengthy and many-faceted talks, reciprocal concessions and a political compromise among extremely different Cambodian groups and foreign forces supporting them.

In connection with the "Jakarta linkage," the world press is currently extensively discussing a variety of possible steps with a view to its practical implementation, and for counteracting the efforts of the Pol Pot group to torpedo the settlement. Those who either oppose the "linkage" or excessively emphasize its first part, i.e., the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, must reasonably answer the following question: What are the guarantees that the Pol Pot forces, which retain a strong military organization, would not organize in Cambodia a blood bath after the departure of the Vietnamese forces?

As the discussion which took place last year at the UN General Assembly indicates, the virtually unanimous opinion is that no Cambodian settlement can include Pol Pot and other direct culprits of the genocide.

It is worth recalling briefly the specific crimes we are talking about. Although the precise number of victims of Pol Pot terror can apparently not be determined, we can rely on the results of the work conducted by the Commission On the Study of the Atrocities of the Pol Pot Regime, which were published in Pnom Penh in 1983. Its report, submitted to the National Assembly of the PRK, includes the following figures: between 1975 and 1978 2,746,105 people died, 586,663 disappeared, 141,848 were disabled and 200,000 children were orphaned.

The Pol Pot people hit with particular savagery the most educated segment of the population. They destroyed about 80 percent of the administrative and engineering and technical personnel, specialists in economics, health care, and education, and members of the creative intelligentsia. Of 725 professors and docents at institutes 50 remained alive; 54 of 487 physicians, 85 of 1,000 Khmers educated abroad, 450 out of 11,000 students, and 121 actors out of 1,241 survived.

The Pol Pot regime destroyed entire religious groups of the population; thousands of Buddhist monks and members of the Islamic clergy were killed and the Christian community was wiped out. All of these monstrous crimes were committed by Pol Pot and his assistants under the banner of socialism, in the name of the communist party. This circumstance is used in the Western countries for propaganda purposes in defaming the ideals of socialism by equating it with Pol Pot's criminal activities. The communists firmly reject the provocative efforts to identify "Pol Potism" with socialism. Pol Pot built a barracks society in Cambodia, without cities, industry, money, institutes, schools, hospitals, movie theaters and television, a kind of social system in the spirit of a primitive barbarism of the 20th century. What kind of socialism could this possibly be?

The Cambodians accuse Pol Pot also of the fact that with his crimes he brought shame on the Cambodian nation, a nation with an ancient culture which has long been known for its optimism, peaceful nature and Buddhist mentality. "Pol Potism" triggers in present-day Cambodia a feeling of profound hatred and disgust. The PRK population expresses its gratitude to Vietnam, which helped to save it from the regime of genocide. Today, when the question of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops becomes the practical task of the day, the overwhelming majority of Cambodians, the intellectuals in particular, insist on the full withdrawal of Vietnamese forces only if the impossibility of the Pol Pot clique return to power is guaranteed.

As the facts indicate, the Pol Pot people have "forgotten things but leaned a great deal," and are continuing to this day to increase their crimes. Terror and intimidation prevail in the camps of Cambodian refugees in Thailand under Pol Pot control. Secret Pol Pot instructions are imbued with the ideas of revenge and call for the "merciless destruction of the enemies," which include the supporters of Sihanuk and Son Sann. At the same time, the Pol Pot people are trying, if not to wreck, at least maximally to complicate the initiated inter-Khmer dialogue.

In short, the Pol Pot Khmer Rouge leadership is the main and very serious obstacle on the path to the fastest possible political settlement of the situation in and around Cambodia. That is why particularly topical today

is the appeal of the PRK to the global community to efficiently block Pol Pot and his clique and to prevent a repetition of its policy and practice of genocide in Cambodia.

The Soviet Union maintains relations of fraternal friendship and comprehensive cooperation with the PRK. The regular meetings between M.S. Gorbachev and Heng Samrin, and between other Soviet and Cambodian leaders, provide a major impetus for the further strengthening and advancement of Soviet-Cambodian relations. In response to the request of the Cambodian side, the USSR provides the PRK with technical and economic aid in restoring and building agricultural and industrial projects, power plants, hospitals and schools.

The Soviet Union fully supports the policy of national reconciliation proclaimed by the PRK government. Soviet diplomacy is active in the international arena in settling the conflict surrounding the Cambodian problem. It tries efficiently to cooperate in broadening the areas in which the approaches of the various sides involved in the conflict coincide. It uses contacts and exchanges of views with all interested countries. As the Soviet-Indian Summit Declaration, which was adopted on the basis of the talks between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi pointed out, the Soviet Union and India "urgently call upon all interested sides to increase their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Cambodia, which would ensure the peaceful, sovereign, independent and nonaligned status of that country and eliminate the threat of the restoration of the regime of genocide."

Our country intends to pursue unabatedly its efforts in order to bring as soon as possible an end to the conflict in Cambodia, above all in the interests of the entire Cambodian people and the cause of peace and security in Southeast Asia and throughout the world. The new constructive initiative of the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia—that if a political settlement is achieved there will be a full withdrawal of Vietnamese volunteers from Cambodia by no later than September 1989—provides a real opportunity to eliminate the hotbed of the Cambodian conflict this very year, and opportunity which, the Soviet Union believes, must not be lost.

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#### Short Book Reviews

18020008n Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 2, Jan 89 (signed to press 17 Jan 89) pp 127-128

[Text]

V.Zh. Kelle. *Nauka Kak Komponent Sotsialnoy Sistemy* [Science As a Component of the Social System]. Nauka, Moscow, 1988, 200 pp. Reviewed by V. Kerimov, candidate of philosophical sciences.

Today, when the mobilization of the intellectual potential of society becomes one of the main resources for perestroika, the study of science through the lens of

Marxist sociophilosophical theory becomes particularly significant. In this book the link between science and society is considered in two aspects: first, from the viewpoint of the dynamics of analytical thinking from society to science, i.e., from the perspective of sociology. Second, as a movement from science to society, as "learning," and intellectualizing various areas of social life.

The author promotes the idea that it is precisely the social interest as a whole, including the needs of material production that, in the final account, determines scientific progress. At the same time, according to him, we should not fall into vulgar sociology, for the relative autonomy of science is based on a certain inner logic of its development and dependence on various mental data and the active feedback of science to factors which caused it. In this connection, the work under review raises a question which is becoming increasingly important, that of the way cultural traditions determine the nature of science. One could agree with Kelle's basic thesis that there can be no Indian and European science, for instance (see p 24). Let us point out, however, that this question is by no means simple. As early as the 19th century, N.Ya. Danilevskiy tried, on the basis of significant factual data, to prove that British mathematics is as different from German as are the philosophical traditions of the two countries. This theme is quite firmly established in non-Marxist philosophy of culture and deserves more substantive criticism.

The next interesting and arguable problem considered in the book is the place of science within the system of social awareness. The first question which arises here is the following: Is science (including natural science) part of social awareness? The author answers simply that it is. But at that point, the opponents of this view point out, it would be legitimate to speak of bourgeois biology or, for example, of socialist mathematics. This argument seems irrefutable. However, Kelle finds a refined and interesting conclusion to this apparent stalemate.

The logic of his thoughts is as follows: a specific-historical analysis indicates that any form of social awareness could contain scientific ingredients, in addition to ideological components, and has a possibility for the interpenetration between science and ideology, so that assertions such as "the more ideology the less science" cannot be considered, in general, accurate. It is true that there are forms in which the ideological aspect predominates such as, for example, political awareness which is closely and directly related to the class struggle. However, even this "could be both illusory and, to a greater or lesser extent scientific, i.e., rely on scientific data in defining the objective and means of the political struggle and the formulation of its strategy and tactics" (p 61). In other words, there are forms of social consciousness which are maximally ideologized, and others in which a scientific element dominates. The latter include the natural sciences, the analysis of which in terms of class categories would be irrational.

The second part of the work deals with the role of science in contemporary socialist society. The author emphasizes that science has always been a spiritual power for production. However, it is only with the appearance of machine industry that scientific knowledge is materialized in increasingly advanced equipment and technology. Discussions are taking place in our philosophical publications on whether or not science loses by being materialized in production and in forms of knowledge. According to the author, the significance of science in terms of machine production does not end with the process of the materializing of knowledge. The production process constantly needs people with specific scientific knowledge if it is to function and advance. This solution, which dialectically links man as the subject of knowledge to knowledge itself, materialized in labor tools, is fruitful and enables us to identify the "human dimension" in scientific and technical progress.

The need to humanize science is a subject of special consideration in the book. In the author's view, scientific rationality in socialist society is not something hostile to personality in culture but, conversely, a means of developing man and his capabilities and "essential forces." Although science plays an exceptionally important role in contemporary culture, scientific rationality should not be made antagonistic to the other forms of spiritual mastery of reality, such as art, morality, and so on. Conversely, their harmonious combination is, precisely, the essence of socialist humanistic culture. Social progress is promoted not by a romantic movement against science but by the aspiration to humanize it. The powerful intellectual resource of man and his collective mind—science—must be also sensibly human, the author writes, something with which we can only agree.

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#### Chronicle

180200080 Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 2, Jan 89 (signed to press 17 Jan 89) p 128

[Text] A meeting was held between *KOMMUNIST* editors and Jouko Kajanoja, chairman of the Finnish Communist Party (Unity). The topics included problems of ownership, the role of the market in the Soviet economy, distribution relations based on labor and social guarantees, establishment of socialist pluralism and the development of democratic institutions in the USSR.

The topic of a discussion sponsored by the editors of *KOMMUNIST* among economists and historians was "The Dialectics of Economics and Politics in the Lessons of the 'Great Change' of 1929." The discussion covered

a wide range of unstudied problems on the nature of Lenin's theoretical approaches to the building of socialism in the USSR, economic and political practices by the turn of the 1930s, the search within the party of alternatives to the Stalinist course, the lessons from the then implemented option of socioeconomic changes, as applicable to problems of economics and politics at the contemporary stage. The roundtable discussion was attended by the following: V.A. Tikhonov, VASKHNIL academician, O.R. Latsis, doctor of economic sciences, M.Ya. Lemeshev, G.I. Shmelev, V.S. Lelchuk, doctor of historical sciences, D.K. Shelestov, Yu.M. Goland, candidate of economic sciences, M.M. Gorinov, candidate of historical sciences, V.A. Kozlov, and S.Ye. Shcheblygin, historian.

The editors were visited by M.B. Nicholson, special assignments councilor to the British cabinet. The discussion covered problems of perestroika in the USSR, enhancing the role of mass information media in strengthening universal peace and the upward development of Soviet-British relations.

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